Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush - Hardcover

Rodman, Peter W.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0307269795 ISBN 13: 9780307269799

Verlag: Alfred a Knopf Inc, 2009

Inhaltsangabe

A revelatory account from a Washington insider of how modern presidents have succeeded—and failed—in making foreign policy. An important contribution in the wake of recent American experiences abroad, and an essential book for the new administration, here is a fascinating, in-depth look at what actually happens in the Oval Office from a respected expert who has held high-level positions in several governments.

Illuminating the qualities of personal leadership—character, focus, determination, persuasiveness, and consistency—that determine a president’s ability to guide his staff, Peter W. Rodman makes clear how these qualities shape policy and determine how this policy is implemented. With telling anecdotes and trenchant analysis, he reminds us of the importance of a president’s vision for the world and of his ability to make this vision a reality.

Rodman’s tour through the past forty years recounts both high points and dismal lows. He shows how Nixon’s deep knowledge of the world combined with his personal paranoia to produce great victories (China) and deep failures (the demoralization of State and other departments). He demonstrates how Carter suffered from his own indecisiveness, and how Reagan’s determined focus in dealing with the Soviets contrasted with his lack of attention to the Middle East, which helped lead to the disastrous events in Beirut. And, finally, he illustrates how George W. Bush put too much stock in bureaucratic consensus and, until the surge, failed to push hard enough for new strategies in Iraq.

Rodman offers an original and telling survey of modern presidential policy-making, challenging many conventional accounts of events as well as many standard remedies. This is a vivid story of larger-than-life Washington personalities in action, an invaluable guide for our new president, and a deeply insightful primer on executive leadership.

Über diesen Titel

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Peter W. Rodman is a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., where he lives. He has served as deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, as director of the state department’s policy planning staff, as special assistant to Henry Kissinger in the White House, and, most recently, as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (2001–2007). Rodman is the author of More Precious Than Peace.

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Chapter One

Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Legitimacy

There is a famous story of President Abraham Lincoln, taking a vote in a cabinet meeting on whether to sign the Emancipation Proclamation. All his cabinet secretaries vote nay, whereupon Lincoln raises his right hand and declares: “The ayes have it!”

The story is apocryphal, but it well captures the truth of Lincoln’s relations with his cabinet. That cabinet included supremely ambitious men, substantial political figures in their own right, several of whom had sought the presidency in 1860 and remained convinced that they,
not the country lawyer from Illinois, should be sitting in his chair. Yet Lincoln came to dominate this “team of rivals” and seized the responsibility
that was inescapably his.

Such a story brings a smile when the president under discussion is the most revered political leader in the history of the republic. But our modern political culture and sensibility are more ambivalent. When less revered presidents make controversial decisions, what do we really believe about presidential authority? How do we feel, for example, about Richard Nixon overruling the dissent of both his secretary of state and his secretary of defense to order military escalations that he thought essential to prosecute the Vietnam War? What do we think of Ronald Reagan pursuing what he thought was a strategic opening with Iran, over the objection of his chief cabinet officers? With respect to the very public anguish of Secretary of State Colin Powell and his State Department over George W. Bush’s decisions on Iraq, do we identify with Bush or with Powell? How often do we read in the press about White House “interference” in the work of experts in the departments and agencies, and complaints that their work is being “politicized”? One part of our brain seems to side with the permanent government. In the age of the whistle-blower, what do we really think about a president’s authority to decide and carry out policies with which subordinates disagree?

The answer should not depend simply on one’s own policy or partisan preferences. There ought to be neutral principles, not only to guide the public discourse but also to guide presidents. The modern trend, especially since the United States emerged from World War II as a global power, has been to expand the White House staff and institutions like the National Security Council (NSC) precisely to enable more centralized control, or at least better central coordination, over an expanding policy community. That policy community includes traditional cabinet departments with an international role (State, Defense, Treasury), other institutions (the Central Intelligence Agency, the uniformed military, and agencies in charge of trade and foreign aid policy), and departments and agencies only recently playing an important role in foreign policy (the departments of Justice and Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration). But like a law of physics, presidential efforts to strengthen control over this expanding community only stimulate the countertrends that are at work—powerful centrifugal forces in Congress, in the media, and in the Executive Branch itself.

The subject of this book is not the question of presidential prerogative vis-à-vis Congress. Library shelves are already filled with books on the two “co-equal” branches, and especially the ancient debate over war powers. The issue here is presidential control over the Executive Branch.

Congress’s role, however, is an enormously important factor. As scholar Richard Neustadt has expressed it, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 did not, as commonly thought, create a system of separated powers. “Rather, it created a government of separated institutions sharing powers.” Presidents undoubtedly have more freedom of action in the national security realm than in making domestic policy. Nonetheless, cabinet secretaries and their departments have obligations to Congress by statute; they are beholden to Congress for the final disposition of their budgets and their testimony is a duty. Cabinet secretaries are thus inevitably responsive, at least in part, to Congress as well as to the president. But that only restates the problem.

Neustadt recounts that President Harry Truman in 1952, contemplating the possibility that Dwight Eisenhower would be elected to succeed him, predicted that the eminent general would have problems adjusting: “ ‘He’ll sit here,’ Truman would remark (tapping his desk for emphasis), ‘and he’ll say, “Do this! Do that!” And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army. He’ll find it very frustrating.’ ” Truman’s own experience was: “I sit here all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense enough to do without my persuading them. . . . That’s all the powers of the President amount to.”

That was Neustadt’s analysis as well. His answer was to counsel presidents and would-be presidents on how to maximize their power to persuade. His classic book Presidential Power, first published in 1960, explained that a president’s success depended on expanding and husbanding his personal political leverage and prestige, his mastery of tools of influence that convince his subordinates that what the president wants them to do comports with their own personal and bureaucratic interests. Neustadt graded presidents according to their “power sense”—their instinct for maintaining their personal political power; he thought Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman had this “power sense,” but Eisenhower did not. His book was seized upon by the new administration of John F. Kennedy as a primer on how to strengthen presidential control. However, the centrifugal forces have only strengthened since then—to the point where Neustadt, in an edition of his book twenty years later, felt compelled to go out of his way to debunk the notion of the “imperial presidency” that had become fashionable in some circles in the interim. As late as 1990, even after the Reagan presidency, Neustadt was still preoccupied with what he saw as the weakness of the office: “Weakness is still what I see: weakness in the sense of a great gap between what is expected of a man (or someday a woman) and assured capacity to carry through.” Part of this weakness resides in the expansion of the modern bureaucracy and the increasing difficulty of a single individual’s asserting systematic control over it.


Concepts of Legitimacy

Our Constitution, on the face of it, seems unambiguous about who is in charge of the Executive Branch: “The executive power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America” (Article II, section 1). But, as usual, a closer reading of our founding document reveals a more
complex picture. Passages in section 2 of the same Article II refer specifically to the “executive departments” and to Congress’s power to authorize the heads of those departments to appoint subordinates. The president’s authority over the civilian establishment is less explicit than his authority as commander in chief of the armed forces. The renowned constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin concluded that the phrase “executive power” is a “term of uncertain content.” While the United States may have a cabinet, we do not have a cabinet system, which is what the British have. The cabinet at Westminster is “the government”—the body of ministers (what we would call cabinet secretaries) headed by the prime minister, who is in...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Alfred a Knopf Inc
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2009
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0307269795
• ISBN 13: 9780307269799
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Auflage: 1
• Anzahl der Seiten: 351
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar