Verwandte Artikel zu The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing...
Inhaltsangabe
You're standing at an ATM. It can't access account information but allows unlimited withdrawals. Do you take more than your balance? David Callahan thinks most of us would. While there have always been those who cut corners, he shows that cheating on every level—from the highly publicized corporate scandals to Little League fraud—has risen dramatically in the last two decades. Why all the cheating? Why now?
Callahan pins the blame on the dog-eat-dog economic climate of the past two decades. An unfettered market and unprecedented economic inequality have corroded our values, he argues—and ultimately threaten the level playing field so central to American democracy itself. Through revealing interviews and extensive data, he takes us on a gripping tour of cheating in America and offers a powerful argument for why it matters. Lucidly written, scrupulously argued, The Cheating Culture is an important, original examination of the hidden costs of the boom years.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor
David Callahan is cofounder and director of research at the public policy center Demos. The author of five books, he has published articles in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today, and has been a frequent commentator on CNN, MSNBC, and NPR. He received a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and lives in New York City.
Von der hinteren Coverseite
Updated with a new afterword
Free cable television. Imaginary tax deductions. Movies and music downloadable on your home computer. Do you take your chance to cheat? David Callahan thinks many of us would: witness corporate scandals, doping athletes, plagiarizing journalists. Why all the cheating? Why now?
Callahan blames the dog-eat-dog climate of the past twenty years: An unfettered market and unprecedented economic inequality have corroded our values and threaten to corrupt the equal opportunity we cherish. Callahan's "Winning Class" has created a separate moral reality where it cheats without consequences -- while the "Anxious Class" believes choosing not to cheat could cancel its only shot at success in a winner-take-all world.
Analyzing the very latest scandals, The Cheating Culture takes us on a gripping tour of cheating in America and makes a powerful case for why it matters.
"Everything you ever wanted to know about what's gone wrong with ethics in our society is explained in David Callahan's remarkable and readable new book. For its meticulously researched, thoughtful and damning look at our broken moral compass, this should be required reading . . . This is one of those rare books that will make you mad, ashamed, and one may hope, determined to change."--Philadelphia Inquirer
David Callahan is cofounder of the public policy center Demos, where he is a senior fellow. He is the author of five previous books, and his articles have appeared in many publications, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today. He received a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and lives in New York City. Look for more information about cheating on his Web site, www.cheatingculture.com.
Free cable television. Imaginary tax deductions. Movies and music downloadable on your home computer. Do you take your chance to cheat? David Callahan thinks many of us would: witness corporate scandals, doping athletes, plagiarizing journalists. Why all the cheating? Why now?
Callahan blames the dog-eat-dog climate of the past twenty years: An unfettered market and unprecedented economic inequality have corroded our values and threaten to corrupt the equal opportunity we cherish. Callahan's "Winning Class" has created a separate moral reality where it cheats without consequences -- while the "Anxious Class" believes choosing not to cheat could cancel its only shot at success in a winner-take-all world.
Analyzing the very latest scandals, The Cheating Culture takes us on a gripping tour of cheating in America and makes a powerful case for why it matters.
"Everything you ever wanted to know about what's gone wrong with ethics in our society is explained in David Callahan's remarkable and readable new book. For its meticulously researched, thoughtful and damning look at our broken moral compass, this should be required reading . . . This is one of those rare books that will make you mad, ashamed, and one may hope, determined to change."--Philadelphia Inquirer
David Callahan is cofounder of the public policy center Demos, where he is a senior fellow. He is the author of five previous books, and his articles have appeared in many publications, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today. He received a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University and lives in New York City. Look for more information about cheating on his Web site, www.cheatingculture.com.
Auszug. © Genehmigter Nachdruck. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.
"Everybody Does It"
I PLAYED A LOT OF MONOPOLY GROWING UP. LIKE MOST PLAYERS of the game, I loved drawing a yellow Community Chest card and discovering a "bank error" in my favor-"Collect $200!" It never occurred to me not to take the cash. After all, banks have plenty of money and if one makes an error in your favor, why argue?
I haven't played Monopoly in twenty years, but I'd still take the $200 today. And what if a real bank made an error in my favor? That would be a tougher dilemma.
Such things do happen.
Just to the east of where the Twin Towers once stood is a twenty-six-story office building that houses the Municipal Credit Union of New York City. The credit union has 300,000 members-federal, state, and city government employees-and over $1 billion in assets. Although a number of buildings near Ground Zero sustained serious damage when the towers came down, the MCU's glass-and-steel building on Cortlandt Street survived unscathed. However, the credit union did suffer a major computer failure that severed its link to the New York Cash Exchange (NYCE), the largest network of automatic teller machines in the Northeast.
The network managers at NYCE quickly detected the severed link. The problem meant that while credit union members could withdraw money at cash machines, NYCE couldn't immediately track these transactions or prevent members from overdrawing their accounts. NYCE leaders managed to get through to the credit union staff, even though the organization was in chaos. They posed the following choice: With just a few strokes on a computer keyboard, NYCE could cut off all cash withdrawals until the severed link was restored-which could take several weeks-or NYCE could let the cash keep flowing and sort out the withdrawal records later. Theoretically, anyone with a credit union ATM card could take out as much money as they wanted. The credit union would have to assume that risk. What did it want to do?
The Municipal Credit Union of New York is one of the oldest credit unions in America, founded more than eight decades ago. It is guided by an ethos of self-help and pooled aspirations. Many of its members are firemen and policemen and, in the wake of the attacks, it was widely assumed that some of these people had perished just across the street from the MCU's office. There was no way the credit union would prevent its members and their families from accessing their money at a time of crisis. Thomas Siciliano, the general counsel of the credit union, said later: "We felt it would have hurt them badly and added to the chaos of the city." The MCU trusted them to use their ATM cards responsibly.
Credit union members realized early on that their ATM use wasn't monitored and that there was no limit to how much cash they could take out. As word spread, withdrawals skyrocketed. As many as 4,000 members overdrew their accounts, some by as much as $10,000. One member used his card more than 150 times between late September and mid-October.
In November, the computer link with NYCE was finally restored. As the credit union got back to normal, it pieced together the full record of cash withdrawals after September 11. Those who had overdrawn their accounts had left a substantial electronic trail, and the MCU set about tracking them down. Siciliano led this work. He initially suspected that most of the members' overdrawing had occurred by accident, or maybe was prompted by emergency needs. The MCU assumed the best of its members, even those with average bank balances of less than $100 who had withdrawn thousands of dollars in just a few weeks. "We try to understand people," Siciliano says. "We're not just about the bottom line."
The MCU sent letters to those with overdrawn accounts listing the money that was missing and asking for repayment. While some money was repaid, many letters got no response. More letters were sent-notarized letters with threats. After months of appeals, $15 million was still missing. At that point, the MCU called in the authorities. A criminal investigation, led by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau and the New York City Police Department, extended into the following summer. It resulted in scores of arrests.
A FEW BLOCKS AWAY from the credit union's offices, another investigation was reaching its climax in the spring of 2002, this one at Merrill Lynch's newly repaired global headquarters on Vesey Street. After September 11, Merrill Lynch had scattered 9,000 employees around back-office facilities in New Jersey and midtown. Months passed before it was able to move back downtown. When Merrill did return, morale at the company was low. Huge layoffs had depleted its ranks and profits were down in the new bear market. Worse, Merrill found itself cornered in a criminal probe led by New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.
Before his assault on Wall Street made him famous, Spitzer was an obscure state official. Those who did know him were reminded of a character straight out of early-twentieth-century America. Wealthy by birth, with a father who bankrolled his political career, Spitzer is a muckraking crusader for the public interest.
Merrill Lynch had come to Spitzer's attention in a circuitous fashion. In early 2001, a Queens pediatrician named Debases Kanjilal hired a lawyer to pursue a civil suit against Merrill. Kanjilal was among the legions of investors who got burned when the NASDAQ cratered in 2000. Specifically, he had lost $500,000 on a single Internet stock, InfoSpace. Kanjilal's instinct had been to sell InfoSpace when it was trading at $60 a share. But his broker at Merrill Lynch had urged him to hold on to the stock, advice that reflected Merrill's public research reports that recommended InfoSpace as a "buy" stock. Standing behind those research reports, and affirming their recommendations in his TV appearances, was Merrill's star analyst and "Internet stock guru," Henry Blodget.
It is hard today to appreciate the influence once wielded by Blodget. Just over thirty years old in 2000, Blodget was a Yale grad who had never aspired to stardom on Wall Street. He had tried instead to make it as a writer, and when that didn't work out, his father rescued him from unemployment by helping him land a position at Prudential Securities. Blodget's career was unremarkable until he shot to fame in 1998 with his prediction that Amazon's stock would reach the unthinkable price of $400 a share. When the stock did, in fact, hit that level a month later, Blodget was hailed as an oracle. Shortly thereafter he moved to Merrill Lynch with a $3 million contract. There, he reigned as the single most visible adviser to investors hoping to score big in the Internet gold rush. Blond and affable, with telegenic good looks, Blodget was everywhere with his stock predictions as well as broader prognostications about the new economy.
What Blodget didn't mention to CNBC junkies or Merrill Lynch's own clients was that his role at Merrill went far beyond analyzing stocks. Like other star analysts of the time, he also became deeply involved in Merrill's investment banking business, helping to bring Internet companies-and fat underwriting fees-to Merrill. One of the companies Merrill's investment banking division represented was Go2Net, a company that InfoSpace was in the process of purchasing in 2000. Merrill had a financial interest in InfoSpace's stock price staying high so that the deal would go through.
Debases Kanjilal held on to his InfoSpace stock even as it declined steadily. Finally he sold at $11 a share and took a staggering loss. At the time Kanjilal sold, Merrill and Blodget were continuing to recommend InfoSpace to investors. Kanjilal's losses were part of an estimated $4 trillion that investors lost when NASDAQ crashed. Big-name analysts hyped many sinking tech stocks with the same enthusiasm they'd...
I PLAYED A LOT OF MONOPOLY GROWING UP. LIKE MOST PLAYERS of the game, I loved drawing a yellow Community Chest card and discovering a "bank error" in my favor-"Collect $200!" It never occurred to me not to take the cash. After all, banks have plenty of money and if one makes an error in your favor, why argue?
I haven't played Monopoly in twenty years, but I'd still take the $200 today. And what if a real bank made an error in my favor? That would be a tougher dilemma.
Such things do happen.
Just to the east of where the Twin Towers once stood is a twenty-six-story office building that houses the Municipal Credit Union of New York City. The credit union has 300,000 members-federal, state, and city government employees-and over $1 billion in assets. Although a number of buildings near Ground Zero sustained serious damage when the towers came down, the MCU's glass-and-steel building on Cortlandt Street survived unscathed. However, the credit union did suffer a major computer failure that severed its link to the New York Cash Exchange (NYCE), the largest network of automatic teller machines in the Northeast.
The network managers at NYCE quickly detected the severed link. The problem meant that while credit union members could withdraw money at cash machines, NYCE couldn't immediately track these transactions or prevent members from overdrawing their accounts. NYCE leaders managed to get through to the credit union staff, even though the organization was in chaos. They posed the following choice: With just a few strokes on a computer keyboard, NYCE could cut off all cash withdrawals until the severed link was restored-which could take several weeks-or NYCE could let the cash keep flowing and sort out the withdrawal records later. Theoretically, anyone with a credit union ATM card could take out as much money as they wanted. The credit union would have to assume that risk. What did it want to do?
The Municipal Credit Union of New York is one of the oldest credit unions in America, founded more than eight decades ago. It is guided by an ethos of self-help and pooled aspirations. Many of its members are firemen and policemen and, in the wake of the attacks, it was widely assumed that some of these people had perished just across the street from the MCU's office. There was no way the credit union would prevent its members and their families from accessing their money at a time of crisis. Thomas Siciliano, the general counsel of the credit union, said later: "We felt it would have hurt them badly and added to the chaos of the city." The MCU trusted them to use their ATM cards responsibly.
Credit union members realized early on that their ATM use wasn't monitored and that there was no limit to how much cash they could take out. As word spread, withdrawals skyrocketed. As many as 4,000 members overdrew their accounts, some by as much as $10,000. One member used his card more than 150 times between late September and mid-October.
In November, the computer link with NYCE was finally restored. As the credit union got back to normal, it pieced together the full record of cash withdrawals after September 11. Those who had overdrawn their accounts had left a substantial electronic trail, and the MCU set about tracking them down. Siciliano led this work. He initially suspected that most of the members' overdrawing had occurred by accident, or maybe was prompted by emergency needs. The MCU assumed the best of its members, even those with average bank balances of less than $100 who had withdrawn thousands of dollars in just a few weeks. "We try to understand people," Siciliano says. "We're not just about the bottom line."
The MCU sent letters to those with overdrawn accounts listing the money that was missing and asking for repayment. While some money was repaid, many letters got no response. More letters were sent-notarized letters with threats. After months of appeals, $15 million was still missing. At that point, the MCU called in the authorities. A criminal investigation, led by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau and the New York City Police Department, extended into the following summer. It resulted in scores of arrests.
A FEW BLOCKS AWAY from the credit union's offices, another investigation was reaching its climax in the spring of 2002, this one at Merrill Lynch's newly repaired global headquarters on Vesey Street. After September 11, Merrill Lynch had scattered 9,000 employees around back-office facilities in New Jersey and midtown. Months passed before it was able to move back downtown. When Merrill did return, morale at the company was low. Huge layoffs had depleted its ranks and profits were down in the new bear market. Worse, Merrill found itself cornered in a criminal probe led by New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.
Before his assault on Wall Street made him famous, Spitzer was an obscure state official. Those who did know him were reminded of a character straight out of early-twentieth-century America. Wealthy by birth, with a father who bankrolled his political career, Spitzer is a muckraking crusader for the public interest.
Merrill Lynch had come to Spitzer's attention in a circuitous fashion. In early 2001, a Queens pediatrician named Debases Kanjilal hired a lawyer to pursue a civil suit against Merrill. Kanjilal was among the legions of investors who got burned when the NASDAQ cratered in 2000. Specifically, he had lost $500,000 on a single Internet stock, InfoSpace. Kanjilal's instinct had been to sell InfoSpace when it was trading at $60 a share. But his broker at Merrill Lynch had urged him to hold on to the stock, advice that reflected Merrill's public research reports that recommended InfoSpace as a "buy" stock. Standing behind those research reports, and affirming their recommendations in his TV appearances, was Merrill's star analyst and "Internet stock guru," Henry Blodget.
It is hard today to appreciate the influence once wielded by Blodget. Just over thirty years old in 2000, Blodget was a Yale grad who had never aspired to stardom on Wall Street. He had tried instead to make it as a writer, and when that didn't work out, his father rescued him from unemployment by helping him land a position at Prudential Securities. Blodget's career was unremarkable until he shot to fame in 1998 with his prediction that Amazon's stock would reach the unthinkable price of $400 a share. When the stock did, in fact, hit that level a month later, Blodget was hailed as an oracle. Shortly thereafter he moved to Merrill Lynch with a $3 million contract. There, he reigned as the single most visible adviser to investors hoping to score big in the Internet gold rush. Blond and affable, with telegenic good looks, Blodget was everywhere with his stock predictions as well as broader prognostications about the new economy.
What Blodget didn't mention to CNBC junkies or Merrill Lynch's own clients was that his role at Merrill went far beyond analyzing stocks. Like other star analysts of the time, he also became deeply involved in Merrill's investment banking business, helping to bring Internet companies-and fat underwriting fees-to Merrill. One of the companies Merrill's investment banking division represented was Go2Net, a company that InfoSpace was in the process of purchasing in 2000. Merrill had a financial interest in InfoSpace's stock price staying high so that the deal would go through.
Debases Kanjilal held on to his InfoSpace stock even as it declined steadily. Finally he sold at $11 a share and took a staggering loss. At the time Kanjilal sold, Merrill and Blodget were continuing to recommend InfoSpace to investors. Kanjilal's losses were part of an estimated $4 trillion that investors lost when NASDAQ crashed. Big-name analysts hyped many sinking tech stocks with the same enthusiasm they'd...
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Suchergebnisse für The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing...
Beispielbild für diese ISBN
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: Your Online Bookstore, Houston, TX, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Paperback. Zustand: Good. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 0156030055-3-19286170
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,01
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Beispielbild für diese ISBN
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Cheating on every level--from highly publicized corporate scandals to Little League fraud--has risen dramatically in recent decades. Why all the cheating? Why now? You're standing at an ATM. It can't access account information but allows unlimited withdrawals. Do you take more than your balance? David Callahan thinks most of us would. Callahan pins the blame on the dog-eat-dog economic climate of the past two decades. An unfettered market and unprecedented economic inequality have corroded our values, he argues--and ultimately threaten the level playing field so central to American democracy itself. Through revealing interviews and extensive data, he takes us on a gripping tour of cheating in America and offers a powerful argument for why it matters. Lucidly written, scrupulously argued, The Cheating Culture is an important, original examination of the hidden costs of the boom years. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 00100027231
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,02
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 8 verfügbar
Beispielbild für diese ISBN
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Paperback. Zustand: Good. Cheating on every level--from highly publicized corporate scandals to Little League fraud--has risen dramatically in recent decades. Why all the cheating? Why now? You're standing at an ATM. It can't access account information but allows unlimited withdrawals. Do you take more than your balance? David Callahan thinks most of us would. Callahan pins the blame on the dog-eat-dog economic climate of the past two decades. An unfettered market and unprecedented economic inequality have corroded our values, he argues--and ultimately threaten the level playing field so central to American democracy itself. Through revealing interviews and extensive data, he takes us on a gripping tour of cheating in America and offers a powerful argument for why it matters. Lucidly written, scrupulously argued, The Cheating Culture is an important, original examination of the hidden costs of the boom years. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 00096100114
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,02
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 12 verfügbar
Beispielbild für diese ISBN
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Paperback. Zustand: Fair. Cheating on every level--from highly publicized corporate scandals to Little League fraud--has risen dramatically in recent decades. Why all the cheating? Why now? You're standing at an ATM. It can't access account information but allows unlimited withdrawals. Do you take more than your balance? David Callahan thinks most of us would. Callahan pins the blame on the dog-eat-dog economic climate of the past two decades. An unfettered market and unprecedented economic inequality have corroded our values, he argues--and ultimately threaten the level playing field so central to American democracy itself. Through revealing interviews and extensive data, he takes us on a gripping tour of cheating in America and offers a powerful argument for why it matters. Lucidly written, scrupulously argued, The Cheating Culture is an important, original examination of the hidden costs of the boom years. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 00106952691
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,02
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Foto des Verkäufers
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: Zoom Books East, Glendale Heights, IL, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Zustand: good. Book is in good condition and may include underlining highlighting and minimal wear. The book can also include "From the library of" labels. May not contain miscellaneous items toys, dvds, etc. . We offer 100% money back guarantee and 24 7 customer service. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ZEV.0156030055.G
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,08
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Foto des Verkäufers
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: Greenworld Books, Arlington, TX, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Zustand: very_good. Fast Free Shipping â" Very Good condition book with a firm cover and clean pages. Shows normal use and some light wear or limited notes markings. A solid, nice copy to enjoy. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers GWV.0156030055.VG
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,83
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 3 verfügbar
Foto des Verkäufers
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: Greenworld Books, Arlington, TX, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Zustand: good. Fast Free Shipping â" Good condition. It may show normal signs of use, such as light writing, highlighting, or library markings, but all pages are intact and the book is fully readable. A solid, complete copy that's ready to enjoy. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers GWV.0156030055.G
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,83
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 3 verfügbar
Foto des Verkäufers
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: ZBK Books, Carlstadt, NJ, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Zustand: good. Fast & Free Shipping â" Good condition. It may show normal signs of use, such as light writing, highlighting, or library markings, but all pages are intact and the book is fully readable. A solid, complete copy that's ready to enjoy. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ZWV.0156030055.G
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 4,83
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Beispielbild für diese ISBN
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Verlag:
Mariner Books (edition Reprint), 2004
ISBN 10: 0156030055
ISBN 13: 9780156030052
Gebraucht
Paperback
Anbieter: BooksRun, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Reprint. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 0156030055-11-18
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 5,17
Versand gratis
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Foto des Verkäufers
The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
Anbieter: MERS Goodwill-Kansas City, Blue Springs, MO, USA
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Zustand: good. The book has been read but is in good condition. It has very minimal damage to the cover, including scuff marks, but no holes or tears. The dust jacket for hard covers may not be included. The binding has minimal wear. The majority of pages are undamaged with minimal creasing or tearing, minimal pencil underlining of text, no highlighting of text, and no writing in the margins. There are no missing pages. See the seller's listing for full details and a description of any imperfections. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers WMEKV.0156030055.G
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 1,83
EUR 3,58 Versand
Versand innerhalb von USA
Versand innerhalb von USA
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar