In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want - a good reason to believe - and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, and characterizes the latter using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is then applied to philosophical and historical issues. Solutions are provided to the "grue," "ravens," "lottery," and "old-evidence" paradoxes, and to a series of questions including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support; and what counts as a scientific discovery, and what evidence it requires. The historical questions include whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for the existence of molecules; what type of evidence J. J. Thomson offered for the existence of the electron; and whether as is usually supposed-he really discovered the electron. Achinstein proposes answers to all of these, using his theory of evidence. As the premier book in the new series Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science, this volume is essential for philosophers of science and historians of science, as well as for statisticians, scientists with philosophical interests, and anyone curious about scientific reasoning.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Peter Achinstein has written a book for anyone who wonders what has happened to confirmation theory and the interpretation of probability among philosophers of science since the golden age of Hempel, Carnap, and Reichenbach ... This book has a rare combination of analytical clarity and historical sensibility and could only have been written by someone who has been thinking about these issues for several decades ... notable too for providing a lucid account of the main positions onevidence and probability available today that will be accessible to students (and others) not familiar with the territory ... Achinstein's project is richly executed, with many fringe benefits. Isis
What is required for something to be evidence for an hypothesis? The distinguished philosopher of science, Peter Achinstein, introduces here a basic concept of "potential" evidence which is characterized using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is applied to a range of philosophical and historical issues, including the "grue" and "raven" paradoxes; whether explanation or predictions provide more evidential weight; scientific discovery; whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for molecules; and whether J.J. Thomson really discovered the electron.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
EUR 8,76 für den Versand von USA nach Deutschland
Versandziele, Kosten & DauerAnbieter: Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, USA
Zustand: Good. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 52502718-6
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar