An Anticipative Feedback Solution for the Infinite-Horizon, Linear-Quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game - Softcover

Chen, Baoline; Zadrozny, Peter A.

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1288632282 ISBN 13: 9781288632282

Verlag: BiblioGov, 2013

Inhaltsangabe

This paper derives and illustrates a new suboptimal-consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. This solution lies in the same solution space as the infinite-horizon, dynamic-programming, feedback solution but puts the leader in a preferred equilibrium position. The idea comes from Kydland (1977) who suggested deriving a consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game by varying the coefficients in the player's linear constant-coefficient decision rules. Here feedback is understood in the sense of setting a current control vector as a function of a predetermined state vector. The proposed solution is derived for discrete- and continuous-time games and is called the anticipative feedback solution. The solution is illustrated with a numerical example of a duopoly model

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: BiblioGov
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2013
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 1288632282
• ISBN 13: 9781288632282
• Einband: Tapa blanda
• Anzahl der Seiten: 34
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar