<div>Development assistance employs carrots and sticks to influence regimes and obtain particular outcomes: altered economic policies, democratization, relief of suffering from catastrophes. Wealthy nations and international agencies such as the World Bank justify development assistance on grounds of improving the global human condition. Over the last forty years, however, ethnic conflict has increased dramatically. Where does ethnic conflict fit within this set of objectives? How do the resources, policy advice, and conditions attached to aid affect ethnic conflict in countries in which donors intervene? How can assistance be deployed in ways that might moderate rather than aggravate ethnic tensions?<br></div><div>These issues are addressed comparatively by area specialists and participant-observers from development assistance organizations. This book is the first systematic effort to evaluate this dimension of international affairs--and to propose remedies. Case studies include Russia, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and Kenya, with references to many other national experiences.<br></div><div>Cross-cutting chapters consider evolution of USAID and the World Bank's policies on displacement of people by development projects, as well as how carrots and sticks may affect ethnic dynamics, but through different mechanisms and to varying degrees depending on political dynamics and regime behaviors. They show that projects may also exacerbate ethnic conflict by reinforcing territoriality and exposing seemingly unfair allocative principles that exclude or harm some while benefiting others.<br></div><div>For students of international political economy, development studies, comparative politics, and ethnic conflict, this book illuminates a problem area that has long been overlooked in international affairs literature. It is essential reading for staff members and policymakers in development assistance agencies and international financial institutions.<br></div><div>Milton J. Esman is the John S. Knight Professor of International Studies, Emeritus, and Professor of Government, Emeritus, at Cornell University.<br></div><div>Ronald J. Herring is Director of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies at Cornell, the John S. Knight Professor of International Relations, and Professor of Government at Cornell University. <br></div>
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Milton J. Esman is the John S. Knight Professor of International Studies, Emeritus, and Professor of Government, Emeritus, at Cornell University.
Ronald J. Herring is Director of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies at Cornell, the John S. Knight Professor of International Relations, and Professor of Government at Cornell University.
Preface...............................................................................................................................vii1. Projects and Policies, Politics and Ethnicities Ronald J. Herring and Milton J. Esman.............................................12. The World Bank and Displacement: The Challenge of Heterogeneity Daniel R. Gibson..................................................263. USAID and Ethnic Conflict: An Epiphany? Heather S. McHugh.........................................................................494. Foreign Aid and Ethnic Interests in Kenya John M. Cohen...........................................................................905. Ethnic Cooperation in Sri Lanka: Through the Keyhole of a USAID Project Norman T. Uphoff..........................................1136. Making Ethnic Conflict: The Civil War in Sri Lanka Ronald J. Herring..............................................................1407. Foreign Assistance as Genocide: The Crisis in Russia, the IMF, and Interethnic Relations Stephen D. Shenfield.....................1758. "Indian Market": The Ethnic Face of Adjustment in Ecuador Alison Brysk............................................................2109. Policy Dimensions: What Can Development Assistance Do? Milton J. Esman............................................................235Contributors..........................................................................................................................257Index.................................................................................................................................261
Ronald J. Herring and Milton J. Esman
Ethnic conflict has often jarred the international community with its ferocity and durability. The causes are perplexing-clearly multiple and multidimensional, and situationally specific, dif Despite "aid weariness," the tasks assigned to development assistance have multiplied in number, complexity, and gravity. Discussion of aid in the United States now raises post-Cold War problematics of "chaos," "failed states," "early warning systems," "governance," and "preventive development." Humanitarian assistance in response to horrendous catastrophes takes precedence over traditional development activities, leading to discussions of "development diversion" and mission dilution. Brian Atwood, on retiring as head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), criticized the benign neglect of aid in Washington: "What will it take to wake up our political leaders? More failed states? More wars? More south-to-north migration? More transmission of infectious diseases? More terrorism?" The ugly side of globalization stirs fears of broadly gauged threats that substitute for Cold War imperatives as justifications of international aid.
The Asian financial collapse of 1997 found the World Bank not only criticizing its own prior narrowly economistic assumptions about development but assuming a lead role in global crisis management. The president of the bank said in his address to the Board of Governors in 1998: "Today, in the wake of crisis, we need a second framework ... that includes the human and social accounting, that deals with the environment, that deals with the status of women, rural development, indigenous people, progress in infrastructure, and so on." Mr. Wolfensohn spoke of a mission so broad as "empowering the people, writing the laws, recognizing the women, eliminating the corruption, educating the girls, building the banking systems, protecting the environment, inoculating the children" (Wolfensohn 1998, 11, 12). The World Bank asserts here an extraordinary mandate: global crisis management and local social engineering on a global scale. Whether staff of the World Bank buy into such grand visions operationally remains to be seen; rhetoric tends to outrun both capacity and will.
As expectations have escalated, resources have waned. Until the early 1990s, the volume of international development assistance increased annually. By the mid-1990s, however, it had stagnated at the level of about U.S.$70 billion net of loan repayments (OECD 1996). Though its aggregate volume has stagnated, the impact of development assistance may ironically increase over time. Governments facing fiscal and balance-of-payments crises seek both the hard currency of assistance and the legitimation for foreign direct investment that often follows the lead of development assistance agencies. Many aid-recipient countries depend on foreign assistance to finance their development budgets, to ensure fiscal stability, to balance external payments, and to reassure foreign investors. In the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report for 1998, 41 countries received aid in excess of 10 percent of GNP. The figure for Mozambique was 72 percent; for Nicaragua, 61 percent. World Bank data for 1998-99 indicate similar patterns. Aid of course constituted a much higher percentage of these domestic budgets than of GNP. Though private resource flows exceed development assistance in some countries, these flows are uneven in distribution and largely avoid the most desperate societies. Aid is especially critical in catastrophes, whether natural or human-made. The Asian financial collapse of 1997 produced at least 20 million poor people very quickly; international development agencies became crisis response managers (Wolfensohn 1998).
Development assistance distributes carrots and deploys sticks to influence regimes and obtain particular outcomes-altered economic policies, democratization, relief of suffering from catastrophes. We believe there are important reciprocal interactions between international development flows-of project monies, loans, grants, policy advice, and conditionality-and ethnic politics, for several reasons. First and most important, aid projects and restructuring policy advice have distributive consequences. Distributive concerns in general, and especially ethnic distributive issues, have been dif
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