Methods of Ethics, a supplement to the first edition - Softcover

Sidgwick, Henry

 
9781151514455: Methods of Ethics, a supplement to the first edition

Zu dieser ISBN ist aktuell kein Angebot verfügbar.

Inhaltsangabe

Book may have numerous typos, missing text, images, or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1877. Excerpt: ... CHATTER XIII. PHILOSOPHICAL IXTUITIOXISM. § 1 ••••; And this is to some extent the case. But Moral Philosophy, or Philosophy as applied to Morality, has had other tasks to occupy it, even more profoundly difficult than that of penetrating to the fundamental principles of Duty. In modern times especially, it has admitted the necessity of demonstrating the harmony of Duty with Interest; that is, with the Happiness or Good of the agent on whom tho duty in each case is imposed. It has also undertaken to determine the relation of Right or Good generally to the world of .actual existence; a task which could hardly be satisfactorily accomplished without an adequate explanation of the existence of Evil. It has further been distracted by psychological questions (of which, as I Lave before argued, the importance seems to have been much exaggerated) as to the 'innatencss' of our notions of Duty, and the origin of the faculty that furnishes them. With their attention concentrated on these difficult subjects, each of which has been mixed up in various ways with the discussion of fundamental moral intuitions, philosophers have too easily been let! to satisfy themselves with ethical formulae which implicitly accept the morality of Common Sense en bloc, ignoring its defects; and merely express a certain view of the relation of this morality to the individual mind or to the universe of actual existence. Perhaps also they have been hampered §2. The definitions quoted may be found in modern writers: but it seems worthy of remark that throughout the ethical speculation of Greece", such universal affirmations as arc presented to us concerning Virtue or Good conduct seem always to be propositions which can only be defended from the charge of tautology, if they arc unders...

Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.

Weitere beliebte Ausgaben desselben Titels