Controlling Corruption - Softcover

Klitgaard, Robert

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0520074084 ISBN 13: 9780520074088

Verlag: University of California Press, 1991

Inhaltsangabe

Corruption is increasingly recognized as a preeminent problem in the developing world. Bribery, extortion, fraud, kickbacks, and collusion have resulted in retarded economies, predator elites, and political instability. In this lively and absorbing book, Robert Klitgaard provides a framework for designing anti-corruption policies, and describes through five case studies how courageous policymakers were able to control corruption.

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Robert Klitgaard is Dean and Ford Distinguished Professor of International Development adn Security at the RAND Government School. He has been a professor at Harvard and Karachi Universities and has served as a consultant in twenty-one nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

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"Controlling Corruption is a brilliant book. It is far and away the best work on the subject that I have read and I think the best there is."—Aaron Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley

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"Controlling Corruption is a brilliant book. It is far and away the best work on the subject that I have read and I think the best there is."—Aaron Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley

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Controlling Corruption

By Robert Klitgaard

University of California Press

Copyright © 1991 Robert Klitgaard
All right reserved.
ISBN: 9780520074088
Introduction

What worries me more than anything among our problems," said Nigerian President Shehu Shagari in 1982, "is that of moral decadence in our country. There is the problem of bribery, corruption, lack of dedication to duty, dishonesty, and all such vices."

He was right to worry. About a year later his civilian government was toppled in a military coup, which the generals justified by the need to control corruption. This topic dominated the new regime's policies, as foretold in its first press conference in early 1984: "It is necessary to reiterate that this new Administration will not tolerate fraud, corruption, squandermania, abuse of public office for self or group, or other such vices that characterized the administration of the past four years."1

The Shagari regime had tried. It had proclaimed an "ethical revolution" to combat corruption. The government had included a code of conduct for public servants in the 1979 constitution, and it had established a Code of Conduct Bureau to enforce the "prescribed behaviors." The leadership had even appointed a cabinet Minister of National Guidance to provide moral leadership against corruption. Yet according to popular accounts, Nigeria had grown even more corrupted, leaving its citizens more alienated from the government and its economy more vulnerable to official venality.

In recent years a remarkable feature of many governmental changes of command has been the promise to do something about the corruption of the previous regime. This is even so when one's predecessor is an intimate ally. In his first speech upon assuming the leadership of the

Africa Now ,November l982, 55; The Guardian ,19 January 1984. I am indebted to Stephen Riley of North Staffordshire Polytechnic for these citations.

Congress Party after his mother's assassination in late 1984, Rajiv Gandhi put government officials in India on notice that the corrupt and dishonest would no longer be tolerated. His overwhelmingly successful election campaign was partially based on promises to fight corruption. In a change of command a leader may even criticize one's own regime. At the inauguration of his successor in 1982, Mexican President Josi Ls Portillo decried corruption and the lamentable fact that Mexican citizens illicitly "have taken more money out of Mexico in the past two years than imperialists ever exploited during the entire history of our country."2 The new Mexican president, Miguel de la Madrid, had built his campaign on the need to combat corruption, and among his first acts in office were the promulgation of a new code of conduct for public officials and the creation of a new agency to fight corruption. This phenomenon is not confined to the developing nations. Upon assuming office, leaders ranging from the late Soviet Chairman Andropov to Massachusetts Governor Dukakis called for new measures against corruption.

But what should such measures include? If in Nigeria "ethical revolutions," bureaucratic purges, codes of conduct, and a Ministry of National Guidance were not sufficient, what should or could be done? As policymakers speak out about the evils of corruption, how should they think about designing and implementing measures to control it?

This book is addressed to government officials, especially in developing countries, who are searching for answers to such questions. With such an intended audience, a cynic might respond, the book will not sell many copies. The prevalence and persistence of corruption are discouraging, for they imply that many policymakers and politicians do not want to control corruption. They may use illicit activities to maintain themselves in power, even at the expense of the nation's development, as has been argued in a careful study of Morocco.3 Of course, corruption has

For further details about allegations of corruption during the administration of President Lspez Portillo, see my Corruption in Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1983). According to Jack Anderson, the Central Intelligence Agency estimates that Lspez Portillo himself took between $1 and $3 billion out of mexico during his six years in office (Jack Anderson, "Mexico's Riches Were Devoured by Ex-President," Washington Post , 18 June 1984, p. B-12).

John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical System," World Politics (July 1973): 533 55; reprinted in Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a Search for Causes and Consequences , ed. Monday U. Ekpo (Washington, D.C. University Press of American, 1979), 355 80.

self-serving aspects to those in power, not only as a means for lining one's pockets but as a mechanism for political dealing, forging linkages, and even inducing political participation, as we shall discuss in the next chapter. There are even occasions where corrupt acts may improve economic or organizational efficiency.

That corruption benefits at least some of those in power makes it a difficult problem to tackle. Nonetheless, many leaders and public managers in developing countries want to do better at controlling fraud, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, tax evasion, kickbacks, and other forms of illicit and corrupt behavior. Some of these concerned leaders are top legislators and chief executives. Others hold responsible positions in police forces, customs agencies, tax bureaus, ministries that distribute goods and services, and regulatory agencies. These people see corruption as threatening their agency's mission and the broader goals of national development. They are not naive: they recognize that corruption can never be completely eradicated, and they do not suppose that corruption has a simple cure, as polio has a vaccine. Still these officials would like to reduce many forms of corruption, and their hope is shared by most ordinary citizens in the developing world.

What exactly is the "corruption" they wish to control? It depends. What is corrupt in one society may not be in another. When historian J. S. Furnivall examined why, according to British standards, colonial Burma was so "corrupt," he concluded that in many cases the Burmese were simply following their customary norms of correct conduct.4 Some of the activities most praised in capitalist economics private investment, trading and retrading, accumulating resources may be called "corrupt" in a communist system.5

What is lawful, and therefore what is unlawful, depends on the country and culture in question. While this valid insight should not be lost, it must not short-circuit our search for effective anticorruption policies. As a matter of fact, the majority of countries and cultures decry most instances of bribery, fraud, extortion, embezzlement, and most

J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1948).

Several examples are cited in J. M. Montias and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption in a Soviet-type Economy: Theoretical Considerations," in Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson , ed. Steven Rosefielde (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 53 83.

forms of kickbacks on public contracts. Over a wide range of "corrupt" activities, there is little argument that they are wrong and socially harmful.

This point becomes clearer when we get down to specific cases. The following examples display...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: University of California Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 1991
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0520074084
• ISBN 13: 9780520074088
• Einband: Taschenbuch
• Anzahl der Seiten: 240
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Buchpark GmbH; gpsr@buchpark.de; ; Krügerweg 1; Trebbin; Brandenburg; 14959; Deutschland