The Rules of Thought - Hardcover

Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Jarvis, Benjamin W.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0199661804 ISBN 13: 9780199661800

Verlag: OUP Oxford, 2013

Über diesen Titel

Críticas:

... a dense and ambitious book whose principal aim is to defend the view that philosophical inquiry is a priori inquiry into essential natures. The book covers a broad range of philosophical issues spanning the philosophy of mind and language, the epistemology of metaphysical modality and the philosophy of philosophy. It will be of considerable interest to many, since there is something in it for just about everyone. (Anandi Hattiangadi, Analysis)

an impressive tome . . . helps to crystallize a framework of ways of thinking and fundamental problems for the philosophy of philosophy. . . . the book is a thorough, informative, often enlightening, and only rarely dissatisfying work on the philosophy of philosophy. . . . it will surely provide an incitement to further discourse about the theory of content and epistemology of philosophy. (Gurpreet Rattan, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews)

Reseña del editor:

The Rules of Thought develops a rationalist theory of mental content while defending a traditional epistemology of philosophy. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis contend that a capacity for pure rational thought is fundamental to mental content itself and underwrites our quotidian reasoning and extraordinary philosophical engagement alike. Part I of the book develops a Fregean theory of mental content, according to which rational relations between propositions play a central role in individuating contents; the theory is designed to be sensitive not only to Frege's puzzle and other data that have motivated rationalist conceptions of content, but also to considerations in the philosophy of mind and language that have motivated neo-Russellian views. Part II articulates a theory of the a priori, and shows that, given the framework of Part I, it is very plausible that much philosophical work of interest is genuinely a priori. Notably, it is no part of the picture developed that intuitions have an important role to play, either in mental content, or in the epistemology of the a priori; Part III defends this departure from rationalist orthodoxy.

Über diese Auflage

• Verlag: OUP Oxford
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2013
• ISBN 10: 0199661804
• ISBN 13: 9780199661800
• Einband: Tapa dura
• Anzahl der Seiten: 368