A useful textbook providing a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory
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Flavio Menezes joined the University of Queensland as a Chair in Economics after more than a decade at the Australian National University, where he was, amongst other responsibilities, the Foundation Director of the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics. Flavio is also a former part-time Vice President and Senior Consultant with the Regulatory Economics and Public Policy Practice at CRA International in Canberra. Flavio Menezes has published widely in the economics of information and uncertainty. He is regarded as Australasia's leading auction expert.
Paulo Monteiro was Associate Professor at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and then at IMPA (Institute of Pure and Applied Mathematics.) He is presently at the Postgraduate School of Economics of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV-EPGE). Monteiro researches on infinite dimensional general equilibrium theory, mechanism design, and auction theory.
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Softcover. Zustand: gut. 2008. The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. Moreover, auction theory is now seen as an important component of an economist's training. For example, some of the more celebrated results from the single-object auction theory are now usually taught in advanced undergraduate and first-year graduate courses on the economics of information. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results. Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory. Although the book focuses squarely on auctions, it is likely to be helpful in courses dealing with information economics generally. A particular virtue of the book is the tangible, hands-on, approach taken to explaining the revelation principlea very helpful collection of core results and techniques. John Asker Economic Record Synopsis The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. Moreover, auction theory is now seen as an important component of an economist's training. For example, some of the more celebrated results from the single-object auction theory are now usually taught in advanced undergraduate and first-year graduate courses on the economics of information. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results.Coverage includes: the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions. The paperback edition of the text includes a new chapter which acts as a guide to current developments in auction theory. Zum Inhalt: Dem standardmäßigen Anfang mit Independent-Private-Value-Standard-Auktionen folgen andere Informationskonzepte, darunter auch das Affiliated Model sowie die Auflösung der Standardannahmen. Natürlich fehlt auch nicht das obligartorische Mechanism-Design-Kapitel. Ebenfalls bahandelt werden Mehrgüterauktionen. Anders als das sehr theoretische Buch von Krishna(2002), ist das Buch wesentlich anwendungsorientierter. Das liegt wohl auch daran, dass dem Buch eine Vorlesung zu Grunde liegt. Trotz des guten didaktischen Aufbaus, ist es trotzdem eine Menge Arbeit sich in das Thema Auktion einzuarbeiten, was allerdings nicht am Buch, sondern vielmehr am komplexen Thema liegt. Behandelt werden zudem eine Menge Konzepte und Spezialfällen. Benötigt man konkrete Beispiele ist dieses Buch unumschränkt zu empfehlen. Sucht man dagegen ein Nachschlagewerk, bietet sich Krishna an. Autor: Flavio Menezes joined the University of Queensland as a Chair in Economics after more than a decade at the Australian National University, where he was, amongst other responsibilities, the Foundation Director of the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics. Flavio is also a former part-time Vice President and Senior Consultant with the Regulatory Economics and Public Policy Practice at CRA International in Canberra. Flavio Menezes has published widely in the economics of information and uncertainty. He is regarded as Australasia's leading auction expert. Paulo Monteiro was Associate Professor at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and then at IMPA (Institute of Pure and Applied Mathematics.) He is presently at the Postgraduate School of Economics of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV-EPGE). Monteiro researches on infinite dimensional general equilibrium theory, mechanism design, and auction theory. TOC: Introduction ; 2. Preliminaries ; 3. Private Values ; 4. Common Value ; 5. Affiliated Values ; 6. Mechanism Design ; 7. Multiple Objects ; 8. Guide to current developments in auction theory ; A. Probability ; B. Differential Equations ; C. Affiliation ; D. Convexity ; References Zusatzinfo black & white illustrations Verlagsort Oxford Sprache englisch Maße 157 x 232 mm Mathematik Informatik Maths Finanzmathematik Wirtschaftsmathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften Ökonomie BWL VWL Volkswirtschaftslehre Lexika Wirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Mikroökonomie ISBN-10 0-19-927599-8 / 0199275998 ISBN-13 978-0-19-927599-1 / 9780199275991 In englischer Sprache. 198 pages. 15,7 x 1 x 23,2 cm. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers BN23458
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