Game Theory: Introduction - Hardcover

Tadelis, Steven

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0691129088 ISBN 13: 9780691129082

Verlag: Princeton Univers. Press, 2012

Inhaltsangabe

The definitive introduction to game theory

This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.

Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them.

• Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory
• Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information
• Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises
• Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission
• Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students
• Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students

Über diesen Titel

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Steven Tadelis is associate professor and Barbara and Gerson Bakar Faculty Fellow at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Distinguished Economist at eBay Research Labs.

Von der hinteren Coverseite

"Steve Tadelis's Game Theory is an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduates, and great preparation for graduate work. It provides a clear, self-contained, and rigorous treatment of all the key concepts, along with interesting applications; it also introduces key technical tools in a straightforward and intuitive way."--Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University

"Steven Tadelis is a leading scholar in applied game theory, and his expertise shines through in this excellent new text. Aimed at intermediate to advanced undergraduates, it presents and discusses the theory remarkably clearly, at both the intuitive and formal levels. One novel feature I like is its serious consideration of the decision theoretic foundations of game theory. Another is its transparent presentation of relatively recent topics and applications, such as reputations in asymmetric information games, legislative bargaining, and cheap talk communication."--Steve Matthews, University of Pennsylvania

"Steve Tadelis has written an up-to-date, comprehensive, yet reader-friendly introductory textbook to game theory. He explains difficult concepts in an exceptionally clear and simple way, making the book accessible to students with a minimal background in mathematics. The abundance of examples and illustrations, drawing from economics, political science, and business strategy, not only shows the wide range of applications of game theory, but also makes the book attractive and fun to read. Tadelis's book will undoubtedly become a reference textbook for a first course in game theory."--Francis Bloch, école Polytechnique

"These days, game theory plays an essential role not only in economics, but in many other branches of social and engineering science, as well as philosophy, biology, psychology, even law. In all these disciplines, students and instructors alike should welcome this excellent resource for mastering the key tools of modern game theory."--Peter Hammond, University of Warwick

"It's hard to write a game theory textbook that strikes a good balance between precision and accessibility. But Steve Tadelis has accomplished this juggling act, with style and humor besides."--Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University

"Game theory is a powerful tool for understanding strategic behavior in business, politics, and other settings. Steve Tadelis's text provides an ideal guide, taking you from first principles of decision theory to models of bargaining, auctions, signaling, and reputation building in a style that is both rigorous and reader-friendly."--Jonathan Levin, Stanford University

"Game Theory fills a void in the literature, serving as a text for an advanced undergraduate--or masters-level class. It has more detail than most undergraduate texts, while still being accessible to a broad audience and stopping short of the more technical approach of PhD-level texts. This is a valuable book, written by a meticulous scholar who is an expert in the field."--Matthew O. Jackson, author ofSocial and Economic Networks

"This is a great text, just at the right level for fourth-year undergraduates. The style is just right and the exercises are of high quality. Flow and organization are major strengths of the book--I can follow the text almost as is for the class I teach."--Luca Anderlini, Georgetown University

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GAME THEORY

AN INTRODUCTIONBy Steven Tadelis

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2013 Princeton University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-12908-2

Contents

Preface............................................................................xiChapter 1 The Single-Person Decision Problem......................................3Chapter 2 Introducing Uncertainty and Time........................................14Chapter 3 Preliminaries...........................................................43Chapter 4 Rationality and Common Knowledge........................................59Chapter 5 Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium..................................79Chapter 6 Mixed Strategies........................................................101Chapter 7 Preliminaries...........................................................129Chapter 8 Credibility and Sequential Rationality..................................151Chapter 9 Multistage Games........................................................175Chapter 10 Repeated Games.........................................................190Chapter 11 Strategic Bargaining...................................................220Chapter 12 Bayesian Games.........................................................241Chapter 13 Auctions and Competitive Bidding.......................................270Chapter 14 Mechanism Design.......................................................288Chapter 15 Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information.....................303Chapter 16 Signaling Games........................................................318Chapter 17 Building a Reputation..................................................339Chapter 18 Information Transmission and Cheap Talk................................357Chapter 19 Mathematical Appendix..................................................369References.........................................................................385Index..............................................................................389

Chapter One

The Single-Person Decision Problem

Imagine yourself in the morning, all dressed up and ready to have breakfast. You might be lucky enough to live in a nice undergraduate dormitory with access to an impressive cafeteria, in which case you have a large variety of foods from which to choose. Or you might be a less-fortunate graduate student, whose studio cupboard offers the dull options of two half-empty cereal boxes. Either way you face the same problem: what should you have for breakfast?

This trivial yet ubiquitous situation is an example of a decision problem. Decision problems confront us daily, as individuals and as groups (such as firms and other organizations). Examples include a division manager in a firm choosing whether or not to embark on a new research and development project; a congressional representative deciding whether or not to vote for a bill; an undergraduate student deciding on a major; a baseball pitcher contemplating what kind of pitch to deliver; or a lost group of hikers confused about which direction to take. The list is endless.

Some decision problems are trivial, such as choosing your breakfast. For example, if Apple Jacks and Bran Flakes are the only cereals in your cupboard, and if you hate Bran Flakes (they belong to your roommate), then your decision is obvious: eat the Apple Jacks. In contrast, a manager's choice of whether or not to embark on a risky research and development project or a lawmaker's decision on a bill are more complex decision problems.

This chapter develops a language that will be useful in laying out rigorous foundations to support many of the ideas underlying strategic interaction in games. The language will be formal, having the benefit of being able to represent a host of different problems and provide a set of tools that will lend structure to the way in which we think about decision problems. The formalities are a vehicle that will help make ideas precise and clear, yet in no way will they overwhelm our ability and intent to keep the more practical aspect of our problems at the forefront of the analysis.

In developing this formal language, we will be forced to specify a set of assumptions about the behavior of decision makers or players. These assumptions will, at times, seem both acceptable and innocuous. At other times, however, the assumptions will be almost offensive in that they will require a significant leap of faith. Still, as the analysis unfolds, we will see the conclusions that derive from the assumptions that we make, and we will come to appreciate how sensitive the conclusions are to these assumptions.

As with any theoretical framework, the value of our conclusions will be only as good as the sensibility of our assumptions. There is a famous saying in computer science—"garbage in, garbage out"—meaning that if invalid data are entered into a system, the resulting output will also be invalid. Although originally applied to computer software, this statement holds true more generally, being applicable, for example, to decision-making theories like the one developed herein. Hence we will at times challenge our assumptions with facts and question the validity of our analysis. Nevertheless we will argue in favor of the framework developed here as a useful benchmark.

1.1 Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences

Consider the examples described earlier: choosing a breakfast, deciding about a research project, or voting on a bill. These problems all share a similar structure: an individual, or player, faces a situation in which he has to choose one of several alternatives. Each choice will result in some outcome, and the consequences of that outcome will be borne by the player himself (and sometimes other players too).

For the player to approach this problem in an intelligent way, he must be aware of three fundamental features of the problem: What are his possible choices? What is the result of each of those choices? How will each result affect his well-being? Understanding these three aspects of a problem will help the player choose his best action. This simple observation offers us a first working definition that will apply to any decision problem:

The Decision Problem A decision problem consists of three features:

1. Actions are all the alternatives from which the player can choose.

2. Outcomes are the possible consequences that can result from any of the actions.

3. Preferences describe how the player ranks the set of possible outcomes, from most desired to least desired. The preference relation [??] describes the player's preferences, and the notation x [??] y means "x is at least as good as y."

To make things simple, let's begin with our rather trivial decision problem of choosing between Apple Jacks and Bran Flakes. We can define the set of actions as A = {a, b}, where a denotes the choice of Apple Jacks and b denotes the choice of Bran Flakes. In this simple example our actions are practically synonymous with the outcomes, yet to make the distinction clear we will denote the set of outcomes by X = {x, y}, where x denotes eating Apple Jacks (the consequence of choosing Apple Jacks) and y denotes eating Bran Flakes.

1.1.1 Preference Relations

Turning to the less familiar notion of a preference relation, imagine that you prefer eating Apple Jacks to Bran Flakes. Then we will write x [??] y, which should be...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Princeton Univers. Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2012
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0691129088
• ISBN 13: 9780691129082
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Anzahl der Seiten: 396
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: gpsr@libri.de; gpsr@libri.de; ; Friedensallee 273; Hamburg; 22763; Deutschland