Bringing together powerful new tools from set theory and the philosophy of language, this book proposes a solution to one of the few unresolved paradoxes from antiquity, the Paradox of the Liar. Treating truth as a property of propositions, not sentences, the authors model two distinct conceptions of propositions: one based on the standard notion used by Bertrand Russell, among others, and the other based on J.L. Austin's work on truth. Comparing these two accounts, the authors show that while the Russellian conception of the relation between sentences, propositions, and truth is crucially flawed in limiting cases, the Austinian perspective has fruitful applications to the analysis of semantic paradox. In the course of their study of a language admitting circular reference and containing its own truth predicate, Barwise and Etchemendy also develop a wide range of model-theoretic techniques--based on a new set-theoretic tool, Peter Aczel's theory of hypersets--that open up new avenues in logical and formal semantics.
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Anbieter: avelibro OHG, Dinkelscherben, Deutschland
22 x 14,5 cm. Zustand: Gut. 1. Auflage,. XII, 185 Seiten Innen sehr sauber, sehr leichte Gebrauchspuren. Leineneinband, mit den üblichen Bibliotheks-Markierungen, Stempeln und Einträgen, innen wie außen, siehe Bilder. Ecken und Kanten berieben und bestoßen. DH-25-08A Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 408. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 2052239
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Anbieter: Kisharon Langdon New Chapters, HARROW, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: As New. Sold by the U.K. Charity Kisharon Langdon. Offering Opportunities and Support for People within the Autism and Learning Disability Community. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers EDU/BOX2/CS1/270326
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Anbieter: Ted Kottler, Bookseller, Redondo Beach, CA, USA
Hardcover. Zustand: Fine. Zustand des Schutzumschlags: Fine. 1st Edition. xii, 185 pp. Original cloth. Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. 'Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy propose that the liar sentence (which they interpret as synonymous with the Strengthened Liar) is ambiguous. They base this conclusion on a distinction they make between a 'denial' and a 'negation'. If the liar means 'It is not the case that this statement is true' then it is denying itself. If it means 'This statement is not true' then it is negating itself. They go on to argue, based on their theory of 'situational semantics', that the 'denial liar' can be true without contradiction while the 'negation liar' can be false without contradiction' ('Liar Paradox' entry on Wikipedia). Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 18070
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