Entry and Exit: Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Stopping Games This scholarly work analyzes when firms should enter or exit an industry under uncertainty modeled by continuous time and Brownian motion. It presents barrier policies and subgame perfect equilibria to explain timing decisions in single?firm and duopoly settings.
The book explains how optimal stopping and continuous-time game theory can be combined to determine when a firm should enter, stay, or leave. It uses mathematical models to show why and how barrier levels govern entry and exit decisions, and it explores how competition between two firms shapes these choices.
Readers will encounter concrete results about existence, uniqueness, and structure of equilibria, along with implications for the duration of monopoly periods and the impact of potential entrants on incumbents. The treatment blends single?firm problems with interactive duopoly analysis to illuminate strategic timing under uncertainty.
Ideal for readers of advanced microeconomic theory, contract and game theory, or operations research who want a rigorous, math?driven view of timing decisions under uncertainty.
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Anbieter: Forgotten Books, London, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: New. Print on Demand. This book examines continuous-time entry and exit subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games. It offers an in-depth analysis of a class of continuous-time entry and exit games where the stochastically changing environment is modeled through Brownian motion. When there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria, the author explicitly characterizes the equilibrium strategies, thereby providing the bounds of all possible strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium. The book provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilibrium. The author extends the analysis of entry-exit decisions done either in continuous time under certainty or in discrete-time under uncertainty to continuous time under uncertainty, while directly working with continuous time without taking limits of discrete-time outcomes. They also contribute to continuous-time game theory by working with continuous time without taking limits of discrete-time outcomes. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9781332259618_0
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Anbieter: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, USA
PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers LW-9781332259618
Anbieter: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Vereinigtes Königreich
PAP. Zustand: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers LW-9781332259618
Anzahl: 15 verfügbar
Anbieter: Buchpark, Trebbin, Deutschland
Zustand: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 26073709/2
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