Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and Its Applications - Hardcover

Good, Irving John

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0816611416 ISBN 13: 9780816611416

Verlag: Univ of Minnesota Pr, 1983

Inhaltsangabe

Good Thinking was first published in 1983.Good Thinking is a representative sampling of I. J. Good’s writing on a wide range of questions about the foundations of statistical inference, especially where induction intersects with philosophy. Good believes that clear reasoning about many important practical and philosophical questions is impossible except in terms of probability. This book collects from various published sources 23 of Good’s articles with an emphasis on more philosophical than mathematical.He covers such topics as rational decisions, randomness, operational research, measurement of knowledge, mathematical discovery, artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, chess, and the nature of probability itself. In spite of the wide variety of topics covered, Good Thinking is based on a unified philosophy which makes it more than the sum of its parts. The papers are organized into five sections: Bayesian Rationality; Probability; Corroboration, Hypothesis Testing, and Simplicity; Information and Surprise; and Causality and Explanation. The numerous references, an extensive index, and a bibliography guide the reader to related modern and historic literature.This collection makes available to a wide audience, for the first time, the most accessible work of a very creative thinker. Philosophers of science, mathematicians, scientists, and, in Good’s words, anyone who wants “to understand understanding, to reason about reasoning, to explain explanation, to think about thought, and to decide how to decide” will find Good Thinking a stimulating and provocative look at probability.

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Univ of Minnesota Pr
• Erscheinungsdatum: 1983
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0816611416
• ISBN 13: 9780816611416
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar