Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy, 18, Band 18) - Softcover

Tsebelis, George

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0520076516 ISBN 13: 9780520076518

Verlag: University of California Press, 1991

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Clearly written and easily understood by the nonspecialist, Nested Games provides a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently irrational political actions.

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“The notion of nested games greatly expands the domain of formal analysis while also rendering game theory more capable of reflecting political reality.”—David Cameron, Yale University

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The notion of nested games greatly expands the domain of formal analysis while also rendering game theory more capable of reflecting political reality. David Cameron, Yale University

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Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics

By George Tsebelis

University of California Press

Copyright 1991 George Tsebelis
All right reserved.
ISBN: 0520076516
Chapter One
Nested Games and Rationality

This book analyzes cases in which an actor confronted with a series of choices does not pick the alternative that appears to be the best. In the course of the book, the reader will see that British Labour party activists who consider their standing MP too moderate may vote to replace her, although that choice may lead to the loss of a seat for the Labour party; that Belgian elites who are considered in the consociational literature to be accommodating and compromising in character sometimes initiate political conflict; and that French political parties in certain constituencies do not support their coalition partner, leading their own coalition to defeat.

Why are situations in which an actor chooses an alternative that appears to be against her own interests, or not the best she can do under the existing circumstances, intriguing? Why do they demand explanation? Choices that do not appear to be the best an actor can do are puzzling because most observers assume (at least implicitly) that people try to behave in ways that maximize the achievement of their presumed goals, that is, they make optimal choices. The goal of this book is to provide a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently suboptimal choices. The following examples illustrate the importance and frequence of apparently suboptimal choices in politics.

I
Some Apparently Suboptimal Choices

Urho Kekkonen was first elected president of Finland in 1956. His presidency was so successful that he occupied the office for twenty-

five years. It was, according to Duverger (1978, 63), "the longest and most powerful presidency in Finnish history." What is interesting for our purposes is how this presidency became possible. Therefore, I examine the preferences and behavior of the actors involved in the 1956 Finnish presidential election.

According to Finnish law, presidential elections are conducted by a special three hundredmember electoral college. An election may require two rounds if no candidate gains a majority of the votes. The first two ranking candidates then compete in a second round, assuring a majority vote for the winner.

In 1956, three candidates participated in the first round: the agrarian Urho Kekkonen, the Socialist Karl-August Fagerholm, and the incumbent conservative Juo Kusti Paasikivi. The most challenging opponent for Kekkonen, who had the support of the Communist party, was the conservative Paasikivi. One would expect the Communists to support Kekkonen in the first round with all their fifty-six votes. Instead, only fourteen Communists cast their votes for Kekkonen; the majority (forty-two out of fifty-six) voted for the Socialist candidate. Was this a split inside the Communist party? It was not; the Communists disliked Fagerholm intensely.

Why did most of the Communists choose not to support their preferred candidate, Kekkonen, that is, why did they choose suboptimal behavior? In order to understand the logic of the Communist vote, one must consider the full story of the 1956 election. Paasikivi was eliminated in the first round with 84 votes, against 114 for Fagerholm and 102 for Kekkonen. In the second round, when Kekkonen faced Fagerholm, the Communists voted exclusively for the former. Kekkonen was elected with 151 votes; Fagerholm was defeated with 149.

Although the Communists preferred Kekkonen, they voted for Fagerholm in the first round in order to eliminate the more threatening Paasikivi from the race. The Communists misrepresented their preferences in the first round to promote their most preferred outcome in the second round. The Communists understood that the supposed question of the first round"which one of the three candidates do you prefer?"was immaterial. First round voting was a path leading to the second round and to a competition between either Kekkonen and Paasikivi or Kekkonen

and Fagerholm. Given that Kekkonen could defeat Fagerholm but not Paasikivi in the last round, his supporters took the necessary steps to assure the final victory of Kekkonen: they eliminated from the last round Kekkonen's most dangerous opponent, Paasikivi.

An actor votes strategically or sophisticatedly (as opposed to sincerely) if in one or more rounds of a series of votes, she votes against her preferences in order to assure a more preferred final outcome. According to this definition, the Communists voted strategically in 1956. Had the Communists voted sincerely, Kekkonen would have received 144 votes in the first round, Paasikivi, 84, and Fagerholm, 72. However, in the succeeding round, in which Kekkonen would have faced Paasikivi, Paasikivi would have won the election. Thus, the Communists' behavior, which was surprising at first glance, turns out to be optimal upon closer consideration. It was, in fact, a manifestation of strategic voting.

This is the end of the factual story; however, this is not the end of the conceptual investigation. Farquharson (1969) traced sophisticated voting back to Pliny the Younger, and Gibbard (1973) found that strategic voting is possible in all resolute electoral systems.1 The possibility of altering outcomes through sophisticated voting leads to a new series of questions. Was strategic voting possible for the Socialists as well as the Communists? If so, could the Socialists have voted in such a way as to prevent Kekkonen from getting elected?

The answer to both questions is affirmative. The Socialists also could have voted strategically and prevented the election of Kekkonen. In fact, if they had withdrawn their candidate in the first or second round, the duel between Kekkonen and Paasikivi would have ended in Kekkonen's defeat, as the Socialists would have wished in such a case. Why didn't they follow such a strategy? If strategic voting for the Communists was not the mistake it appeared at first glance, but rational (that is, optimizing) behavior, and if strategic voting was available to the Socialists, then the Socialists chose a suboptimal option: to vote sincerely. Why?

To vote strategically, Socialist leaders would have had to explain to their own party activists and voters why they were with-

Resolute electoral systems are those that exclude ties. For a similar proof that does not require resoluteness, see Schwartz (1982).

drawing their quite successful candidatea difficult task. This constraint meant the Socialist leadership was involved in two different games simultaneously. In the parliamentary arena, where the president of Finland was to be decided, strategic voting was the optimal choice. In the internal (party) arena, however, where maintaining the allegiance of activists and voters was at stake, sophisticated voting was not possible. When the consequences of strategic voting in both arenas were considered together, strategic voting ceased to be optimal.

The situation was different for the Communists for two reasons. First, Kekkonen was not the Communist candidate, but an agrarian one, so the Communists did not have to explain why they did not vote for their own candidate. Second, Communist parties all over the world (at least in...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: University of California Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 1991
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0520076516
• ISBN 13: 9780520076518
• Einband: Taschenbuch
• Anzahl der Seiten: 292
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar