On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield - Softcover

Finkel, Meir

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0804774897 ISBN 13: 9780804774895

Verlag: STANFORD SECURITY STUDIES, 2011

Inhaltsangabe

This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises-ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines?

Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm-with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities-generally doesn't work.

Based on historical case analysis of successful "under-fire" recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have determined these outcomes, and he presents an innovative method for military force planning that will enables armies to deal with the uncertainties of future wars "in real time."

His proposed method combines conceptual, doctrinal, cognitive, command, organizational, and technological elements to produce optimal battlefield flexibility and adaptability. He then demonstrates that, when properly applied, this method can eliminate most obstacles to overcoming battlefield surprises.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Meir Finkel is the Director of the Israeli Defense Force's Ground Forces Concept Development and Doctrine Department. As a Colonel in the IDF, he commanded armor units up to brigade level.

Meir Finkel is the Director of the Israeli Defense Force's Ground Forces Concept Development and Doctrine Department. As a Colonel in the IDF, he commanded armor units up to brigade level.

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On Flexibility

RECOVERY FROM TECHNOLOGICAL AND DOCTRINAL SURPRISE ON THE BATTLEFIELDBy Meir Finkel

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2007 Ma'arachot
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-7489-5

Contents

Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................................................................ixIntroduction....................................................................................................................................................................1PART ONE THE CHALLENGE OF FORCE PLANNING FACING FUTURE SURPRISES................................................................................................................191 Prediction and Intelligence—The Dominant Approach in Force Planning and Its Failure to Answer the Challenge of Technological and Doctrinal Surprise.....................21PART TWO FLEXIBILITY-BASED RECOVERY—A THEORETICAL VIEW....................................................................................................................532 Conceptual and Doctrinal Flexibility..........................................................................................................................................553 Organizational and Technological Flexibility..................................................................................................................................734 Cognitive and Command and Control (C2) Flexibility............................................................................................................................985 The Mechanism for Lesson Learning and Rapid Dissemination.....................................................................................................................111PART THREE RECOVERY FROM SURPRISE—A HISTORICAL VIEW.......................................................................................................................1216 The German Recovery From the Surprise of British Chaff........................................................................................................................1237 The German Recovery From the Soviet T-34 Tank Surprise........................................................................................................................1388 The Israeli Recovery From the Egyptian Sagger Missile Surprise................................................................................................................1509 The Israeli Air Force Recovery From the Arab Anti-Aircraft Missile Surprise...................................................................................................16410 The Slow British Recovery From the German Armor and Anti-Tank Tactics........................................................................................................17911 The Slow Soviet Recovery From the Surprise of Low-Intensity Conflict in Afghanistan..........................................................................................19112 The French Failure to Recover From the Surprise of the German Blitzkrieg.....................................................................................................205Summary and Conclusions.........................................................................................................................................................223Appendixes to Chapter 1.........................................................................................................................................................233Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................249Bibliography....................................................................................................................................................................301Index...........................................................................................................................................................................321

Chapter One

PREDICTION AND INTELLIGENCE The Dominant Approach in Force Planning and Its Failure to Answer the Challenge of Technological and Doctrinal Surprise

MILITARY FORCE PLANNING: PRAXIS AND RESEARCH

The goal of military force planning is to enable the "planner" to deal with security threats in the best possible way. According to Avi Kober, an Israeli expert in defense matters, "[t]he theory of force planning is a complex set of principles that directs force organization, structure and arming so that it can wage war successfully according to parameters laid down in the security doctrine. There is no universal doctrine of military force planning."

Various military organizations use different terms and definitions in the force planning process. Since technological and doctrinal surprise challenges force planning on all levels and at every stage of war, the definition of military force planning should be as comprehensive as possible, that is, it should include all aspects of military force development, beginning with the development of the concept of force employment(as a combat doctrine), through the planning of organization, armament, equipping, education, training, and human resources management, to the implementation of the plans and adapting them to changes. Military force planning deals with the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Given the sensitivity to surprise of warfare doctrine, this book treats the doctrine as an integral part of force planning. All of the abovementioned elements support the development of abilities and expertise in six main areas: maneuvering, fire, intelligence, command and control (C2), logistics, and force protection.

The Sensitivity of Force planning to uncertainty

Force planning is directly influenced by the security doctrine, which itself is derived from the national security doctrine, the latter being based on geopolitical, social, economic, ethical, and ideological factors. For example, Israel's national security doctrine is predicated, inter alia, on limited geographical depth, a plethora of enemies and confrontation fronts, a small but high-quality, technologically developed society, and limited economic resources that preclude a protracted war. These factors led to the development of a warfare doctrine that strives for deterrence, strategic warning based on intelligence gathering, a lightning decision in enemy territory, and force planning based on a limited conscript army, a large, well-trained reserve force, compulsory conscription that puts manpower to the best use, reliance on an extensive intelligence layout for strategic warning, and offensive branches such as armor and air.

Force planning at the operational and tactical levels is strongly influenced by technological development and scenarios that depict the probable fighting method against defined enemies in specific combat arenas. Uncertainty is an inherent feature in force planning, derived from the need to predict future influences on each of the abovementioned factors and on the army's ability to achieve superiority on the battlefield.

Thus, while force planning consists of relatively invariable factors, such as geopolitics and population size (or quality), variable factors are also present, so that the uncertainty factor is of supreme importance. In addition, it should be recalled that force planning is carried out on a number of levels. At the strategic level, it is...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: STANFORD SECURITY STUDIES
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2011
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0804774897
• ISBN 13: 9780804774895
• Einband: Taschenbuch
• Anzahl der Seiten: 336
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Mare Nostrum Group B.V.; gpsr@mare-nostrum.co.uk; ; Doelen 72; Breda; 4831 GR; Niederlande