Assume that a nation is pursuing a given foreign policy and that we are concerned with the way in which it will act in the future. We may want to make a forecast--but then to what extent is the present policy of a nation a valid guide to its future behavior? Or we may want to influence the nation to change its course--can we succeed? In other words, will the policy change or persist in the face of new conditions or negative feedback? Kjell Goldmann identifies the factors that may have an impact on whether a specific foreign policy is likely to endure or to change and develops them into a theory of foreign policy stability. He then uses this theory to explore the reasons why West German-Soviet detente during the 1970s proved to be more enduring than the improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally, he outlines a hypothetical scenario for a fully successful process of detente stabilization and examines the extent to which this scenario is realistic. The book ends with some thought about how to conduct a policy aimed at stable detente with an adversary.
Originally published in 1988.
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List of Illustrations, vii,
List of Tables, ix,
Preface, xi,
Abbreviations, xiii,
Introduction, xv,
PART ONE. CHANGE AND STABILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL SKETCH, 1,
1. Foreign Policy Stability as a Research Problem, 3,
2. Foreign Policy Stabilizers: An Inventory, 26,
3. Policy Stabilization as a Process, 70,
PART TWO. DETENTE: EVALUATION OF AN EXPERIMENT, 79,
4. The 1970s as an Experiment, 81,
5. The International Stabilization of Detente, 91,
6. The Cognitive Stabilization of Detente, 117,
7. The Political Stabilization of Detente, 134,
8. The Administrative Stabilization of Detente, 173,
9. Evaluation of the Detente Experiment, 187,
PART THREE. THE STABILIZATION OF DETENTE: A SCENARIO, 197,
10. Detente in Anarchy, 199,
Appendix: A Note on the Utility of Weak Theory and Weak Tests, 223,
References, 229,
Index, 243,
Foreign Policy Stability as a Research Problem
We generally assume that there are patterns in the foreign policy of nations and not just single acts. A knowledge of the pattern — the "policy" — of an actor is assumed to be useful for explaining and predicting actions. If we can show that an action fits into a pattern — that is, that the actor behaves as he usually does, or says that it is his policy to do, we have in one sense explained his action. Similarly, if we know the pattern, we may anticipate what the actor will be likely to do in the future. We know, in other words, about a regular feature of international politics — a feature that may, however, be more or less amenable to change.
The assumption of foreign policy patterns is easy to justify. The arguments commonly put forward range from the imperatives of geopolitics to the standard operating procedures of bureaucracies to the inertia of belief systems. However, analysts also find it easy to explain new departures after the fact by reference to, say, the dynamics of international relations, the flux of domestic politics, or the erratic nature of personalities. Such explanations undermine the very assumption that foreign policy is patterned — unless it can be explained why this particular policy was vulnerable to that particular disturbance.
There is an inevitable tension between viewing international politics as the pursuit of policies and seeing it as variable responses to shifting situations. Yet the tradition in foreign policy analysis is to do both. It was to be expected that the United States and China would remain enemies even after the Sino-Soviet rift: their mutual enmity had deep roots in both countries. It was also to be expected that they would come together as a result of the new triangular balance of power. But if both were to be expected, how can either be explained, and how could either have been predicted? What factors determine whether, when, and to what extent pressure for change in a policy will in fact produce change?
This is an unresolved issue in foreign policy theory. It relates to three key problems in the analysis of international politics:
1. The problem of adaptation. On the one hand, nations — and organizations in general — are under pressure to adapt to changing conditions in their environment. On the other hand, they have a tendency to stick to their previous policies. What determines the impact of environmental change?
2. The problem of learning. On the one hand, nations — and organizations in general — take into account the way in which the environment responds to their policies; negative feedback is a pressure for change. On the other hand, there is a tendency to continue as before. Inter-nation action-reaction sometimes operates and sometimes fails to operate. What factors account for the impact of feedback?
3. The problem of domestic change. On the one hand, shifts in domestic politics — and within organizations in general — may place new people in positions of power, people whose views differ from those of their predecessors. On the other hand, new people may find themselves to be the prisoners of past policies. What factors determine the sensitivity of a foreign policy to domestic change?
These are three common themes in controversies over foreign policy. How will U.S. policy be affected by long-term changes in the international distribution of power? Would Western restraint have an impact on Soviet arms policy? Is West German foreign policy dependent on who wins the next election? Nations are assumed to pursue identifiable, stable policies. At the same time, a number of factors are assumed to be sources of change in policy. The issue concerns the likely outcome of the confrontation between the two. Foreign policy theory is weak on this point. It is uncommon among foreign policy theorists even to make a strict distinction between pressures for, or motivators of, change and pressures for, or motivators of, lack of change. The theoretical sketch to be presented here is meant to improve our understanding of the stability and instability of foreign policies, and to do it by taking environmental change, negative feedback, and shifts in leadership for granted and focusing instead on the factors accounting for their varying impact.
The term theoretical sketch is deliberate. What follows is theory — it contains not merely definitions but also propositions about the ways in which certain phenomena affect certain other phenomena. It is a sketch in three ways, however: its concepts are imprecise, its propositions are weak, and it has not been exposed to a systematic empirical test. A theoretical sketch is a necessary intermediate step between impressions and theory proper. It paves the way for more sophisticated inquiry. It also, however, serves, in the absence of theory proper, as a tool for asking better questions — as a systematic checklist for the analysis of specific problems.
Such a checklist can be useful. If none exists, the analyst has the option of doing the work ad hoc — that is, without considering the meaning and relevance of the concepts. The analysis risks being overly narrow, biased, or prejudiced as a result; whatever comes to mind at the outset is assumed to be the proper object of study. Or the analyst may make his or her own theoretical preparations. This is a big task, however, and it may be out of the question for the analyst who is concerned with a specific case or an immediate problem rather than with the development of theory; those who need to consume theory cannot always produce it themselves. Now, if a theoretical sketch exists, there is no need to choose between being arbitrary and beginning from scratch. Theory proper is better, but a sketch is better than nothing at all. This is the way in which the sketch that is about to be presented may contribute to the analysis of specific problems of foreign policy stability — as a reasonably systematic, considered, and comprehensive list of matters to be taken into account.
The notion of a theoretical sketch is further discussed in the Appendix. A problem with theoretical sketches is how to evaluate and improve them. They are not always strictly testable, especially not by historical case study. Nor are they arbitrary, however. The...
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