Reputation: What It Is and Why It Matters - Hardcover

Origgi, Gloria

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0691175357 ISBN 13: 9780691175355

Verlag: Princeton University Press, 2017

Inhaltsangabe

A compelling exploration of how reputation affects every aspect of contemporary life Reputation touches almost everything, guiding our behavior and choices in countless ways. But it is also shrouded in mystery. Why is it so powerful when the criteria by which people and things are defined as good or bad often appear to be arbitrary? Why do we care so much about how others see us that we may even do irrational and harmful things to try to influence their opinion? In this engaging book, Gloria Origgi draws on philosophy, social psychology, sociology, economics, literature, and history to offer an illuminating account of an important yet oddly neglected subject. Origgi examines the influence of the Internet and social media, as well as the countless ranking systems that characterize modern society and contribute to the creation of formal and informal reputations in our social relations, in business, in politics, in academia, and even in wine. She highlights the importance of reputation to the effective functioning of the economy and e-commerce. Origgi also discusses the existential significance of our obsession with reputation, concluding that an awareness of the relationship between our reputation and our actions empowers us to better understand who we are and why we do what we do. Compellingly written and filled with surprising insights, Reputation pins down an elusive subject that affects everyone.

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Gloria Origgi, a Paris-based philosopher, is a senior researcher at the Institut Jean Nicod at the National Center for Scientific Research. Her books include one on trust and another on the future of writing on the Internet. She maintains a blog in English, French, and Italian at gloriaoriggi.blogspot.com.

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"This is a truly original, highly insightful, and highly readable book on a vital yet largely unexplored question: who do we trust, why should we trust, and how should we trust. Let's stop ignoring the expert problem. This is not a book, but the birth of a branch of applied knowledge."--Nassim Nicholas Taleb

"Having a good reputation is crucial for individuals, groups, and even objects. Through wide-ranging and well-crafted examples—from wine tasting to academic prestige—Gloria Origgi offers a grand tour of how the social sciences illuminate the process of reputation formation. Reputations might be imperfect, but they are unavoidable, and Origgi's book can help us make them more reliable."--Hugo Mercier, coauthor of The Enigma of Reason

"Fascinating, thought-provoking, and persuasive, this book deepens our understanding of the complexity and importance of reputation. Its engaging and accessible style ensures that the reader is never bored."--Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, City College of New York and the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris

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Reputation

What It Is and Why It Matters

By Gloria Origgi

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2018 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-691-17535-5

Contents

Preface to the English Edition, vii, 
Acknowledgments, xiii, 
1 How I See Myself Seen, 1, 
2 Is Reputation a Means or an End?, 28, 
3 "Somebody Told Me," or How Reputations Spread, 62, 
4 Assessing Uncertainty: How Trustworthy Is a Reputation?, 86, 
5 The Paradox of the "Top Specialist" and the Heuristics of Reputation, 113, 
6 Homo Comparativus: Status, Honor, and Prestige, 147, 
7 Information and Reputation: The Collective Intelligence of the Web, 171, 
8 Experts and Connoisseurs: The Reputation of Wine, 195, 
9 Academic Reputation, or Voluntary Epistemic Servitude, 216, 
10 Reputation in Democracies: Instructions for Use, 241, 
References, 255, 
Index, 263, 

CHAPTER 1

How I See Myself Seen

Fear of losing his loved ones but also of losing himself, of discovering that behind his social façade he was nothing.

— E. CARRÈRE, THE ADVERSARY

He smiled understandingly, much more than understandingly. It was one of those rare smiles with a quality of eternal reassurance in it that you may come across four or five times in life. It faced — or seemed to face — the whole external world for an instant, and then concentrated on you with an irresistible prejudice in your favor. It understood you just as far as you wanted to be understood, believed in you as you would like to believe in yourself.

— F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY

On January 9, 1993, in his house in the region of Gex, located between Switzerland and Jura, Jean-Claude Romand murdered his wife, his two children (ages five and seven), his parents, and their dog. He then tried to kill his mistress in the forest of Fontainebleau, where he had brought her for dinner, supposedly at the house of Bernard Kouchner, whom he did not know and who owns no house in Fontainebleau. Lastly, he set his house on fire, swallowed sleeping pills, and fell asleep, hoping never to wake up. Contrary to his plan, however, he regained consciousness, awakening unexpectedly from the coma induced by barbiturates and burns, and he survived. Charged with having committed these atrocious acts, he was subsequently convicted and imprisoned. According to the French prosecutor who argued the case, the motive for the crime was "the impostor's fear of being unmasked."

But how could confessing to having told a lie, even an extravagantly outrageous lie, ever become more difficult than exterminating one's entire family? How could Jean-Claude Romand's reputation have meant more to him than the life of his children? This book represents an attempt to answer these questions.

Romand's gruesome story was made famous by Emmanuel Carrère's book L'Adversaire (2000). The author tells the tale of a man who constructed for himself a bogus reputation as a successful doctor working at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. He was purportedly a friend of important politicians and internationally renowned researchers. But the picture was fabricated from top to bottom. It was an enormous lie. In truth, Romand had never completed his medical studies and, for ten long years, rather than working as the doctor he pretended to be, he had been frittering away whole days inside his car in the WHO parking lot in Geneva or loitering in the woods or loafing in cafés until it was time to go home. He had meticulously cultivated his false identity, taking home fliers and brochures he had picked up at the WHO library that was open to the public on the ground floor of the organization's headquarters. When he claimed that he was away on "business trips," he instead stayed at a modest hotel near his home where he would watch TV and peruse guidebooks describing whatever country he was supposed to be visiting. He never neglected to call his family every day to tell them what time it was in Tokyo or Brazil, and he always returned from these absences with gifts that seemed to come from the countries where he had allegedly been. He carefully tended and honed his make-believe existence, his spurious reputation, as if it were the love of his life. He clung so implacably to his fictional identity that when the façade began to crumble due to money problems, his frantic urge to defend his palace of lies led him to murder his entire family lest they discover the scandalous truth.

Romand's story raises a paradoxical question: Which was his real life? The one that his family thought he lived, full of success, trips, and international recognition, or the one that he alone knew about, the insipid existence spent reading in his car or killing time in the squalid cafés of Bourg-en-Bresse or aimlessly hiking the Jura mountains? This second life existed only for Romand himself. So how real was it? Since no one else knew about it, it was socially invisible. Moreover, he apparently experienced it exclusively as a means to an end. It was significant only as a way for him to keep up his elaborate charade, to maintain the pretense of the dream life that his family imagined he was living. When, after the murders, friends from his village realized that Jean-Claude's entire life had been a fraud, he ceased to exist for them. He was no longer the man they thought they had known: "When they spoke of him, late at night, they couldn't manage to call him Jean-Claude any more. They didn't call him Romand either. He was somewhere outside life, outside death, where he no longer had a name."

All of us have two egos, two selves. These parallel and distinguishable identities make up who we are and profoundly affect how we behave. One is our subjectivity, consisting of our proprioceptive experiences, the physical sensations registered in our body. The other is our reputation, a reflection of ourselves that constitutes our social identity and makes how we see ourselves seen integral to our self-awareness. At the beginning of the twentieth century, American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley called this second ego the looking-glass self. This second ego is woven over time from multiple strands, incorporating how we think the people around us perceive and judge us. In fact, our understanding of this second self is not created simply by reflection but rather by the refraction of our image that is warped, amplified, redacted, and multiplied in the eyes of others. This social self controls our lives to a surprising extent and can even drive us to commit extreme acts. It does not really belong to us but is rather the part of us that lives in and through others. Yet the feelings that it provokes — shame, embarrassment, self-esteem, guilt, pride — are both very real and very deeply rooted in our emotional experience. Biology demonstrates that our body responds to shame as if it were aphysical wound, releasing chemical substances that provoke inflammation and a rise in the level of cortisol. A slap in the face does more harm to our self-esteem than to our stinging and reddened cheek.

In his work on the culture of honor, psychologist Richard Nisbett and his collaborators measured the level of cortisol in experimental participants before and after an experience where they felt their honor had been besmirched. The study was conducted as follows. A group of eighty-three students selected from southern and northern regions of the United States were invited to participate in a psychological study. Before the experiment, the subjects were asked to fill out a form with their personal information and to return it to an experimenter who, rather than being located in the room where the study itself was conducted, was instead stationed at the end of an adjoining hallway. It was only when they left the room to hand in their forms that the "true" experiment actually began. An experimenter pretending to be an employee of the university was organizing files in a rolling filing cabinet placed awkwardly in the middle of the hallway. To allow the students to pass, this fake employee had to heave the cabinet to one side. Once the students reached the end of the hallway and submitted their forms, they turned around to come back, and the fake employee was again forced to shove aside the heavy cabinet to allow them to squeeze by. He did this while expressing irritation and murmuring "asshole." Unlike the students who grew up in the North, students from the South felt that being called an asshole was a serious affront, that it had inflicted palpable damage to their reputation (and their virility). At the end of the experiment, their levels of cortisol were much higher than at the beginning. The perception that their public image had been smeared had provoked a measurable chemical transformation, a much-studied hormonal reaction that frequently signals a disposition to lash out and commit acts of physical violence.

What I Think You Think about Me

More than a third of the homicides committed in the United States have surprisingly trivial causes such as verbal altercations, wanton insults, or even disputes about who is first in line to occupy a just-vacated parking space. Among the most convincing sociological explanations for crimes without weighty motives are honor, pride, and reputation. Many such crimes, moreover, are committed by people without psychopathic psychological profiles. What apparently drives them to murderous extremes are frivolous social slights and niggling questions of precedence.

Indeed, all of us can react angrily to discourteous or insulting encounters, to the rude waiter who abuses his little "power" over us or to the woman in the car ahead who refuses to move five centimeters forward to let us turn left. Such visceral reactions are frequently triggered by the wounds that we think others have inflicted on the respect that we think we are "owed." They are genuine and deeply felt emotional injuries that are provoked by the conceit that we have not received appropriate respect and consideration. That was not the way we should have been treated!

But why would an imagined injury to a flattering image of ourselves that we wish others would accept provoke a physically violent response? How can a chimerical "me," imagined but nonexistent, which is nothing but a trace, a shadow of myself inhabiting the minds of others, have such precisely measurable psychophysical effects? The paradox of reputation resides in the apparent disproportionality between the enormous psychological and social value that we assign to our reputation and its merely symbolic nature. Being honorable is nothing more than being recognized as honorable by someone else. Why do we value so highly the image that others entertain of us, a representation that exists only in their minds, especially since, in the end, we are the only ones obsessively concerned with our own reputation (excepting of course those celebrities whose reputation fascinates the entire world)?

Mark Leary, a social psychologist at Duke University, has advanced the hypothesis that humans have an internal sociometer, a psychological mechanism or a motivational apparatus that works as an indicator of the "social temperature" around us, a kind of built-in thermometer that registers social acceptance or rejection, using the resulting degree of self-esteem as a unit of measurement. Our social emotions, according to this theory, provide a way to keep track of the part of ourselves that inhabits the minds of others. Even if our reputation is only a reflection, from this perspective, the emotions accompanying it have a physical and psychological expression that helps us keep track of how others see us.

The principal problem with psychological explanations of this sort is their underlying assumption that the hypothesized sociometer is properly adjusted, that the emotions that it provokes within us and the external social temperature covary in a coordinated fashion. Unfortunately, as George Elliot wisely remarked, "the last thing we learn in life is our effect on others." How we think we are seen seldom reflects how we are actually seen.

As actors, in any case, we normally proceed by trial and error, experimenting with different selves, erecting a series of façades that turn out to be nothing but provisional drafts. When we see the effects that these invented selves have on others, we go back to the drawing board and try to fashion a different social image. Either that, or we give up and acquiesce in the picture that others have of us when we realize that we can't control it anymore. The bitterness that accompanies a ruined reputation, the Proustian anxiety about our always uncertain social standing, and the deep ambivalence that these feelings evoke are due to our fundamental incapacity to keep our double on a tight leash. Indeed, the shadowy reflection of ourselves that exists solely in the minds of others is ultimately impossible to control.

Our second ego is not the opinion that others entertain of us, however. It is rather what we think others think of us, or sometimes even what we would like to imagine that others think of us. In the epigraph from Fitzgerald that opens this chapter, Gatsby's smile reassures the young Nick Carraway, giving him the feeling that he is finally seen as he would like to be seen, no more, no less. A smile of approval evokes a feeling of emotional comfort permitting him to let himself go since he has finally been seen by someone as he would like to be seen. The mysterious Gatsby with his sulfurous reputation is the only one in a position to give Carraway the supposedly correct assessment of himself, to provide him the profound satisfaction of being seen at last as he truly is or wants to be. And Gatsby gives him the rarest and most beautiful gift: to feel for an instant that his two egos are reunited — to overcome at last the eternally ambivalent relation between being and seeming. Carraway is also Gatsby's accomplice since he understands the latter's profound need to fashion a dream-self, a parallel persona that is not merely a flimsy social façade but that represents what he would like others to think of him: "So he invented just the sort of Jay Gatsby that a seventeen-year-old boy would be likely to invent, and to this conception he was faithful to the end." Nick Carraway also upholds his own second self when he says: "Every one suspects himself of at least one of the cardinal virtues, and this is mine: I am one of the few honest people that I have ever known." And it is this cardinal virtue that Gatsby acknowledges and reinforces by his smile.

Our social image is both familiar and strange. The reactions it provokes in us are largely involuntary, such as blushing before an intimidating audience. Although the way we see how others see us can occasionally cause us to lose control, it is, at the same time, the part of ourselves we prize most highly and on which we lavish the tenderest care. If we fail to distinguish between our two egos, our actions will often make no sense and we can find ourselves plunged into a state of profound confusion where we can no longer understand why we act the way we do.

This book explores the hidden logic of our double ego. Reputation itself is strikingly enigmatic. How a good name is gained or lost is often inexplicable. Why some reputations are considered good and others bad can be equally obscure. It is a perfect topic, in other words, for proverbs and works of creative literature rich with insights drawn from concrete life experience and that vividly depict what social scientists have a hard time analyzing in abstract terms, much less explaining. A pertinent example appears in this maxim of Rochefoucauld: "Self-love is cleverer than the cleverest man in the world" (L'amour-propre est plus habile que le plus habile homme du monde). The idea of a double intentionality that guides action is obviously implicit here, even if it isn't very precisely conveyed in the evocative ambiguity of the proverb.

Much of the mystery enveloping and obscuring the idea of reputation derives from the concept having been neglected, for various reasons, by serious social scientists. For starters, the concept of reputation suffers from a very bad reputation. It is commonly considered a vestige of a premodern and anti-individualistic society. Fama, honor, and the effort to win and maintain prestige in a social hierarchy are often dismissed as the trappings of a bygone aristocratic world that our disenchanted modernity has thankfully left behind. Studying them is sometimes said to have "merely historical interest" for another reason as well: none of these phenomena actually exists. They are dismissed as phantoms that, in earlier ages, haunted a purely symbolic world. There was apparently never anything real or worthy of study underlying them in the first place. Attempting social scientific research on reputation, from this allegedly illusion-free perspective, would be like undertaking a rigorous inquiry into the nimbus of saints, the aura and luminosity that surround supernatural beings and people touched by divinity that we find in Christian and Muslim iconography. Such phenomena can doubtless be examined from a historical-cultural point of view, looking, for example, at their evolution in the history of art or poetry. (Aura is often mentioned in medieval poetry and religious literature.) These phenomena, studied by such authors as Leon Daudet and Walter Benjamin, and that even attracted the attention of Charcot, nevertheless remain unexplained and resemble more an aesthetic concept than a genuinely scientific one. Choosing to investigate aura in a "scientific" manner is thus something we would expect only from tabloid hacks or pseudo-investigators of the paranormal, not from natural or social scientists. Reputation sometimes seems to have acquired a similarly unfavorable notoriety, as if it were an apparition that can be taken seriously only by cultural historians. Since it is held to be nonexistent as a social or psychological reality, it is thought to defy systematic testing and analysis. From this viewpoint, elevating reputation to the status of a worthy object of social science research would be as frivolous as believing that ghostly presences inhabit the ruins of medieval castles.

(Continues...)

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Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Princeton University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2017
• ISBN 10: 0691175357
• ISBN 13: 9780691175355
• Einband: Tapa dura
• Sprache: Englisch
• Anzahl der Seiten: 296
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar