Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking impossibility theorem was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of Arrows theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorems value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal - given that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Eric Maskin is the Adams University Professor at Harvard University. He received the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (with L. Hurwicz and R. Myerson) for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. He has also contributed to game theory, contract theory, social choice theory, political economy, and other areas of economics.
Amartya Sen is the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. In 1998 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and in 1999 he was awarded the Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian award. He is also a senior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows; distinguished fellow of All Souls College, Oxford; and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His books have been translated into more than thirty languages.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: Gulf Coast Books, Cypress, TX, USA
hardcover. Zustand: Fair. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 0231153287-4-34788412
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, USA
Zustand: Good. Item in good condition. Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 00106110365
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, USA
Hardcover. Zustand: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers G0231153287I3N00
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 20584775-n
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, USA
Hardback or Cased Book. Zustand: New. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem. Book. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers BBS-9780231153287
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 20584775
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ABLIING23Feb2215580076579
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, USA
Hardback. Zustand: New. Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers LU-9780231153287
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: California Books, Miami, FL, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers I-9780231153287
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Vereinigtes Königreich
Hardback. Zustand: New. Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers LU-9780231153287
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar