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The Sanctions Paradox Hardback: Economic Statecraft and International Relations: 65 (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65) - Hardcover
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The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? This 1999 book argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results.
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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor
Charlotte y Peter Fiell son dos autoridades en historia, teoría y crítica del diseño y han escrito más de sesenta libros sobre la materia, muchos de los cuales se han convertido en éxitos de ventas. También han impartido conferencias y cursos como profesores invitados, han comisariado exposiciones y asesorado a fabricantes, museos, salas de subastas y grandes coleccionistas privados de todo el mundo. Los Fiell han escrito numerosos libros para TASCHEN, entre los que se incluyen 1000 Chairs, Diseño del siglo XX, El diseño industrial de la A a la Z, Scandinavian Design y Diseño del siglo XXI.
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)
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Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10: 0521643325
ISBN 13: 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65)
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The Sanctions Paradox
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Zustand: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? This 1999 book argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where . Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 446943529
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations
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The Sanctions Paradox (Hardcover)
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10: 0521643325
ISBN 13: 9780521643320
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Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox (Hardcover)
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10: 0521643325
ISBN 13: 9780521643320
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Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations
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Buch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65)
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The Sanctions Paradox (Hardcover)
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10: 0521643325
ISBN 13: 9780521643320
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Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9780521643320
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