The Evolution of a Nation: How Geography and Law Shaped the American States (Princeton Economic History of the Western World) - Hardcover

Berkowitz, Daniel; Clay, Karen B.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0691136041 ISBN 13: 9780691136042

Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2011

Inhaltsangabe

Although political and legal institutions are essential to any nation's economic development, the forces that have shaped these institutions are poorly understood. Drawing on rich evidence about the development of the American states from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth century, this book documents the mechanisms through which geographical and historical conditions--such as climate, access to water transportation, and early legal systems--impacted political and judicial institutions and economic growth.


The book shows how a state's geography and climate influenced whether elites based their wealth in agriculture or trade. States with more occupationally diverse elites in 1860 had greater levels of political competition in their legislature from 1866 to 2000. The book also examines the effects of early legal systems. Because of their colonial history, thirteen states had an operational civil-law legal system prior to statehood. All of these states except Louisiana would later adopt common law. By the late eighteenth century, the two legal systems differed in their balances of power. In civil-law systems, judiciaries were subordinate to legislatures, whereas in common-law systems, the two were more equal. Former civil-law states and common-law states exhibit persistent differences in the structure of their courts, the retention of judges, and judicial budgets. Moreover, changes in court structures, retention procedures, and budgets occur under very different conditions in civil-law and common-law states.



The Evolution of a Nation illustrates how initial geographical and historical conditions can determine the evolution of political and legal institutions and long-run growth.

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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Daniel Berkowitz is professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh. Karen B. Clay is associate professor of economics at Carnegie Mellon University.

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"In this book, Berkowitz and Clay make major contributions to understanding the nature of economic development. They do a superb job examining the evidence about the importance of geography, institutions, and laws in influencing the causes and consequences of state courts and legislatures from the colonial era up to today. Their approach and findings will become central to the ongoing study of economic growth."--Stanley L. Engerman, University of Rochester

"This remarkable book tackles one of the most important and yet underresearched topics in institutional economics: how institutions persist over time and the mechanisms via which they do so. Focusing on political competition and judicial independence across U.S. states, the book combines rich historical narrative with sophisticated social science and is a must-read for anyone with an interest in comparative institutional and economic development."--James Robinson, Harvard University

"Berkowitz and Clay not only produce convincing evidence of the effect of political competition and judicial independence on economic performance in American states. They also present a fascinating and comprehensive institutional history of the United States using the latest quantitative tools in the social sciences. A great piece of modern institutional and historical analysis."--Gerard Roland, University of California, Berkeley

"This book is the latest evidence suggesting that institutions have long lasting effects on the organization and performance of societies. Using the legal origins of American states, Berkowitz and Clay show that accidents of being colonized by a common or civil law power reverberate right up to the present day. Their results challenge those who believe that institutions are not important in economic history. They also challenge those who believe institutions are important to explain how, despite ongoing institutional change, patterns from the past continue to influence behavior in the present."--John Wallis, University of Maryland

"Berkowitz and Clay provide an imaginative integration of recent scholarship from a wide range of disciplines, including economics, political economy, economic geography, the theory of institutions, and law. The result is a fresh look at American history which emphasizes the persistence of institutions and the long-term implications of common law versus civil law traditions in the various colonies."--Barry Weingast, Stanford University

"This book is a tour de force on the persistent but often neglected influence of geography on the development of key political and legal institutions in the U.S. states. Along the way, it pulls off the seemingly impossible by opening up new lines of inquiry in not one but as many as four disciplines: law, economics, political science, and history."--Lee Epstein, University of Southern California

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"In this book, Berkowitz and Clay make major contributions to understanding the nature of economic development. They do a superb job examining the evidence about the importance of geography, institutions, and laws in influencing the causes and consequences of state courts and legislatures from the colonial era up to today. Their approach and findings will become central to the ongoing study of economic growth."--Stanley L. Engerman, University of Rochester

"This remarkable book tackles one of the most important and yet underresearched topics in institutional economics: how institutions persist over time and the mechanisms via which they do so. Focusing on political competition and judicial independence across U.S. states, the book combines rich historical narrative with sophisticated social science and is a must-read for anyone with an interest in comparative institutional and economic development."--James Robinson, Harvard University

"Berkowitz and Clay not only produce convincing evidence of the effect of political competition and judicial independence on economic performance in American states. They also present a fascinating and comprehensive institutional history of the United States using the latest quantitative tools in the social sciences. A great piece of modern institutional and historical analysis."--Gerard Roland, University of California, Berkeley

"This book is the latest evidence suggesting that institutions have long lasting effects on the organization and performance of societies. Using the legal origins of American states, Berkowitz and Clay show that accidents of being colonized by a common or civil law power reverberate right up to the present day. Their results challenge those who believe that institutions are not important in economic history. They also challenge those who believe institutions are important to explain how, despite ongoing institutional change, patterns from the past continue to influence behavior in the present."--John Wallis, University of Maryland

"Berkowitz and Clay provide an imaginative integration of recent scholarship from a wide range of disciplines, including economics, political economy, economic geography, the theory of institutions, and law. The result is a fresh look at American history which emphasizes the persistence of institutions and the long-term implications of common law versus civil law traditions in the various colonies."--Barry Weingast, Stanford University

"This book is a tour de force on the persistent but often neglected influence of geography on the development of key political and legal institutions in the U.S. states. Along the way, it pulls off the seemingly impossible by opening up new lines of inquiry in not one but as many as four disciplines: law, economics, political science, and history."--Lee Epstein, University of Southern California

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The Evolution of a Nation

HOW GEOGRAPHY AND LAW SHAPED THE AMERICAN STATESBy Daniel Berkowitz Karen B. Clay

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2012 Princeton University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-13604-2

Contents

Acknowledgments.......................................................................ixChapter One Introduction.............................................................1Chapter Two Legal Initial Conditions.................................................16Chapter Three Initial Conditions and State Political Competition.....................60Chapter Four The Mechanism...........................................................92Chapter Five State Courts............................................................133Chapter Six Legislatures and Courts..................................................169Chapter Seven Institutions and Outcomes..............................................192References............................................................................203Index.................................................................................223

Chapter One

Introduction

Countries around the world exhibit striking differences in per capita income. For example, in 2008, income in the United States, Singapore, and Switzerland was roughly forty times higher than income in Nepal and Uganda. There are also differences within countries. In the United States in 2000 income in the state of Connecticut was almost twice as high as income in the state of Mississippi. In Russia, income in the city of Moscow was six and a half times higher than income in the neighboring Ivanovo oblast. What drives the disparities?

The disparities appear to be driven in part by political and legal institutions. Political institutions such as legislatures influence key aspects of the economy, including the rights individuals hold vis-à-vis land, labor, capital, materials, and intellectual property. Legal institutions—in particular courts—play an integral role in defining and enforcing rights. This discussion pushes the question back one level. What drives differences in political and legal institutions across countries?

A recent literature suggests that differences in institutions and income are driven by a combination of geographic and historical factors. Gallup, Sachs, and Melllinger (1998), Mellinger, Gallup, and Sachs (2000), Sachs and Malaney (2002), Sachs (2003), and Nunn and Puga (2009) argue that geography influences income through its effects on public health, productivity, trade costs, population growth, and investment. Diamond (1997) makes the case that distance from historically critical trade routes and centers of knowledge influences income through its impact on the diffusion of technology and knowledge.

Several studies argue that geography and the disease environment at time of settlement have influenced the character of institutions in former European colonies. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997 and 2005) argue that climate and soil shaped the subsequent character of political institutions. In colonies that were warm and rainy and had soil suitable for sugar and other staples, "bad" political institutions representing the narrow interests of wealthy elites emerged. In colonies that were colder and dryer and had different soil conditions, "good" political institutions representing broader interests were established. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) provide evidence that the disease environment at time of settlement shaped the quality of institutions that protect property rights. In colonies where early settlers had a good chance of surviving, "good" institutions that protected property rights and limited the power of the government to expropriate emerged. By contrast, in colonies where early settlers were likely to contract life-threatening diseases, "bad" institutions that allowed settlers to easily extract resources emerged.

Historical factors such as legal and governmental institutions also appear to have been influential. France and many other European countries inherited or appropriated a civil-law legal system early in their histories. Although civil law is conventionally referred to as a legal system, it represents a particular approach to governance that goes well beyond the courts. Through colonization, these countries spread civil-law legal systems to many other parts of the world, including North America, South America, Asia, and Africa. England, for a whole host of historical reasons, developed a quite different legal and governmental system that came to be known as common law. Through colonization, it too spread common law to many other parts of the world.

Documenting how and why geography and other historical factors have had a persistent influence on political and legal institutions is challenging. The challenge arises because many countries lack the detailed qualitative and quantitative evidence necessary to document persistence and to test the relevance of alternative mechanisms. Lacking data on political institutions, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) investigate a variety of indirect measures such as the timing and intensity of the extension of the voting franchise, the funding of public schools, and the allocation of land grants to immigrants in the Americas. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) use a model to explain persistence of political institutions even in the face of large changes in the franchise. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and Klerman and Mahoney (2007) use historical evidence on England and France to show how legal origins shaped the evolution of legal procedures and judicial independence. Our attempts in two earlier papers to understand how and why colonial legal institutions have had persistent effects on American state constitutions and state courts (Berkowitz and Clay 2005, 2006) were a major motivation for this book.

This book uses detailed historical evidence to analyze how and why geographical and colonial initial conditions have affected the evolution of legislatures and courts in the American states. The American states have relatively diverse geographic and colonial initial conditions, well-documented historical experiences, and rich data on politics and courts going back to the 1860s. At the same time, a focus on the American experience avoids the problem of analyzing countries that often differ along many different dimensions and have had wildly different historical experiences. The primary goal of this book, then, is to understand political and legal institutions. In the conclusion, however, initial conditions are used to shed light on the contribution of political and legal institutions to long-term growth.

Figure 1.1 outlines the structure of the argument in the book. It is useful to begin by considering the two types of institutions of interest—state legislatures and state courts—near the top of the figure. Political competition in state legislatures is of interest because it is thought to lead to better economic and social outcomes. In the international context, Gryzmala-Buesse (2007), Jackson et al. (2005), Rodrik (1999), and Remington (2010) have found strong positive associations between the extent of political competition and outcomes such as government efficiency and corruption, the entry and subsequent growth of new firms, the provision of public goods, tax compliance, and manufacturing wages. The relationship between political competition and economic and social outcomes in the United States has been the focus of considerable discussion, but causal inference has been...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Princeton University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2011
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0691136041
• ISBN 13: 9780691136042
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Anzahl der Seiten: 234
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Buchbär; info@buchbaer.de; ; Weberstr. 67; Osnabrück; 49084; Deutschland