The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research - Hardcover

 
9780804784184: The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research
Hardcover
ISBN 10: 0804784183 ISBN 13: 9780804784184
Verlag: Stanford University Press, 2013

Inhaltsangabe

The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research offers the first comprehensive overview of how the rational choice paradigm can inform empirical research within the social sciences. This landmark collection highlights successful empirical applications across a broad array of disciplines, including sociology, political science, economics, history, and psychology.

Taking on issues ranging from financial markets and terrorism to immigration, race relations, and emotions, and a huge variety of other phenomena, rational choice proves a useful tool for theory- driven social research. Each chapter uses a rational choice framework to elaborate on testable hypotheses and then apply this to empirical research, including experimental research, survey studies, ethnographies, and historical investigations. Useful to students and scholars across the social sciences, this handbook will reinvigorate discussions about the utility and versatility of the rational choice approach, its key assumptions, and tools.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Rafael Wittek is Professor of Theoretical Sociology at the University of Groningen. Tom A. B. Snijders is Professor of Statistics in the Social Sciences at the University of Oxford and the University of Groningen. Victor Nee is the Frank and Rosa Rhodes Professor in the Department of Sociology at Cornell University.


Rafael Wittek is Professor of Theoretical Sociology at the University of Groningen. Tom A. B. Snijders is Professor of Statistics in the Social Sciences at the University of Oxford and the University of Groningen.Victor Nee is the Frank and Rosa Rhodes Professor in the Department of Sociology at Cornell University.

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The HANDBOOK of RATIONAL CHOICE SOCIAL RESEARCH

By Rafael Wittek, Tom A. B. Snijders, Victor Nee

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 2013 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-8418-4

Contents

Contributors...............................................................ix
Introduction: Rational Choice Social Research Rafael Wittek, Tom A. B. 
Snijders, and Victor Nee...................................................		1
Part I: Rationality and Decision-making....................................
1 Rationality, Social Preferences, and Strategic Decision-making from a 
Behavioral Economics Perspective Simon Gächter............................		33
2 Social Rationality, Self-Regulation, and Well-Being: The Regulatory 
Significance of Needs, Goals, and the Self Siegwart Lindenberg............		72
3 Rational Choice Research on Social Dilemmas: Embeddedness Effects on 
Trust Vincent Buskens and Werner Raub.....................................		113
4 Modeling Collective Decision-making Frans N. Stokman, Jelle Van der 
Knoop, and Reinier C. H. Van Oosten........................................		151
Part II: Networks and Inequality...........................................
5 Social Exchange, Power, and Inequality in Networks Karen S. Cook and 
Coye Cheshire..............................................................		185
6 Social Capital Henk Flap and Beate Völker...............................220
7 Network Dynamics Tom A. B. Snijders.....................................252
Part III: Communities and Cohesion.........................................
8 Rational Choice Research in Criminology: A Multi-Level Framework Ross 
L. Matsueda................................................................		283
9 Secularization: Theoretical Controversies Generating Empirical Research 
Nan Dirk De Graaf..........................................................		322
10 Assimilation as Rational Action in Contexts Defined by Institutions and 
Boundaries Victor Nee and Richard Alba....................................		355
Part IV: States and Conflicts..............................................
11 Terrorism and the State Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca.........................381
12 Choosing War: State Decisions to Initiate and End Wars and Observe the 
Peace Afterward James D. Morrow...........................................		411
13 Rational Choice Approaches to State-Making Edgar Kiser and Erin 
Powers.....................................................................		443
Part V: Markets and Organizations..........................................
14 Market Design and Market Failure Carlos Cañón, Guido Friebel, and Paul 
Seabright..................................................................		473
15 Organizational Governance Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein...........513
16 Rational Choice and Organizational Change Rafael Wittek and Arjen Van 
Witteloostuijn.............................................................		556
Index......................................................................589

CHAPTER 1

Rationality, Social Preferences, and StrategicDecision-making from a Behavioral Economics Perspective

SIMON GÄCHTER


Introduction

The central assumption of the rational choice approach is that decision-makershave logically consistent goals (whatever they are), and, given thesegoals, choose the best available option. This model, in particular its extension tointeractive decision-making (game theory), has had a tremendous impact in thesocial sciences, in particular economics, and has allowed for great theoreticalprogress in the latter. For instance, the model and its formalization have led toimportant insights into the functioning of economic systems (see Mas-Colell,Whinston, and Green [1995] for a leading textbook account). They have alsoshed new light on numerous nonmarket processes, such as crime, addiction,family behavior, political decision-making, and organizational behavior(Coleman 1990; Becker 1993; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Gintis, Bowles,Boyd, and Fehr 2005). Rational choice theory in the form of game theory isnow the core theoretical tool of economics. It is therefore certainly justified tospeak of the rational choice model as a "success story."

Rational choice models often assume that agents are "unboundedly rational"and always know what is best for them. This assumption has long found manycritics (Simon 1982). A further assumption that is not part of the canonicalrational choice model but is frequently invoked in applications is that agentsare primarily self-regarding. This assumption has been challenged in particularin the last decade through the accumulation of empirical, in particularexperimental, evidence that has shown substantial and robust deviations fromwhat selfishness predicts.

In the past the discussions about the fruitfulness of the rational choiceapproach were based largely on philosophical convictions and less on facts. Inthis chapter I will argue on the basis of insights from behavioral economicsthat the usefulness of the rational choice approach is also an empirical questionand not just a philosophical one. My approach is related to that of Hechter andKanazawa (1997), who argue for the fruitfulness of rational choice explanationsby discussing its empirical successes across a large variety of interestingsociological domains. My arguments are based on data from many laboratoryexperiments which all share the feature that the theoretical predictions arederived from rational choice models (typically game-theoretic models) and thatdecisions in the experiments have financial consequences for the participants,which give them an incentive to take decisions seriously. Specifically, I willuse experimental results to argue that one can acknowledge that humansare boundedly rational and nevertheless appreciate the predictions made byrational choice models that at times rest on unrealistically strong assumptions.Moreover, I argue that a rational choice approach does not imply assuming thateveryone is selfish.

I start by giving a short characterization of the canonical rational choicemodel, including the selfishness assumption. With the help of one famousresearch program on the functioning of experimental markets I will illustrateone main point that will recur several times. I argue that one can fruitfullyuse rational choice theory to predict social outcomes even if the assumptionsentering the model are empirically invalid. I will first discuss the success andlimits of the rational choice approach. Then, I focus attention on the empiricalinvestigation of the selfishness assumption. I will present evidence from severaleconomic experiments that have been used as tools to uncover the structureof people's "social preferences." Numerous experiments have shown that theselfishness assumption is invalid as a description of typical behavior, although inall experiments we do find selfish...

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Verlag
Stanford University Press
Erscheinungsdatum
2013
Sprache
Englisch
ISBN 10 
0804784183
ISBN 13 
9780804784184
Einband
Gebundene Ausgabe
Anzahl der Seiten
624
Herausgeber
Wittek Rafael, Snijders Tom A. B., Nee Victor
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