Logic: The Laws of Truth - Hardcover

Smith, Nicholas J.J.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0691151636 ISBN 13: 9780691151632

Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2012

Inhaltsangabe

Logic is essential to correct reasoning and also has important theoretical applications in philosophy, computer science, linguistics, and mathematics. This book provides an exceptionally clear introduction to classical logic, with a unique approach that emphasizes both the hows and whys of logic. Here Nicholas Smith thoroughly covers the formal tools and techniques of logic while also imparting a deeper understanding of their underlying rationales and broader philosophical significance. In addition, this is the only introduction to logic available today that presents all the major forms of proof--trees, natural deduction in all its major variants, axiomatic proofs, and sequent calculus. The book also features numerous exercises, with solutions available on an accompanying website. Logic is the ideal textbook for undergraduates and graduate students seeking a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the subject. * Provides an essential introduction to classical logic * Emphasizes the how and why of logic * Covers both formal and philosophical issues * Presents all the major forms of proof--from trees to sequent calculus * Features numerous exercises, with solutions available at http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~njjsmith/lawsoftruth * The ideal textbook for undergraduates and graduate students

Über diesen Titel

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Nicholas J. J. Smith is senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Sydney in Australia. He is the author of Vagueness and Degrees of Truth.

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"Smith's book combines accessibility with comprehensiveness in a way that I have not found in other texts. It is very readable and well paced, but does not sacrifice precision. Difficult issues aren't glossed over or skipped, but are introduced at a gentle pace for novice logicians. As a teacher of logic, I see real benefits in Smith's approach."--Jennifer Duke-Yonge, Macquarie University, Australia

"Lots of books aim to provide a first introduction to symbolic logic. I predict that this one will be widely adopted throughout the English-speaking world. One of its unique strengths is that it broaches important philosophical issues that naturally arise in connection with symbolic logic. The book thus serves both as an introduction to logic itself and to the philosophy of logic."--Stewart Shapiro, editor ofThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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LOGIC

The Laws of TruthBy NICHOLAS J. J. SMITH

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2012 Princeton University Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-15163-2

Contents

Preface..................................................................xiAcknowledgments..........................................................xvPART I Propositional Logic...............................................11 Propositions and Arguments.............................................32 The Language of Propositional Logic....................................323 Semantics of Propositional Logic.......................................494 Uses of Truth Tables...................................................635 Logical Form...........................................................796 Connectives: Translation and Adequacy..................................977 Trees for Propositional Logic..........................................134PART II Predicate Logic..................................................1618 The Language of Monadic Predicate Logic................................1639 Semantics of Monadic Predicate Logic...................................18910 Trees for Monadic Predicate Logic.....................................21111 Models, Propositions, and Ways the World Could Be.....................24212 General Predicate Logic...............................................26413 Identity..............................................................298PART III Foundations and Variations......................................35514 Metatheory............................................................35715 Other Methods of Proof................................................38516 Set Theory............................................................438Notes....................................................................467References...............................................................509Index....................................................................515

Chapter One

Propositions and Arguments

1.1 What Is Logic?

Somebody who wants to do a good job of measuring up a room for purposes of cutting and laying carpet needs to know some basic mathematics—but mathematics is not the science of room measuring or carpet cutting. In mathematics one talks about angles, lengths, areas, and so on, and one discusses the laws governing them: if this length is smaller than that one, then that angle must be bigger than this one, and so on. Walls and carpets are things that have lengths and areas, so knowing the general laws governing the latter is helpful when it comes to specific tasks such as cutting a roll of carpet in such a way as to minimize the number of cuts and amount of waste. Yet although knowing basic mathematics is essential to being able to measure carpets well, mathematics is not rightly seen as the science of carpet measuring. Rather, mathematics is an abstract science which gets applied to problems about carpet. While mathematics does indeed tell us deeply useful things about how to cut carpets, telling us these things is not essential to it: from the point of view of mathematics, it is enough that there be angles, lengths, and areas considered in the abstract; it does not matter if there are no carpets or floors.

Logic is often described as the study of reasoning. Knowing basic logic is indeed essential to being able to reason well—yet it would be misleading to say that human reasoning is the primary subject matter of logic. Rather, logic stands to reasoning as mathematics stands to carpet cutting. Suppose you are looking for your keys, and you know they are either in your pocket, on the table, in the drawer, or in the car. You have checked the first three and the keys aren't there, so you reason that they must be in the car. This is a good way to reason. Why? Because reasoning this way cannot lead from true premises or starting points to a false conclusion or end point. As Charles Peirce put it in the nineteenth century, when modern logic was being developed:

The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. Consequently, reasoning is good if it be such as to give a true conclusion from true premises, and not otherwise. [Peirce, 1877, para. 365]

This is where logic comes in. Logic concerns itself with propositions—things that are true or false—and their components, and it seeks to discover laws governing the relationships between the truth or falsity of different propositions. One such law is that if a proposition offers a fixed number of alternatives (e.g., the keys are either (i) in your pocket, (ii) on the table, (iii) in the drawer, or (iv) in the car), and all but one of them are false, then the overall proposition cannot be true unless the remaining alternative is true. Such general laws about truth can usefully be applied in reasoning: it is because the general law holds that the particular piece of reasoning we imagined above is a good one. The law tells us that if the keys really are in one of the four spots, and are not in any of the first three, then they must be in the fourth; hence the reasoning cannot lead from a true starting point to a false conclusion.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that logic is itself the science of reasoning. Rather, logic is the science of truth. (Note that by "science" we mean simply systematic study.) As Gottlob Frege, one of the pioneers of modern logic, put it:

Just as "beautiful" points the ways for aesthetics and "good" for ethics, so do words like "true" for logic. All sciences have truth as their goal; but logic is also concerned with it in a quite different way: logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat. To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. [Frege, 1918–19, 351]

One of the goals of a baker is to produce hot things (freshly baked loaves). It is not the goal of a baker to develop a full understanding of the laws of heat: that is the goal of the physicist. Similarly, the physicist wants to produce true things (true theories about the world)—but it is not the goal of physics to develop a full understanding of the laws of truth. That is the goal of the logician. The task in logic is to develop a framework in which we can give a detailed—yet fully general—representation of propositions (i.e., those things which are true or false) and their components, and identify the general laws governing the ways in which truth distributes itself across them.

Logic, then, is primarily concerned with truth, not with reasoning. Yet logic is very usefully applied to reasoning—for we want to avoid reasoning in ways that could lead us from true starting points to false conclusions. Furthermore, just as mathematics can be applied to many other things besides carpet cutting, logic can also be applied to many other things apart from human reasoning. For example, logic plays a fundamental role in computer science and computing technology, it has important applications to the study of natural and artificial languages, and it plays a central role in the theoretical foundations of mathematics itself.

1.2 Propositions

We said that logic is concerned with the laws of truth. Our primary objects of study in logic will therefore be those things which can be true or false—and so it will be convenient for us to have a word for such entities. We shall use the term "proposition" for this purpose. That is, propositions are those things which can be true or false. Now what sort of things are propositions, and what is involved in a proposition's being true or false? The fundamental idea is this: a proposition is a claim about how things are—it represents the world as being some way; it is true if the world is that way, and otherwise it is false. This idea goes back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle:

SOCRATES: But how about truth, then? You would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

S: And there are true and false propositions?

H: To be sure.

S: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?

H: Yes, what other answer is possible? [Plato, c. 360 BC]

We define what the true and the false are. To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. [Aristotle, c. 350 BC-a, Book IV (Γ) §7]

In contrast, nonpropositions do not represent the world as being thus or so: they are not claims about how things are. Hence, nonpropositions cannot be said to be true or false. It cannot be said that the world is (or is not) the way a nonproposition represents it to be, because nonpropositions are not claims that the world is some way.

Here are some examples of propositions:

1. Snow is white.

2. The piano is a multistringed instrument.

3. Snow is green.

4. Oranges are orange.

5. The highest speed reached by any polar bear on 11 January 2004 was 31.35 kilometers per hour.

6. I am hungry.

Note from these examples that a proposition need not be true (3), that a proposition might be so obviously true that we should never bother saying it was true (4), and that we might have no way of knowing whether a proposition is true or false (5). What these examples do all have in common is that they make claims about how things are: they represent the world as being some way. Therefore, it makes sense to speak of each of them as being true (i.e., the world is the way the proposition represents it to be) or false (things aren't that way)—even if we have no way of knowing which way things actually are.

Examples of nonpropositions include:

7. Ouch!

8. Stop it!

9. Hello.

10. Where are we?

11. Open the door!

12. Is the door open?

It might be appropriate or inappropriate in various ways to say "hello" (or "open the door!" etc.) in various situations—but doing so generally could not be said to be true or false. That is because when I say "hello," I do not make a claim about how the world is: I do not represent things as being thus or so. Nonpropositions can be further subdivided into questions (10, 12), commands (8, 11), exclamations (7, 9), and so on. For our purposes these further classifications will not be important, as all nonpropositions lie outside our area of interest: they cannot be said to be true or false and hence lie outside the domain of the laws of truth.

1.2.1 Exercises

Classify the following as propositions or nonpropositions.

1. Los Angeles is a long way from New York.

2. Let's go to Los Angeles!

3. Los Angeles, whoopee!

4. Would that Los Angeles were not so far away.

5. I really wish Los Angeles were nearer to New York.

6. I think we should go to Los Angeles.

7. I hate Los Angeles.

8. Los Angeles is great!

9. If only Los Angeles were closer.

10. Go to Los Angeles!

1.2.2 Sentences, Contexts, and Propositions

In the previous section we stated "here are some examples of propositions," followed by a list of sentences. We need to be more precise about this. The idea is not that each sentence (e.g., "I am hungry") is a proposition. Rather, the idea is that what the sentence says when uttered in a certain context—the claim it makes about the world—is a proposition. To make this distinction clear, we first need to clarify the notion of a sentence—and to do that, we need to clarify the notion of a word: in particular, we need to explain the distinction between word types and word tokens.

Consider a word, say, "leisure." Write it twice on a slip of paper, like so:

leisure leisure

How many words are there on the paper? There are two word tokens on the paper, but only one word type is represented thereon, for both tokens are of the same type. A word token is a physical thing: a string of ink marks (a flat sculpture of pigments on the surface of the paper), a blast of sound waves, a string of pencil marks, chalk marks on a blackboard, an arrangement of paint molecules, a pattern of illuminated pixels on a computer screen—and so on, for all the other ways in which words can be physically reproduced, whether in visual, aural, or some other form. A word token has a location in space and time: a size and a duration (i.e., a lifespan: the period from when it comes into existence to when it goes out of existence). It is a physical object embedded in a wider physical context. A word type, in contrast, is an abstract object: it has no location in space or time—no size and no duration. Its instances—word tokens—each have a particular length, but the word type itself does not. (Tokens of the word type "leisure" on microfilm are very small; tokens on billboards are very large. The word type itself has no size.) Suppose that a teacher asks her pupils to take their pencils and write a word in their notebooks. She then looks at their notebooks and makes the following remarks:

1. Alice's word is smudged.

2. Bob and Carol wrote the same word.

3. Dave's word is in ink, not pencil.

4. Edwina's word is archaic.

In remark (1) "word" refers to the word token in Alice's book. The teacher is saying that this token is smudged, not that the word type of which it is a token is smudged (which would make no sense). In remark (2) "word" refers to the word type of which Bob and Carol both produced tokens in their books. The teacher is not saying that Bob and Carol collaborated in producing a single word token between them (say by writing one letter each until it was finished); she is saying that the two tokens that they produced are tokens of the one word type. In remark (3) "word" refers to the word token in Dave's book. The teacher is saying that this token is made of ink, not that the word type of which it is a token is made of ink (which, again, would make no sense). In remark (4) "word" refers to the word type of which Edwina produced a token in her book. The teacher is not saying that Edwina cut her word token from an old manuscript and pasted it into her book; she is saying that the word type of which Edwina produced a token is no longer in common use.

Turning from words to sentences, we can make an analogous distinction between sentence types and sentence tokens. Sentence types are abstract objects: they have no size, no location in space or time. Their instances—sentence tokens—do have sizes and locations. They are physical objects, embedded in physical contexts: arrangements of ink, bursts of sound waves, and so on. A sentence type is made up of word types in a certain sequence; its tokens are made up of tokens of those word types, arranged in corresponding order. If I say that the first sentence of Captain Cook's log entry for 5 June 1768 covered one and a half pages of his logbook, I am talking about a sentence token. If I say that the third sentence of his log entry for 8 June is the very same sentence as the second sentence of his log entry for 9 June, I am talking about a sentence type (I am not saying of a particular sentence token that it figures in two separate log entries, because, e.g., he was writing on paper that was twisted and spliced in such a way that when we read the log, we read a certain sentence token once, and then later come to that very same token again).

* * *

Now let us return to the distinction between sentences and propositions. Consider a sentence type (e.g., "I am hungry"). A speaker can make a claim about the world by uttering this sentence in a particular context. Doing so will involve producing a token of the sentence. We do not wish to identify the proposition expressed—the claim about the world—with either the sentence type or this sentence token, for the reasons discussed below.

To begin, consider the following dialogue:

Alan: Lunch is ready. Who's hungry?

Bob: I'm hungry.

Carol: I'm hungry.

Dave: I'm not.

Bob and Carol produce different tokens (one each) of the same sentence type. They thereby make different claims about the world. Bob says that he is hungry; Carol says that she is hungry. What it takes for Bob's claim to be true is that Bob is hungry; what it takes for Carol's claim to be true is that Carol is hungry. So while Bob and Carol both utter the same sentence type ("I'm hungry") and both thereby express propositions (claims about the world), they do not express the same proposition. We can be sure that they express different propositions, because what Bob says could be true while what Carol says is false—if the world were such that Bob was hungry but Carol was not—or vice versa—if the world were such that Carol was hungry but Bob was not. It is a sure sign that we have two distinct propositions—as opposed to the same proposition expressed twice over—if there is a way things could be that would render one of them true and the other false. So one sentence type can be used to express different propositions, depending on the context of utterance. Therefore, we cannot, in general, identify propositions with sentence types.

Can we identify propositions with sentence tokens? That is, if a speaker makes a claim about the world by producing a sentence token in a particular context, can we identify the claim made—the proposition expressed—with that sentence token? We cannot. Suppose that Carol says "Bob is hungry," and Dave also says "Bob is hungry." They produce two different sentence tokens (one each); but (it seems obvious) they make the same claim about the world. Two different sentence tokens, one proposition: so we cannot identify the proposition with both sentence tokens. We could identify it with just one of the tokens—say, Carol's—but this would be arbitrary, and it would also have the strange consequence that the claim Dave makes about the world is a burst of sound waves emanating from Carol. Thus, we cannot happily identify propositions with sentence tokens.

(Continues...)

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Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Princeton University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2012
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0691151636
• ISBN 13: 9780691151632
• Einband: Tapa dura
• Anzahl der Seiten: 544
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