A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare Hardback: 48 (Econometric Society Monographs, Series Number 48) - Hardcover

Fleurbaey; Maniquet

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0521887429 ISBN 13: 9780521887427

Verlag: Cambridge University Press, 2011

Inhaltsangabe

This book proposes a theory of social welfare that draws from the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation and encapsulates fairness principles in the definition of social preferences.

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Críticas:

'Fleurbaey and Maniquet are among the outstanding scholars in the development of formal theories of social choice and justice today. Their many original contributions and synthesis, in the present volume, are masterly and go well beyond what can be said in the usual philosophical language. The concepts of fair and efficient resource allocations have been enriched by their work.' Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University and Nobel Laureate in Economics

'In this monograph Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet, two major representatives of a modern Franco-Belgian school of social choice, systematically set out a new approach to social choice based on concepts such as fairness and resource equality. It should interest not just economists and social choice theorists, but also philosophers who agree with the argument that social justice is a matter of allocating resources rather than subjective satisfaction or happiness.' Peter J. Hammond, University of Warwick

'Theoretical attempts to aggregate individual preferences into a measure of social welfare have been plagued by negative results, including Arrow's famous theorem. Yet, in this important book, Fleurbaey and Maniquet show that an attractive theory of aggregation is possible if one relaxes Arrow's independence axiom in a natural way. The approach is rigorous yet conceptually simple enough to be usable in practice.' Eric S. Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton and Nobel Laureate in Economics

'Fleurbaey and Maniquet's axiomatic synthesis of social welfare a la Arrow, and justice as equality of resources, is deeply original and entirely rigorous. Preserving the normative preeminence of efficiency and giving precedence to equal opportunity over informational parsimony, they construct a dazzling array of concrete allocation mechanisms, from income taxation to the fair division of indivisible commodities, and the provision of public goods. This brilliant book turns welfare economics into a powerful deconstruction of the social justice dilemmas.' Hervé Moulin, Rice University

'Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet's book constitutes an outstanding contribution, suitable (and highly recommended) for the broad audience of mainstream economists and policy makers alike, and a 'must read' for those with a taste for normative economics. One can only wish that books like this one get published more often.' Journal of Economic Inequality

Biografía del autor:

Marc Fleurbaey is a Research Director of the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and serves on the staff of CERSES, the joint research entity of the CNRS and the Université Paris Descartes. He first worked at INSEE, taught subsequently at the Universities of Cergy-Pontoise and Pau, and as of 2011 is a professor at Princeton University. Professor Fleurbaey is a research associate at CORE at the Université Catholique de Louvain, at Sciences-Po in Paris, and at IDEP in Marseilles, and a visiting professor at the London School of Economics. He is a former editor of the journal Economics and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press) and is currently a managing editor of Social Choice and Welfare. He is the author, editor or coeditor of seven books, including Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare (2008) and Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls (with Maurice Salles and John Weymark, Cambridge University Press, 2008). His papers on normative and public economics have appeared in leading journals such as Econometrica the Journal of Political Economy and the Journal of Economic Theory.

Über diese Auflage

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2011
• ISBN 10: 0521887429
• ISBN 13: 9780521887427
• Einband: Tapa dura
• Anzahl der Seiten: 316