Science As It Could Have Been: Discussing the Contingency/Inevitability Problem - Hardcover

Hardcover

ISBN 10: 0822944456 ISBN 13: 9780822944454

Verlag: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015

Inhaltsangabe

Could all or part of our taken-as-established scientific conclusions, theories, experimental data, ontological commitments, and so forth have been significantly different? Science as It Could Have Been focuses on a crucial issue that contemporary science studies have often neglected: the issue of contingency within science. It considers a number of case studies, past and present, from a wide range of scientific disciplines—physics, biology, geology, mathematics, and psychology—to explore whether components of human science are inevitable, or if we could have developed an alternative successful science based on essentially different notions, conceptions, and results. Bringing together a group of distinguished contributors in philosophy, sociology, and history of science, this edited volume offers a comprehensive analysis of the contingency/inevitability problem and a lively and up-to-date portrait of current debates in science studies.

Über diesen Titel

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Léna Soler is associate professor of philosophy of science at the University of Lorraine. She is the author of Introduction à l’épistémologie and editor of Science after the Practice Turn in the Philosophy, History, and Social Studies of Science.
Emiliano Trizio is an instructor of philosophy at Seattle University.
Andrew Pickering is professor of sociology and philosophy at the University of Exeter. He is the author of Constructing Quarks, The Mangle of Practice, and The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future.

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: University of Pittsburgh Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2015
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 0822944456
• ISBN 13: 9780822944454
• Einband: Gebundene Ausgabe
• Auflage: 1
• Anzahl der Seiten: 462
• Herausgeber: Soler Lena, Trizio Emiliano, Pickering Andrew
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar