Religious Liberty, Vol. 1: Overviews and History (Emory University Studies in Law and Religion, Band 1) - Softcover

Laycock, Douglas

 
9780802864659: Religious Liberty, Vol. 1: Overviews and History (Emory University Studies in Law and Religion, Band 1)

Inhaltsangabe

The Collected Works on Religious Liberty comprehensively collects the scholarship, advocacy, and explanatory writings of leading scholar and lawyer Douglas Laycock, illuminating every major religious liberty issue from both theoretical and practical perspectives. / This first volume gives the big picture of religious liberty in the United States. It fits a vast range of disparate disputes into a coherent pattern, from public school prayers to private school vouchers to regulation of churches and believers. Laycock clearly and carefully explains what the law is and argues for what the law should be. He also reviews the history of Western religious liberty from the American founding to Protestant-Catholic conflict in the nineteenth century, using this history to cast light on the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. / Collected Works on Religious Liberty is unique in the depth and range of its coverage. Laycock helpfully includes both scholarly articles and key legal documents, and unlike many legal scholars, explains them clearly and succinctly. All the while, he maintains a centrist perspective, presenting all sides - believers and nonbelievers alike - fairly.

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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Douglas Laycock is Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and professor of religious studies at the University of Virginia. In addition to his work as a lawyer, he has written for the New York Times, the Washington Post, and numerous other publications.

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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

volume 1 Overviews and HistoryBy Douglas Laycock

William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company

Copyright © 2010 Douglas Laycock
All right reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8028-6465-9

Contents

Foreword, by John Witte, Jr.............................................................................................................xiiiPreface to the Collected Works..........................................................................................................xviPreface to Volume 1.....................................................................................................................xxiiiA. Normative Overviews..................................................................................................................1B. Analytic and Descriptive Overviews...................................................................................................270C. Book Reviews.........................................................................................................................463D. Judicial Nominations.................................................................................................................486PART TWO: HISTORY.......................................................................................................................525Appendix I "God Alone Is Lord of the Conscience": Policy Statement and Recommendations Regarding Religious Liberty.....................761Appendix II Reading Legal Citations for Nonlegal Readers...............................................................................813Index...................................................................................................................................827

Chapter One

Overviews

A. Normative Overviews

Four of the eight articles in this Section are major scholarly works; they set out the basic principles that underlie all my work in the field. There are also four short pieces here, three written for scholarly outlets and one for law school alumni.

The Long ...

Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion (1990) was the first clear development of the distinction between formal and substantive neutrality. That distinction, and that vocabulary, is now widely used in the academic community. Both conceptions of neutrality appear in Supreme Court cases, but without the vocabulary and rarely with any attention to the difference. Substantive neutrality was and is an attempt to reconcile the lawyer's instinct for neutrality with a robust conception of religious liberty, and to escape the implication that neutrality requires that churches be regulated to the same extent as commercial businesses.

Substantive Neutrality Revisited (2007) is a more mature elaboration of the same distinction, written nearly two decades later, responding to some of the ways in which substantive neutrality had been criticized or misunderstood. This article also provided an occasion to compare my approach with those of the centrist Noah Feldman at Harvard and the strict separationist Steven Gey at Florida State.

Religious Liberty as Liberty (1996) attempts to set out a religion-neutral case for religious liberty. We protect religious liberty not because religion is a good thing or a bad thing, but because individual liberty with respect to religious choices and commitments is a good thing. This piece also contains my most complete elaboration of why nonbelievers should be protected by the Religion Clauses.

Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty (2004) is organized around two Supreme Court decisions in 2004. The Court held that Washington does not have to provide state scholarships to theology majors, and it ducked on the constitutionality of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. This article places those decisions in larger context and uses them to survey the whole field, although of course the most detailed attention is devoted to the bodies of law that most directly controlled those two cases.

... and the Short

Religious Liberty: Not for Religion or against Religion, but for Individual Choice (2004) is a 1,000-word summary of the themes in the larger pieces. There is not much detail or nuance, but if you want a five-minute introduction to what I think, this is the place to start.

Remarks on Acceptance of National Award from the Council for America's First Freedom (2009) is even shorter and draws the moral more pointedly. We must protect the religious liberty of those we disagree with as vigorously as we would protect religious liberty for ourselves.

Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause: General Theories (2000) is a brief summary of all the important competing theories of the Religion Clauses. They say you can't tell the players without a scorecard; this short encyclopedia entry offers a scorecard.

The Benefits of the Establishment Clause (1992) is a talk on what the Establishment Clause adds to the Free Exercise Clause. Because of that comparative focus, and because the talk was delivered during the period of greatest concern about the Supreme Court's contraction of the Free Exercise Clause, the talk and the questions and answers that follow the talk address both clauses.

Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality toward Religion

39 DePaul Law Review 993 (1990)

This was the Sixth Annual Lecture at the Center for Church/State Studies at DePaul University in Chicago. It is the first elaboration of "substantive neutrality," a concept that has been foundational to much of my subsequent work. The core of the conceptual problem addressed in the lecture is this. Religious liberty sometimes requires that religiously motivated conduct be exempted from government regulation, so that believers can actually practice their faith. But regulatory exemptions on religious grounds look like special treatment for religion, and that seems inconsistent with another widely shared intuition, important in other religious liberty controversies: that government should be neutral toward religion. Is there a coherent understanding of neutrality that is consistent with full religious liberty?

Introduction

A wide range of courts and commentators commonly say that government must be neutral toward religion. There are dissenters in both directions — those who think that government can support religion, and those who pursue separation to the point of hostility. In this Article, I will largely ignore those dissenters. I will assume that neutrality is an important part of the meaning of the Religion Clauses.

This Article is about the meaning of neutrality. My goal is to clarify the concept, or at least to clarify our disagreements over its meaning. In the course of doing that, I will address a third group of dissenters — those who think that neutrality is meaningless and should be dropped from our discourse.

Those who think neutrality is meaningless have a point. We can agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed on anything at all. From benevolent neutrality to separate but equal, people with a vast range of views on church and state have all claimed to be neutral.

Consider Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock. The Supreme Court said that Texas can not exempt the sale of religious publications from a sales tax that applies to all other publications. Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia fundamentally disagreed on almost every issue in the case,...

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