Minimum Deterrence and India¿s Nuclear Security (Studies in Asian Security) - Hardcover

Basrur, Rajesh M.

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0804752559 ISBN 13: 9780804752558

Verlag: Stanford University Press, 2005

Inhaltsangabe

In this book, a leading authority on India’s nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India’s nuclear strategy. He shows that the country’s nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.

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In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

Aus dem Klappentext

In this book, a leading authority on India s nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India s nuclear strategy. He shows that the country s nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

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Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security

By Rajesh M. Basrur

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2006 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-5255-8

Contents

1 Introduction: Nuclear Weapons in World Politics.....................12 The Essentials of Minimum Deterrence................................253 Strategic Culture...................................................494 Compellence in a Nuclear Environment................................805 Missile Defense.....................................................1026 Nuclear Terrorism...................................................1227 Minimum Deterrence and Democracy....................................1488 Conclusion: Shaping the Uncertain Future............................169Notes.................................................................185Index.................................................................235

Chapter One

Introduction: Nuclear Weapons in World Politics

In May 1998, India shook the world with a series of nuclear tests accompanied by a declared strategy of "credible minimum deterrence." More than half a decade later, the contours of the strategy are not entirely clear. In essence, the Indian conception of minimum deterrence encompasses the understanding that it is not necessary to have large numbers of sophisticated weapons to deter nuclear adversaries; that nuclear "balances" are not meaningful; and that weapons need not be deployed and kept in a high state of readiness in order that deterrence be effective. Beyond this, important questions remain. While the development of capabilities in technology and organization proceeds apace, nobody is quite clear about what minimum deterrence means. How many weapons are adequate, and of what kind? Might deployment become necessary at some point of time, and if so, under what circumstances? Is war still possible, and if so, how? What kind of arms control is feasible? These and many other questions have been the subject of much discussion since the tests. Perhaps the best thing about the tests is that such questions are now being asked, for they scarcely ever were before the 1998 tests, though the weapons had long been built. This book attempts some answers by examining the fundamentals of nuclear weapons and deterrence in the Indian context.

This is neither a history nor a blueprint. Rather, it is a critique of Indian nuclear thinking and practice based on an inquiry into the basic assumptions and principles that underlie an optimal nuclear weapons posture. The book's central concern is with the hitherto inadequately defined conception of "minimum deterrence" officially adopted by India in 1998, and with the need to clarify its parameters so as to arrive at a cost-effective nuclear strategy. It seeks to comprehend the nature of the world around us, the place of nuclear weapons in it, and the strategic framework that is appropriate to this world. The character of world politics makes the possession of military nuclear capability a reasonable choice in certain circumstances. Yet the extraordinarily destructive quality of nuclear weapons makes their possession problematic, creating new dimensions of insecurity that can never be eliminated. What minimum deterrence can do is reduce them significantly without sacrificing security. The main objective of this book is to spell out the parameters of minimum deterrence, assess India's nuclear-strategic thinking and practice, and help correct the flaws discovered in the process.

Policy makers choose diverse doctrines because they fail to understand that minimum deterrence is the most cost-effective. A nation's actual choice of posture depends on the historical context in which the decision is made, on its technical and financial prowess, and on its normative preferences about the use of force in general and nuclear weapons in particular. India's adoption of an official doctrine of minimum deterrence is embedded in its historical experience and ethical predisposition, but has tended to lose its moorings because of an inadequate understanding of its fundamental assumptions. This is evident from India's search for a variety of capabilities in nuclear hardware, the recent failed experiment with coercive diplomacy or compellence vis--vis Pakistan, and the lack of clarity as to why missile defense is perfectly compatible with minimum deterrence. This book also examines a largely neglected area in the nuclear weapons discourse: the relationship between nuclear terrorism and nuclear strategy. Minimum deterrence, it is argued, is the optimal strategy for a country that faces a significant threat from nonstate actors with an interest in acquiring the capability for mass destruction. Finally, the implications of nuclear weapons for democracy are assessed, and the case is made that minimum deterrence keeps to tolerable proportions the moral and political costs that the possession of these weapons entails.

In the pages that follow, the gray areas between opposite trends and realities that affect India's still evolving nuclear posture are explored. These contradictions encompass the tensions between:

Anarchy and interdependence in world politics-between the self-help character of the world of states, in which power and the use of force are still the bases of national survival, and the increasing integration of this same world, succinctly described by the term "globalization." In the uncertain space between them lies the realm of decisions about the extent to which armed force, and nuclear weapons specifically, must be thought of and organized. The fundamental question is how best we can reduce threats and promote cooperation in such a world.

The possession and non-possession of nuclear weapons-between the sense of insecurity that nations experience when, under threat, they do not have the means to exercise deterrence, and the sense of insecurity they feel even after they do have them because there is no guarantee that deterrence will always work.

Nuclear weapons as usable instruments and as unusable instruments of state power-between the fact of their actually having been used and the possibility of future use, on one hand, and, on the other, the powerful practical and moral constraints on their use for more than half a century. Here, we grapple apprehensively with the dilemma of possessing instruments of mass destruction that we never want to use, and yet threaten to use for the sake of our own survival.

The defensive character of one's own weapons and the offensive character of those possessed by others-between the security nations seek when they acquire (or attempt to acquire) nuclear weapons, and the insecurity they experience when others do so while citing the same reasons.

Democracy and deterrence-between the decentralizing tendency, openness, and respect for human life that characterizes democracy, and the centralizing tendency, secrecy, and indiscriminate destructiveness that adheres to nuclear weapons.

This is a holistic examination of these areas, encompassing three types of relationship. First, the study investigates the domain of interstate interaction, which is characterized by coexisting patterns of cooperation and conflict. Here, Indian policy must simultaneously optimize threat reduction and promote cooperation-not an easy task, since measures taken to offset threats, such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons, generate new tensions. The problem is to maximize security while at the same time restraining...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2005
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0804752559
• ISBN 13: 9780804752558
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Anzahl der Seiten: 264
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar