A novel argument that shows how rules work better than discretion when implementing monetary policy.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Christopher J. Coyne is the F. A. Harper Professor of Economics at George Mason University and the Associate Director of the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: HPB-Red, Dallas, TX, USA
paperback. Zustand: Acceptable. Connecting readers with great books since 1972. Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have condition issues including wear and notes/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority! Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers S_365519723
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: HPB-Red, Dallas, TX, USA
paperback. Zustand: Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority! Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers S_462293358
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, USA
paperback. Zustand: Very Good. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers mon0003690042
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 42469547-n
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, USA
Paperback. Zustand: new. Paperback. Contemporary monetary institutions are flawed at a foundational level. The reigning paradigm in monetary policy holds up constrained discretion as the preferred operating framework for central banks. But no matter how smart or well-intentioned are central bankers, discretionary policy contains information and incentive problems that make macroeconomic stability systematically unlikely. Furthermore, central bank discretion implicitly violates the basic jurisprudential norms of liberal democracy. Drawing on a wide body of scholarship, this volume presents a novel argument in favor of embedding monetary institutions into a rule of law framework. The authors argue for general, predictable rules to provide a sturdier foundation for economic growth and prosperity. A rule of law approach to monetary policy would remedy the flaws that resulted in misguided monetary responses to the 2007-8 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding the case for true monetary rules is the first step toward creating more stable monetary institutions. Working at the intersection of monetary economics and political economy, the authors of this volume develop novel arguments for why discretionary central banking is hard to reconcile with liberal democracy and doesn't actually solve or prevent financial crises. For that, we need rules, not discretion. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9781108790840
Anbieter: California Books, Miami, FL, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers I-9781108790840
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 42469547
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 256 pages. 9.02x5.98x0.45 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers __1108790844
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ria9781108790840_new
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irland
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers V9781108790840
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar