Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia - Softcover

Gorodetsky, Gabriel

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0300084595 ISBN 13: 9780300084597

Verlag: Yale University Press, 2001

Inhaltsangabe

Book by Gorodetsky Professor Gabriel

Über diesen Titel

Críticas:

"This literary sensation is an enthralling narrative and an outstanding historical investigation, based examination of western archives and recently declassified documents scattered in Russian arch Yeltsin's elusive presidential archive". "[A] fascinating and important book." Anthony Beevor, Daily Telegraph "Clearly written and elegantly argued, Grand Delusion is indispensable reading for the specia attempting to make sense of the events leading up to the greatest and deadliest land war in history." Journal of Military History "Not since the publication of John Erickson's books has any single work done so much to improve u went wrong for the Soviets in 1941" Military Review"

Reseña del editor:

This important book draws on vital new archival material to unravel the mystery of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941 and Stalin's enigmatic behavior on the eve of the attack. Gabriel Gorodetsky challenges the currently popular view that Stalin was about to invade Germany when Hitler made a preemptive strike. He argues instead that Stalin was actually negotiating for European peace, asserting that Stalin followed an unscrupulous Realpolitik that served well-defined geopolitical interests by seeking to redress the European balance of power. Gorodetsky substantiates his argument through the most thorough scrutiny ever of Soviet archives for the period, including the files of the Russian foreign ministry, the general staff, the security forces, and the entire range of military intelligence available to Stalin at the time. According to Gorodetsky, Stalin was eagerly anticipating a peace conference where various accords imposed on Russia would be revised. But the delusion of being able to dictate a new European order blinded him to the lurking German danger, and his erroneous diagnosis of the political scene-colored by his perennial suspicion of Great Britain-led him to misconstrue the evidence of his own and Britain's intelligence services. Gorodetsky highlights the sequence of military blunders that resulted from Stalin's determination to appease Germany-blunders that provide the key to understanding the calamity that befell Russia on 22 June 1941.

Über diese Auflage

• Verlag: Yale University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2001
• ISBN 10: 0300084595
• ISBN 13: 9780300084597
• Einband: Tapa blanda
• Anzahl der Seiten: 434