A major departure from mainstream security studies, this book mounts a thoughtful challenge to realist theories of crisis bargaining. It tests the proposition that normative standards of behavior influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, it examines the construction of bilateral norms as the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent interactions over the same issue.
Drawing on institutionalist arguments about the informational impact of norms, Christopher Gelpi contends that norms act as signals that give meaning to other states' behavior in at least two important ways. First, they provide a mutually acceptable focal point for limiting both demands and concessions. Second, security norms change the context in which coercive behavior is interpreted. That is, norms can cause coercive behavior to be interpreted as punishment rather than aggression.
Gelpi tests this argument against its most prominent competitor--a realist model of crisis bargaining--in three stages. First, he uses a probit analysis to perform a quantitative test on the population of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. Second, he conducts detailed case studies of the Cienfuegos Submarine Conflict and the Six Day War. Finally, he conducts a second statistical analysis examining the conditions under which security norms will succeed or fail. While hypotheses derived from realist coercion theory receive only mixed support, Gelpi finds strong evidence that states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Christopher Gelpi
"Too little attention has been given to the role of norms in guiding state behavior, and Gelpi has found a creative way of conducting an empirical test of their role. His is a book I enjoyed reading--a well-constructed professional investigation with intriguing findings. It provides welcome empirical ammunition for institutionalists in their ongoing debate with realists."--Russell Leng, Middlebury College
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, USA
PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers WP-9780691146713
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 7594765-n
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, USA
Paperback. Zustand: New. A major departure from mainstream security studies, this book mounts a thoughtful challenge to realist theories of crisis bargaining. It tests the proposition that normative standards of behavior influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, it examines the construction of bilateral norms as the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent interactions over the same issue. Drawing on institutionalist arguments about the informational impact of norms, Christopher Gelpi contends that norms act as signals that give meaning to other states' behavior in at least two important ways. First, they provide a mutually acceptable focal point for limiting both demands and concessions. Second, security norms change the context in which coercive behavior is interpreted. That is, norms can cause coercive behavior to be interpreted as punishment rather than aggression. Gelpi tests this argument against its most prominent competitor--a realist model of crisis bargaining--in three stages.First, he uses a probit analysis to perform a quantitative test on the population of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. Second, he conducts detailed case studies of the Cienfuegos Submarine Conflict and the Six Day War. Finally, he conducts a second statistical analysis examining the conditions under which security norms will succeed or fail. While hypotheses derived from realist coercion theory receive only mixed support, Gelpi finds strong evidence that states can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers LU-9780691146713
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Vereinigtes Königreich
PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers WP-9780691146713
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irland
Zustand: New. 2009. Paperback. . . . . . Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers V9780691146713
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 7594765
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, USA
Zustand: New. 2009. Paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers V9780691146713
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback / softback. Zustand: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers B9780691146713
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 209 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.50 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers __0691146713
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 7594765-n
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar