Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory (California Series on Social Choice & Political Economy, Band 22) - Hardcover

Frohlich, Norman; Oppenheimer, Joe A.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0520072995 ISBN 13: 9780520072992

Verlag: University of California Press, 1992

Inhaltsangabe

This book presents an entirely new answer to the question: “What is fair?” In their radical approach to ethics, Frohlich and Oppenheimer argue that much of the empirical methodology of the natural sciences should be applied to the ethical questions of fairness and justice.

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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Norman Frolich was Professor Emeritus at the Asper School of Business at the University of Manitoba. Joe A. Oppenheimer is Professor Emeritus in the department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland.

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Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory

By Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer

University of California Press

Copyright 1992 Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer
All right reserved.
ISBN: 0520072995
Chapter One
Empirical Considerations Concerning
Impartial Reasoning

Where does empirical inquiry fit into a quest for a theory of distributive justice? One answer to that question is direct and simple: it stems from the role of impartial reasoning in determining rules for just distributions. Specifically, we advocate empirical work because it is difficult to determine the conclusions of impartial reasoning. To show why empirical methods might be reasonable and useful, we investigate some of the bases of moral reasoning related to our approach.

The Tradition of Impartial Reasoning in Ethical Theory

One hallowed tradition of ethical inquiry is the invocation of impartial reasoning as a basis for achieving moral knowledge. As far back as the first century B.C. , Publius Syrus of Rome noted that when disputes arise, there is an inevitable problem of bias. His dictum was "No one should be judge in his own case."1 The intuition here is that we are likely to assign undue weight to our own interests. To obtain impartiality, third parties, not involved, should be called on to judge. In the days

Maxim 545, as quoted in Bartlett (1980, p. 111).

when wool was symbolic of commerce and wealth, members of the British Parliament had to declare their financial interests in a bill being debated. Members with such interests were required to retire to the door of the Commons and sit on a wool sack. Any arguments these members might offer were presumed to be unduly colored by self-interest. Sitting on "the wool sack" made this partiality concrete.

Indeed, the most famous moral dictum, the Golden Rule (do unto others as you would have them do unto you), arguably "the common moral denominator of all the world's major religions" (Gewirth 1978, p. 133), is an application of impartiality. It calls for each of us to lend equal weight to the concerns of our fellows and even offers a simple method for invoking the requisite impartiality. "The Golden Rule is predicated upon an exchange of viewpoints, as are maxims such as that urging us to stand in another man's shoes" (Henberg 1978, p. 723).2

As M. C. Henberg also notes (1978, p. 723), others have sketched ways in which this impartiality might be accomplished. "C. I. Lewis, for instance, suggests that impartial valuations are best rendered by imagining that the experience of all concerned persons were one's own, 'as, for example, if you had to live the lives of each of them seriatim.' Similarly, Richard Hare suggests that people who render differing moral judgements should imagine that their desires and inclinations are exchanged for the desires and inclinations of their antagonist."3 The intuition behind these and many other similar positions is simple: to be fair, we are to project ourselves into the position of the relevant others and give equal weight to their concerns. The judgment about what is fair must be based on an impartial point of view.

Note that even in such technical works as those of Sen (1973, pp. 1415) where he discusses equity his stance (which he refers to as the Weak Equity Axiom) on interpersonal comparability is not far removed from this position.

The internal citations are to Lewis (1946, p. 547) and Hare (1963, p. 123).

Structuring an Impartial-Reasoning Device

One traditional proposal for determining the content and implications of impartiality is to adopt the perspective of an ideal observer. Such an observer would have to be endowed with certain powers to be capable of making the appropriate moral judgments. Analysis of these properties has varied, but their definition is always designed to ensure that such observers would exercise impartial reasoning in their judgments.4 Such a proposal clearly requires that the observers have considerable knowledge plus exquisite powers of reasoning. No mere moral philosophers could claim, even in their wildest dreams, to approach these qualities even though they argue that such an ideal observer might be required to identify right principles.

Were it a straightforward matter to exercise this device to discover ethical principles, we would be making observable and indisputable progress in this area. The absence of unequivocal headway in moral theory likely reflects the difficulty of identifying and implementing a state of impartiality (in fact and principle) from which to reason. No real observer can be ideal. Real-world deviations from the idealizations of philosophers can be expected to lead to deviations in the acceptability and quality of their conclusions.

Thus, one reason for the failure to make headway in the development of theory and in the discovery of principles about justice and fairness is the inability of real people to be consistently impartial. Two clearly visible barriers are central to this failure. Individuals are unable to shed their own interests, and they have their unique perspectives, which are products of their cultural heritage, life experience, and genetic endowment. These factors inevitably lead the theorist to import biases into any attempt to reason as an impartial observer. In the end,

For example, Firth (1952) has specified that an ideal observer needs to be omniscient with regard to relevant nonethical facts, omnipercipient (able to empathize perfectly) with all the relevant parties, disinterested and dispassionate as among the parties and toward the issues involved, consistent (over time), as well as normal in other respects.

these shortcomings lead to ambiguity, confusion, and dispute over the fundamental issue at stake: the nature of the alternatives that would be selected. Evidence that the problem is susceptible to these difficulties includes the lack of consensus among philosophers who have used this approach to generate ethical principles. Thus, imagining an ideal observer is easier than finding one. Perhaps for this reason other proposals for identifying fair outcomes via impartial reasoning have sprung up. Some of these proposals are for devices that are disarmingly intuitive, simple, and effective. Indeed, some have been widely adopted.

Cutting Cakes

An example of a device or procedure that generates an impartial outcome is ready at hand. For two people to divide a piece of cake fairly, one person cuts and the other chooses. The principle underlying this device is elementary. The job of setting up the alternatives is separated from the job of making the choice. The general acceptability of this process is obvious. The slicer knows that any inequity between the portions is likely to work to the disadvantage of the slicer. Thus the person who is setting up the payoff structure (by slicing the cake) has every incentive to be as fair as possible in the division. So "you cut, I choose" is a universally acceptable procedural solution to the problem of two parties fairly dividing a fixed quantity.5 This procedure has a major implication: some ethical problems have universally acceptable solutions and implementable devices for identifying them.

Although extensions of this notion to more than two persons are possible, it becomes...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: University of California Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 1992
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0520072995
• ISBN 13: 9780520072992
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Anzahl der Seiten: 276
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar