Deterrence: Its Past and Future: Papers Presented at Hoover Institution, November 2010 (Hoover Institution Press Publication (Hardcover), Band 613) - Hardcover

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 081791384X ISBN 13: 9780817913847

Verlag: Hoover Institution Press,U.S., 2011

Inhaltsangabe

Drawn from the third in a series of conferences at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, this report examines the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. Although deterrence will not disappear, current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which nuclear weapons will play the dominant role they did during the cold war.

The authors highlight the ways in which deterrence has been shaped by surrounding conditions and circumstances. They look at the prospective reliability of deterrence as a tool of statecraft in the emerging international environment. And they examine the challenges of “weaponless deterrence”:  developing approaches to nuclear deterrence that rely not on the actua, but rather on the potential existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, they look at the ongoing debates over “de-alerting” (slowing down the capability for immediate launch and rapid nuclear escalation), the role of arms control, and the practical considerations related to verification and compliance.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

George P. Shultz is the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and has had a distinguished career in government, in academia, and in business. He lives in San Francisco. Sidney D. Drell is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor of theoretical physics emeritus at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, Stanford University. He lives in Palo Alto, California. James E. Goodby is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior fellow with the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He lives in San Jose, California.

George P. Shultz, the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution, has had a distinguished career in government, in academia, and in business.

Sidney D. Drell is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor of theoretical physics emeritus at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory, Stanford University.

James Goodby is an author and retired US Foreign Service officer.

Von der hinteren Coverseite

Deterrence as applied during the cold war loomed larger than other tools of statecraft and was identified more closely with the possible use of devastating military force than should be the case today. The current international environment is radically different from that which it was during the cold war. Threats of very different types, from cyber warfare to terrorist attacks, have become the major dangers to world order. Current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which deterrence, least of all nuclear deterrence, will be the most effective tool of statecraft. A new approach is clearly necessary.

This book is a collection of the papers prepared for and presented at the November 2010 Hoover Nuclear Threat Initiative Conference by an expert group of analysts, all of whom have studied deterrence issues for many years. The authors highlight ways deterrence has been shaped by surrounding conditions and circumstances. They look at the prospective reliability of deterrence as a tool of statecraft in the emerging international environment. And they examine the challenges of “weaponless deterrence”: developing approaches to nuclear deterrence that rely not on the actua, but rather on the potential existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, they look at the ongoing debates over “de-alerting” (slowing down the capability for immediate launch and rapid nuclear escalation), the role of arms control, and the practical considerations related to verification and compliance.

As long as nuclear weapons continue to exist, the United States should ensure that its nuclear forces are safe, reliable, and capable of launching a devastating nuclear strike on any nation that attacks it with nuclear weapons. Even after the world reaches the long-for goal of zero nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence will continue to have a vital role for some time to come. As George Shultz says in his foreword to this report, “One thing is clear: no analysis of a world without nuclear weapons can proceed very far without considering the issue of deterrence.”

Aus dem Klappentext

Deterrence as applied during the cold war loomed larger than other tools of statecraft and was identified more closely with the possible use of devastating military force than should be the case today. The current international environment is radically different from that which it was during the cold war. Threats of very different types, from cyber warfare to terrorist attacks, have become the major dangers to world order. Current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which deterrence, least of all nuclear deterrence, will be the most effective tool of statecraft. A new approach is clearly necessary.

This book is a collection of the papers prepared for and presented at the November 2010 Hoover Nuclear Threat Initiative Conference by an expert group of analysts, all of whom have studied deterrence issues for many years. The authors highlight ways deterrence has been shaped by surrounding conditions and circumstances. They look at the prospective reliability of deterrence as a tool of statecraft in the emerging international environment. And they examine the challenges of “weaponless deterrence”: developing approaches to nuclear deterrence that rely not on the actua, but rather on the potential existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, they look at the ongoing debates over “de-alerting” (slowing down the capability for immediate launch and rapid nuclear escalation), the role of arms control, and the practical considerations related to verification and compliance.

As long as nuclear weapons continue to exist, the United States should ensure that its nuclear forces are safe, reliable, and capable of launching a devastating nuclear strike on any nation that attacks it with nuclear weapons. Even after the world reaches the long-for goal of zero nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence will continue to have a vital role for some time to come. As George Shultz says in his foreword to this report, “One thing is clear: no analysis of a world without nuclear weapons can proceed very far without considering the issue of deterrence.”

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Deterrence: Its Past and Future

Papers Presented at Hoover Institution, November 2010

By George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell, James E. Goodby

Hoover Institution Press

Copyright © 2011 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8179-1384-7

Contents

Abbreviations, 
Foreword by George P. Shultz, 
Preface, 
Acknowledgments, 
Introduction by James E. Goodby, 
1 How History and the Geopolitical Context Shape Deterrence by Patrick Morgan and George Quester, 
2 Redefining the Role of Deterrence by Michael Mazarr and James E. Goodby, 
3 Nuclear Deterrence in a World Without Nuclear Weapons by Sidney D. Drell and Raymond Jeanloz, 
4 Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and its Discontents: Challenges of "Weaponless Deterrence" by Christopher A. Ford, 
5 Playing for Time on the Edge of the Apocalypse: Maximizing Decision Time for Nuclear Leaders by Christopher A. Ford, 
6 Arms Control and Deterrence by James M. Acton, Edward Ifft, and John McLaughlin, 
7 Practical Considerations Related to Verification and Compliance by Edward Ifft, 
8 Deterrence and Enforcement in a World Free of Nuclear Weapons by David Holloway, 
Appendix A: Enforcing Zero: Forget Deterrence! by Harald Müller, 
Appendix B: Nuclear Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: An Ethical Analysis by Tyler Wigg-Stevenson, 
Appendix C: Conference Agenda, 
Appendix D: Conference Participants, 
About the Authors, 
Index, 

CHAPTER 1

How History and the Geopolitical Context Shape Deterrence

Patrick Morgan and George Quester

Deterrence was a well-known practice in international politics long before the twentieth century. It began to take on elements of what was to become cold war deterrence long before the cold war appeared, and thus before the appearance of nuclear weapons. Efforts to develop a robust theory of deterrence early in the cold war led to treating it as an abstract phenomenon, basically the same everywhere. In this paper we highlight ways deterrence has been shaped by surrounding conditions and circumstances. We also note how a way of practicing deterrence can become deeply rooted, making it difficult to change or eliminate.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1945 nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed quickly by the Japanese surrender ending World War II, it was hardly surprising that many analysts saw nuclear weapons as setting up something qualitatively new and different in the role of weapons: deterrence. Bernard Brodie's book, The Absolute Weapon, written directly after Hiroshima and published early in 1946, has been quoted many times since on his prediction: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."

The basis of deterrence was of course the painful punishment that faced the launcher of a war. Glenn Snyder later offered a more elaborate distinction, in his 1961 book Deterrence and Defense, between "deterrence by denial" (the military manner in which aggressions had been deterred in the past, by the prospect that an aggressive attack would be rebuffed so that it would be foolish to initiate one) and "deterrence by punishment" (the new mechanism by which, even if an aggressive attack could succeed militarily, the loser could inflict retaliatory punishment as a last gasp on the cities of the winner).

But most observers, when referring to "deterrence" after 1945, had indeed been focusing on what Snyder outlined as "deterrence by punishment." The invention of nuclear weapons, which could deliver tremendous destruction in a very small package slipped past enemy forces by airplane, missile, or submarine, presumably made all the difference. Deterrence was thus a concept discussed much more often after 1945, especially after 1949 when the Soviets detonated their own atomic bomb and Americans had now to be concerned about mutual deterrence.

Yet it is important to note that the word and the concept had existed before 1945, amid experiences that seem like a dress rehearsal for what we lived with in the cold war and which might offer important lessons on future "deterrence." And for the non-nuclear world which existed before 1945 (and for any non-nuclear world we may have in the future) such deterrence also depended heavily on anticipations of pain and punishment. Even today, when North Korea threatens Seoul with conventional attack, or Hezbollah similarly threatens Israeli cities, the deterrent impact is what the targeting jargon labels "counter-value," the punishment of civilians.

Pre-nuclear deterrence

Important earlier examples can be found in the thinking about conventional aerial bombardment that emerged during (and even before) World War I, then in the years between the world wars, and during the escalation of aerial bombing in World War II when the great majority of strategic planners knew nothing about nuclear weapons.

The actual experience of aerial bombing in World War I, as shown in photographs, seems very minor and quaint to a world that has experienced the destruction of Coventry, Hamburg, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. The photos sometimes show "the horrible destruction inflicted by a Zeppelin attack" as one or two flattened units in a row of London townhouses, looking like the missing teeth in a young child.

But the public reaction to the World War I bombings often verged on panic, and future air war was expected to be waged with bigger bombs, incendiaries, and poison gas. The predictions — in the plans of British air marshals like Hugh Trenchard, in the derivative publications of Giulio Douhet in Italy, and from a host of other writers in the 1920s and 1930s — presumed the existence of the destructive equivalent of 1945 atomic bombs, causing populations perhaps to be ready to surrender after such attacks, or causing governments to hold back some of such attacks for fear of matching retaliation.

Actually, the public in London bore up much better under the massive 1940 "Blitz" than it had under the German Zeppelin and winged bomber attacks of 1914–1918, as the British government had over-estimated how many hospital beds it would need for an air assault by an order of magnitude. But, if the reality before Hiroshima did not support what Brodie and others projected for the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons, the important point is that the assumptions guiding planners before 1941 often came close.

Immediately after World War I, planners in the Royal Air Force had also speculated extensively about using "air control" retaliatory bombings on insurgent native villages as a means of asserting political control over colonial territories, ideas tested in British Somaliland and in the Northwest Frontier regions of today's Pakistan. The practice of deterrence here was thus not limited to symmetrical confrontations where each side possessed an air force, but could be especially plausible where the weaker side had no means of parallel retaliation.

To see how the somewhat premature assumptions about air-delivered mass destruction were circulated, and not only among nongovernment theorists, one must look closely at the initial phases of World War II, or of World War I, to find the German and British governments avoiding aerial bombing campaigns for fear of responses in kind.

The outbreak of World War II saw the Royal Air Force...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Hoover Institution Press,U.S.
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2011
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 081791384X
• ISBN 13: 9780817913847
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Auflage: 1
• Anzahl der Seiten: 432
• Herausgeber: Shultz George P., Drell Sidney D., Goodby James E.
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar