Explores how political institutions and economic geography interact to shape governments' policy decisions, particularly with respect to subsidies.
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Stephanie J. Rickard is Associate Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Anbieter: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Vereinigtes Königreich
Hardcover. Zustand: new. Hardcover. Governments in some democracies target economic policies, like industrial subsidies, to small groups at the expense of many. Why do some governments redistribute more narrowly than others? Their willingness to selectively target economic benefits, like subsidies to businesses, depends on the way politicians are elected and the geographic distribution of economic activities. Based on interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats, as well as parliamentary records, industry publications, local media coverage, and new quantitative data, Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies demonstrates that government policy-making can be explained by the combination of electoral institutions and economic geography. Specifically, it shows how institutions interact with economic geography to influence countries' economic policies and international economic relations. Identical institutions have wide-ranging effects depending on the context in which they operate. No single institution is a panacea for issues, such as income inequality, international economic conflict, or minority representation. Why do some democracies redistribute more than others? Election practices cause some governments to deliver policies, such as industrial subsidies, that assist small groups of citizens at the expense of many. Spending to Win will find interest amongst scholars of international political economy, public policy, public administration, and comparative politics. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9781108422321
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Anbieter: moluna, Greven, Deutschland
Zustand: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Why do some democracies redistribute more than others? Election practices cause some governments to deliver policies, such as industrial subsidies, that assist small groups of citizens at the expense of many. Spending to Win will find interest amongst schol. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 447230857
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