Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics - Softcover

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0691140286 ISBN 13: 9780691140285

Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2009

Inhaltsangabe

Since they were pioneered in the 1970s by Robert Keohane and others, the broad range of neoliberal institutionalist theories of international relations have grown in importance. In an increasingly globalized world, the realist and neorealist focus on states, military power, conflict, and anarchy has more and more given way to a recognition of the importance of nonstate actors, nonmilitary forms of power, interdependence, international institutions, and cooperation. Drawing together a group of leading international relations theorists, this book explores the frontiers of new research on the role of such forces in world politics.


The topics explored in these chapters include the uneven role of peacekeepers in civil wars, the success of human rights treaties in promoting women's rights, the disproportionate power of developing countries in international environmental policy negotiations, and the prospects for Asian regional cooperation. While all of the chapters demonstrate the empirical and theoretical vitality of liberal and institutionalist theories, they also highlight weaknesses that should drive future research and influence the reform of foreign policy and international organizations.


In addition to the editors, the contributors are Vinod Aggarawal, Jonathan Aronson, Elizabeth DeSombre, Page Fortna, Michael Gilligan, Lisa Martin, Timothy McKeown, Ronald Mitchell, Layna Mosley, Beth Simmons, Randall Stone, and Ann Tickner.

Über diesen Titel

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Helen V. Milner is the B. C. Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Andrew Moravcsik is professor of politics and international affairs, and director of the European Union Program, at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.

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"Dedicated to the life's work of Robert O. Keohane, this is a book of exceptional intellectual coherence and vigor. A large number of Keohane's distinguished former students here celebrate his seminal contribution to the field of international relations and international political economy. The chapters explore and exemplify his widely recognized and cited institutionalist framework. The volume is a testimony to the undiluted impact Keohane's scholarship continues to have on legions of students and colleagues."--Peter Katzenstein, Cornell University

"Robert O. Keohane is a giant in the field of international relations, not only because he has produced innovative ideas and approaches, but also because of his teaching and mentoring. This edited volume by former Keohane students and colleagues is a fitting tribute to his oeuvre, pushing his thinking on power, interdependence, and the role of nonstate actors into previously understudied domains and dimensions of institutionalism, with results that the rest of us might not have thought of before but which won't entirely surprise the master himself. Highly recommended for all serious students of international relations."--John Gerard Ruggie, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

"This important and timely book pushes the theoretical envelope of neoliberal institutionalism and represents an important step forward in international relations theory. The scholarship is sound, well-documented, and effectively presented, and the ideas are framed and explored in ways that will give them lasting value."--Giulio Gallarotti, Wesleyan University

"Covering a wide range of topics and probing the strengths as well as some weaknesses of neoliberal institutionalism, this book will interest a broad cross-section of international relations scholars."--Edward D. Mansfield, University of Pennsylvania

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Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2009 Princeton University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-14028-5

Contents

List of Figures and Tables.......................................................................................................................................ixContributors.....................................................................................................................................................xiPreface..........................................................................................................................................................xiiiChapter 1 Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics: Research Frontiers Helen V. Milner....................................................3Chapter 2 Institutions, Power, and Interdependence Randall W. Stone............................................................................................31Chapter 3 The Transaction Costs Approach to International Institutions Michael J. Gilligan.....................................................................50Chapter 4 The Influence of International Institutions: Institutional Design, Compliance, Effectiveness, and Endogeneity Ronald B. Mitchell.....................66Chapter 5 Peacekeepers as Signals: The Demand for International Peacekeeping in Civil Wars V. Page Fortna and Lisa L. Martin...................................87Chapter 6 Women and International Institutions: The Effects of the Women's Convention on Female Education Beth A. Simmons......................................108Chapter 7 Private Governance for the Public Good? Exploring Private Sector Participation in Global Financial Regulation Layna Mosley...........................126Chapter 8 Power, Interdependence, and Domestic Politics in International Environmental Cooperation Elizabeth R. DeSombre.......................................147Chapter 9 The Dynamics of Trade Liberalization Vinod K. Aggarwal...............................................................................................164Chapter 10 International Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World Jonathan D. Aronson.................................................................185Chapter 11 The Big Influence of Big Allies: Transgovernmental Relations as a Tool of Statecraft Timothy J. McKeown.............................................204Chapter 12 On Taking Religious Worldviews Seriously J. Ann Tickner.............................................................................................223Chapter 13 Robert Keohane: Political Theorist Andrew Moravcsik.................................................................................................243Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................................265Index............................................................................................................................................................291

Chapter One

Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics RESEARCH FRONTIERS Helen V. Milner

IN THE MID-1970S a new paradigm emerged in international relations. While many of the ideas in this new paradigm had been discussed previously, Keohane and Nye put these pieces together in a new and fruitful way to erect a competitor to realism and its later formulation, neorealism. First elaborated in Power and Interdependence, this paradigm is now usually referred to as neoliberal institutionalism. In the thirty years since Power and Interdependence, this new paradigm has developed substantially and has become the main alternative to realism for understanding international relations. Keohane's seminal work, After Hegemony, which is a centerstone of the neoliberal paradigm, provided the most compelling theoretical justification for the existence and role of international institutions in world politics. Since then the progress of the neoliberal paradigm can be plainly seen in a number of key works, such as Legalization and World Politics, The Rational Design of International Institutions, and Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Each of these projects, and many others, takes the key ideas of the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm and pushes them forward into new areas of research. They attest to the continuing theoretical power of the paradigm.

Furthermore, the paradigm has proven highly robust empirically. Globalization, for instance, has made the world ever more tightly connected, as Power and Interdependence foresaw years ago. Among other trends in world politics, including the increasing prominence of nonstate actors such as multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international institutions, globalization has made the prevailing competing paradigm, neorealism, a less powerful explanation of international relations, and has raised the importance of the neoliberal paradigm. The key ideas articulated by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s are increasingly winning the theoretical and empirical battles in international relations to understand a globalized world.

The four key elements of the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm are emphases on nonstate actors, including international institutions, on forms of power besides military force and threats, on the role of interdependence in addition to anarchy in the international system, and on the importance of cooperation as well as conflict in international politics. These elements contrast starkly with the tenets of realism and neorealism. Keohane originally developed many of these themes in his works, but other scholars have taken many of his ideas and advanced them substantially. This volume is intended to extend our theoretical and empirical understanding of the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm.

This volume assesses the progress that has been made in developing the paradigm and discusses areas where it has encountered new problems. Some of the chapters apply ideas from the paradigm to understand issues that have become increasingly visible, such as women's rights, religion, intellectual property rights, and peacekeeping. Others address anomalies and puzzles that the paradigm has encountered, and suggests ways that it can deal with them. The volume shows the broad range of topics addressed by, and the increasing theoretical depth of, the paradigm. Neoliberal institutionalism is alive and well as a theoretical construct in international relations today.

Neoliberal institutionalism shares a number of features with the paradigm that it contests, neorealism. The approaches in this volume also tend to share these features. Importantly, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism argue for a systemic-level theory of international politics. Systemic theorists believe that the international system exercises an important influence upon states; this environment constrains and shapes them powerfully. Because of this, systemic theorists argue that these external forces must be taken into account first in any theoretical explanation of international relations. To fail to do so would lead to the confusing proliferation of domestic variables to explain a systemic outcome. Neorealists see anarchy and the balance of capabilities as the central systemic factors influencing states. Neoliberal institutionalists accept the importance of these factors, but they also think that the effects of anarchy are mitigated by both mutual interdependence and the institutionalized nature of modern world politics, especially with respect to certain issues and among certain countries. While agreeing that systemic theory is preferred, neoliberal institutionalism does not focus solely on anarchy and the balance of power as the sole elements of the system.

Realists and neoliberal institutionalists also share the view that states are critical actors in world politics, and that they are by and large rational. Neoliberal institutionalism, however, again goes beyond neorealism in admitting that other important actors exist in world politics, such as international institutions and NGOs. Finally, the majority of neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists share a commitment to the same general epistemological orientation. They tend to be rationalists and positivists who are interested in empirical tests of the causal propositions their theories advance. Indeed, the increasing empirical sophistication of research in the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm is an important feature of the field and of this volume. The authors generally adopt these three assumptions, although some of them argue for more attention to domestic politics (see, e.g., DeSombre and McKeown) and one for a move beyond positivism (i.e., Tickner).

The Neoliberal Institutionalist Paradigm: Its Four Elements and Their Elaboration over Time

In what follows I discuss each of the four elements of the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm and their evolution over the last thirty years in the international relations literature. The four elements that differentiate this from other paradigms are an emphasis on nonstate actors including international institutions, on forms of power besides military force and threats, on the role of interdependence in addition to anarchy in the international system, and on the importance of cooperation as well as conflict in international politics. I argue that progress has been made in the paradigm and that the chapters here represent the research frontier now.

Nonstate Actors in World Politics

Starting from a systemic level theory of international politics, neoliberal institutionalism acknowledges the importance of states and their decentralized environment. But this paradigm also insists on the relevance of nonstate actors; and it acknowledges a wide variety of such actors, from multinational corporations to NGOs to international institutions. A central focus, however, is international institutions and regimes. Further, as opposed to the earlier focus on international organizations, neoliberal institutionalism takes a broader view of these actors and includes "sets of governing arrangements" that involve "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge." This broader definition of institutions (i.e., regimes) was a step forward since it acknowledged that not all institutions had to have physical headquarters and staffs. International institutions are a broader category of actor than organizations, which they subsume. There exist many sets of state practices that are institutionalized in the sense that norms, rules, and principles exist that guide states' behavior in particular issue areas. For neoliberal institutionalism, world politics is institutionalized, although to differing extents in different issue areas and regions.

International institutions have proliferated recently, as Stone points out. Almost every area of global cooperation has been formalized into an international institution, if not an actual organization. The number of formal international organizations has risen from three hundred in 1977 to well over six thousand today. Many of these have expanded their membership; for example, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are now global, including almost all countries in the world in their membership, and the World Trade Organization is not far behind. The European Union has also expanded greatly since its foundation. The purviews of these institutions have grown to reach many issue areas that were once considered purely domestic. The growing place of international institutions in world politics cannot be denied. Furthermore, the growing reach of international institutions brings into question the power of neorealist theory; such institutions should not be durable and salient features of international politics according to neorealism.

Early debates centered on whether these institutions mattered. The neorealist reaction was to claim that the distribution of capabilities determined this institutional framework and that the strongest powers were the ones that imposed their norms, practices, and rules on the rest of the world. Hegemonic stability theory was one version of this response, which located the genesis of international institutions for a given time period in the hands of the hegemonic power. Much like Gilpin's work on cycles of war and change, hegemonic stability theory saw institutional change as a function of changes in underlying power relations. Other scholars claimed that states would not cooperate on anything that was not already in their national interest, and hence that cooperation would be very thin. Concerns about relative gains in cooperating were one explanation for the limits to cooperation. Others noted that institutions may make cooperation more appealing but only in the sense that they make noncooperation much more costly for small states. This debate over the power of international institutions has carried on for many years as neorealists have cast doubt on the evidence that nonstate actors matter.

Neoliberal institutionalists have responded in a variety of ways. Keohane has argued that the post–World War II institutions were in part a product of American power but that since their establishment they have evolved into more autonomous entities. He and others, for instance, have noted the continuing relevance of international institutions set up during the Cold War, such as NATO, the EU, and the United Nations, despite the end of the bipolar superpower rivalry nearly two decades ago. This shows that changes in regimes are not simple functions of changes in underlying power relations, as realists assume. Rather, regime change may occur when changes in the structure of the issue area and the resources relevant to it take place. It is the interaction of power and complex interdependence that combine to create institutional change, as discussed by Stone and others in this volume.

Neoliberal institutionalists, however, have turned increasingly to explore the conditions under which and ways in which world politics is institutionalized. Keohane proposed an early theory about why countries would want to create and join international institutions. His theory argues that a country, being rational, will only demand and join international institutions if those institutions can provide net benefits for them relative to the reversion point, which is the outcome if no agreement to join is reached. He sees these benefits as being reduced transaction costs, increased information flows, and reduced uncertainty. In providing these functions, international institutions help states negotiate mutually beneficial agreements that they otherwise would not be able to arrange. In part, this cooperation results from the strategies of reciprocity that can take hold more easily in such institutionalized environments. Game theorists have emphasized slightly different functions; they have focused on how regimes can reduce players' discount rates, increase information flows by signaling players' types, enhance the credibility of domestic commitments, and alter payoff structures through repeated interactions and reciprocity. Others have emphasized that regimes can change actors' preferences and, more deeply, their identities. The constructivist research program has grown out of this approach. It constitutes a large and vibrant literature, which we do not touch on here except briefly in the contribution by Tickner. The chapters here focus on the first two types of rationalist explanations of international institutions and their functions.

Recent work on a variety of international institutions has shown that they can perform these functions and enhance the attainment of mutually beneficial agreements. Martin shows that economic sanctions can work better if they can be multilateralized in a regime; in such a setting greater information flows make countries less likely to cheat on their obligations. Burley and Mattli point out how unexpectedly powerful the European Court of Justice has become, and how autonomously from national courts it has developed. Ikenberry concludes that if powerful states can bind their hands by joining international institutions, they can strike more mutually beneficial agreements with the other countries in the world. Stone points out that the IMF can ensure greater compliance and hence better outcomes when powerful states do not intervene in its operations with economically troubled states. Davis in her study of the WTO concludes that it can help countries overcome domestic opposition and conclude mutually valuable trade agreements. Meunier shows how the EU can make a difference for European countries in their ability to strike trade bargains with other countries. Some have argued that this institutionalization of world politics is becoming increasingly legalized, and that this legalization is having important effects on international cooperation. Others have tried to explain the many different forms that international institutions take to perform some of the same functions but in different environments. All of this research shows that international institutions of various sorts exist, function in ways neoliberal institutionalist theories predict, and have positive effects on interstate cooperation. They represent empirical progress in the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm.

The essays in this volume take a further step forward, as I discuss below. A key point of debate between neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism is the explanation of institutional change. For neorealists, institutions change when the underlying balance of power among states changes. This causal path shows the dependence of institutions on state power and ultimately their epiphenomenality. For neoliberal institutionalism, institutions change in part because of their success or failure in accomplishing the tasks they are delegated. In his chapter, for instance, Randall Stone takes up the question of what accounts for change in international institutions. He notes that most of the key extant institutions are under pressure to reform; the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, and NATO, among others, have been seriously criticized lately for failing to perform adequately. Why have these institutions seemingly failed to achieve their optimal outcomes? In Keohane's later work, he addressed three broad categories of explanations: power, international processes, and the structure of international institutions. In his view, explanations based on the distribution of power in the international system fared poorly; indeed, in terms of its theoretical and empirical aspects the theory of hegemonic stability fared the worst.

According to Stone, two other factors are primarily responsible for the poor results of many international institutions. As Keohane has previously noted, the costs associated with bargaining over issues and institutional procedures are high and pose problems for states. The curse of bargaining is that the necessary condition for successful cooperation—low discount rates—is precisely the condition that makes bargaining most costly; this makes outcomes most inefficient when bargainers most value the future. In addition, Stone notes that the internal dynamics of institutions can plague cooperation. International institutions change through a political process that privileges insiders, who can impose their preferences on countries that join subsequently because voting rules privilege the status quo. In general, those who create the institution can become significant impediments to new agreements that would deepen international cooperation. Thus international institutions are slow to expand and adapt to new areas of potential cooperation because of the costs of bargaining and the entrenched interests of founding members. Stone's pessimistic view, however, lays blame for the shortcomings of international institutions on features other than power politics.

(Continues...)

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Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Princeton University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2009
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0691140286
• ISBN 13: 9780691140285
• Einband: Tapa blanda
• Anzahl der Seiten: 320
• Herausgeber: Milner Helen V., Moravcsik Andrew
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar