State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials - Softcover

Cai, Yongshun

Softcover

ISBN 10: 0804793514 ISBN 13: 9780804793513

Verlag: STANFORD UNIV PR, 2014

Inhaltsangabe

Chinese government officials have played a crucial role in China's economic development, but they are also responsible for severe problems, including environmental pollution, violation of citizens' rights, failure in governance, and corruption. How does the Chinese Party-state respond when a government official commits a duty-related malfeasance or criminal activity? And how does it balance the potential political costs of disciplining its own agents versus the loss of legitimacy in tolerating their misdeeds? State and Agents in China explores how the party-state addresses this dilemma, uncovering the rationale behind the selective disciplining of government officials and its implications for governance in China.

By examining the discipline of state agents, Cai shows how selective punishment becomes the means of balancing the need for and difficulties of disciplining agents, and explains why some erring agents are tolerated while others are punished. Cai finds that the effectiveness of punishing erring officials in China does not depend so much on the Party-state's capacity to detect and punish each erring official but on the threat it creates when the Party-state decides to mete out punishment. Importantly, the book also shows how relaxed discipline allows reform-minded officials to use rule-violating reform measures to address local problems, and how such reform measures have significant implications for the regime's resilience.

Über diesen Titel

Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Yongshun Cai is Professor of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is the author of State and Laid-off Workers in Reform China (2006) and Collective Resistance in China (Stanford, 2010).

Yongshun Cai is Professor of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is the author of State and Laid-off Workers in Reform China (2006) and Collective Resistance in China (Stanford, 2010).

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State and Agents in China

Disciplining Government Officials

By Yongshun Cai

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2015 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-9351-3

Contents

Figures and Tables, 
Acknowledgments, 
1. Introduction, 
2. Government Officials' Malfeasance in China, 
3. The Politics of Disciplining Government Officials, 
4. Disciplining Officials for Duty-Related Malfeasance, 
5. Punishing Corrupt Agents, 
6. The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 
7. Reform-Minded Officials, State Tolerance, and Institutional Change, 
8. Conclusion, 
Appendix: Data Collection, 
3.1. Collection of 111 Cases of Media Exposure, 
3.2. Collection of 133 Cases of Officials' Duty-Related Malfeasance, 
4.1. Cases of Disciplining Cadres in Conflict Management, 
5.1. Cases of the Disciplining of 1,012 Officials, 
5.2. Cases of High-Ranking Officials Given Serious Legal Punishment (N = 41), 
Notes, 
Index, 

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In 2011, peasant protests in Wukan village in Guangdong province attracted the attention of the media in and outside China. The protests were provoked by the village cadres, who had sold land without informing or asking permission from the villagers. Although the village cadres were suspected of embezzling a large amount of money obtained through land sales, the other villagers were barely compensated. In September, the villagers began to stage protests in their village and in front of government offices after repeated but unsuccessful petitions. The village representatives negotiated with the town- and county-level authorities but failed to reach a satisfactory solution. In December, the city government of Shanwei solved the dispute by removing the village party secretary and the head while arresting five village representatives for instigating the protests.

The way the city government handled this case is familiar. It disciplined the conflict-provoking cadres to appease the disgruntled villagers while punishing the leaders of the protests or the activists to deter other troublemakers. Most protest incidents end this way, but the Wukan case did not. The county-level authority claimed that all of the major issues raised by the peasants, including the village finances, land issue, and village election, had been resolved, yet the villagers were disappointed because they felt that the government's declaration was untrue. The protests recurred, and the conflict intensified when one of the detained village representatives died in police custody. The government claimed that the representative died of heart disease, a conclusion that the family and other villagers did not accept. Instead, they believed that the representative had died of wounds.

The local government's failure to effectively solve the case and the constant attention of the media eventually led the provincial government to intervene. A team of around twenty high-ranking officials from about ten provincial Party and government agencies was sent to investigate the case. The team was headed by a vice provincial Party secretary, who was also a member of the central Discipline Inspection Commission; the deputy head of the team was a vice governor. When they took over the case, other detained representatives were released (two were on probation), and a rein-vestigation into the cause of the representative's death was promised.

The provincial leaders were dissatisfied with the local officials' performance. The head of the investigation team stated that the relationship between some cadres and the people was as incompatible as water and fire. Whether the people were facing difficulties was not these cadres' concern. The head of the team criticized the irresponsibility and irresponsiveness of some cadres, blaming them for failing to consider how the peasants who had lost land could make a living. He said:

In some places, the government continues to ignore the problems that have long been raised by the people. If the problem can be suppressed, the government will take immediate and harsh measures to suppress it. The next step is to postpone the settlement as long as possible. In the cadres' view, leaving the problems to their successors is preferable. Once they are transferred, whatever happens next will no longer be their business. This mentality is common among local cadres.

Nevertheless, although the criticisms made by the investigation head seemed to be based on what had happened in the Wukan case, the team's attitude toward the local officials involved in the case was not critical. Indeed, the local officials had been irresponsive in addressing this case because between 2009 and 2011, before the large-scale protests began, the Wukan villagers had repeatedly appealed to fourteen government agencies. Despite the lack of response from local officials, the head of the team was positive about the efforts of the county and the city governments, claiming that their earlier efforts created conditions for the ensuing solution to the disputes.

The Wukan case, one of numerous social protests in China in recent years, reveals the issue of local officials' accountability in the country. The dispute occurred at the grassroots level between the villagers and the village cadres, but neither the town government nor the county- or city-level authority was able to handle it properly. Eventually, the provincial authority formed a team of high-ranking provincial officials to deal with it directly. This case also reveals the difficulties of using sanctions to ensure accountability. Although high-ranking officials were dissatisfied with the performance of the local officials, the former did not necessarily take punitive measures to deal with the latter.

In China, the performance of local officials is anchored to the fulfillment of their assigned responsibilities. For example, in the case of conflict management, government officials are assessed for their performance in maintaining social stability, and they will be disciplined if they fail. If the threat of discipline is credible, local officials need to be more responsive, either to accommodate the demands of the disgruntled or to silence them. However, this does not always seem to be the case. Although the central authority prioritizes building a harmonious society and allocates resources for this purpose, social conflicts continue to increase. For example, incidents of collective action in China increased by 14.6 times, from 8,700 to approximately 127,460, between 1993 and 2008. As the Wukan case shows, local officials may be exempted despite their failure in the management of social conflict.

Yet it would be misleading to conclude that Chinese local officials face little risk in failing to perform their duties. As a county Party secretary revealed, "Like scared birds, we are on high alert every day, worrying about production safety, sudden events, mass petitions, and other large-scale incidents that will result in punishment." Others also admitted, "Given the various 'one-item veto' responsibilities, we wish we could keep one eye open even when we sleep. We are anxious all the time, fearing that we will be required to take responsibility." Some local officials are punished or even jailed because of their failures in local governance.

Why are some officials who fail to perform their duties tolerated, whereas others are punished? Answers to this question shed light on the issue of cadre management, governance, and state capacity in China. This book...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: STANFORD UNIV PR
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2014
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0804793514
• ISBN 13: 9780804793513
• Einband: Taschenbuch
• Anzahl der Seiten: 264
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Mare Nostrum Group B.V.; gpsr@mare-nostrum.co.uk; ; Doelen 72; Breda; 4831 GR; Niederlande