When business leaders, government officials, and other stakeholders come to the table in an environmental, health, or safety dispute, acrimony often results, leading to expensive and time-consuming litigation. Not only does this waste precious resources, but rarely does the process produce the best outcome for any of the parties involved.
For the past five years, the authors of this volume have conducted semi-annual seminars at the Massachussetts Institute of Technology and at Harvard to provide business leaders and regulators with the knowledge and skills they need to more effectively handle environmental, health, and safety negotiations. Their strategy, known as the "mutual gains approach," is a proven method of producing fairer, more efficient, more stable, and wiser results. Negotiating Environmental Agreements provides the first comprehensive introduction to this widely practiced and highly effective approach to environmental regulation.
The book begins with an overview of the mutual gains approach, introducing important concepts and ideas from negotiation theory as well as the theory and practice of mediation. The authors then offer five model negotiations from their MIT-Harvard Public Disputes seminar, followed by a series of real-world negotiated environmental agreements that illustrate the kinds of outcomes possible when the mutual gains approach is employed. A collection of writings by leading experts provide valuable insights into the process, and appendixes offer both instructions for conducting model negotiation sessions and analysis of actual game results from earlier seminars.
This is the only prescriptive text available for the many regulatees and regulators involved in environmental regulatory negotiations each year. Anyone involved with environmental negotiation -- including corporate and public sector managers, students of environmental policy, environmental management, and business management -- will find the book an essential resource.
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Lawrence Susskind is Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and president of the Consensus Building Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is author of Dealing With an Angry Public (Free Press, 1996).
Paul Levy is Executive Dean of Harvard Medical School.
Jennifer Thomas-Larmer is with the Consensus Building Institute.
For the past five years, the authors of this volume have conducted semi-annual seminars at MIT and Harvard to provide business leaders and regulators with the knowledge and skills they need to more effectively handle environmental negotiations. Their strategy, known as the "mutual gains approach", is proven to produce fairer, more efficient, more stable, and wiser results. Negotiating Environmental Agreements provides the first comprehensive introduction to their widely practiced and highly regarded techniques.
For more information and confidential game instructions, visit the MIT Environmental Policy Group website at http: //web.mit.edu/dusp/EPG
About Island Press,
About the MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program,
Title Page,
Copyright Page,
Acknowledgments,
Introduction,
Part 1 - The Mutual Gains Approach,
Part 2 - Putting Your Skills to the Test,
Part 3 - Case Examples of Negotiated Agreements,
Part 4 - Selected Readings,
Bibliography,
Mediation/Facilitation Resources,
About the Authors,
Index,
Island Press Board of Directors,
Part 1
The Mutual Gains Approach
The mutual gains approach to negotiating environmental agreements is described in detail in this part. We begin by looking at the philosophy behind the approach and talk about what regulators, regulatees, and the community at large can learn from its concepts. We then compare traditional negotiation strategies and techniques with the mutual gains approach. We explain the concept of BATNA—"best alternative to a negotiated agreement"—and describe the strategic power of this concept in our negotiation framework. We then present and discuss the essential stages of the mutual gains approach: preparation, value creation, value distribution, and follow through. We place a heavy emphasis on the creation and maintenance of relationships throughout these stages. Finally, we discuss the applications of these concepts to common permitting and other regulatory situations. The part includes adaptations of the overheads we use in our workshop, accompanied by detailed annotations.
Philosophy of the Approach
Regulators and regulatees often have a high degree of skepticism concerning the efficacy of negotiation in the highly structured and legalistic environmental arena. Regulated companies often assume that regulators have little or no discretion when it comes to permitting, compliance, and enforcement. They fear that attempts to engage in negotiation will be perceived by regulators as attempts to "get around the rules" and will therefore backfire by generating even more stringent enforcement activities. Likewise, regulators are often convinced that they, in fact, have little discretion in their permitting and enforcement activities and that attempts to negotiate agreements will serve mainly to weaken environmental laws and regulations.
Our philosophy is that well-structured and thoughtful negotiations can result in gains for both regulators and regulatees, and for the community at large (see Figure 1.1). For the regulator, an effective agreement can produce voluntary compliance that goes beyond minimum standards required or mandated by law. For the regulated company, an effective agreement can offer flexibility in when and how requirements must be met and the opportunity to explain, face to face, the financial and commercial constraints on the regulated industry. For the community at large, agreements can result in better environmental performance and stronger commercial enterprises, yielding numerous benefits to the community.
The Essential Ingredient
The exercise of agency discretion is the key to negotiating optimal agreements (see Figure 1.2). We know that such discretion exists in most regulatory settings. Indeed, state legislators and Congress typically anticipate that enforcement agencies will interpret the law based on technological advances, precedent, financial factors, willingness of companies to cooperate, and a variety of other factors. It is not possible to write an environmental or public health law that can precisely fit the circumstances surrounding each factory, mill, or other production facility. Legislators intend for agencies to use their best judgment to reach the broadly stated goals set forth in a given statute. Courts, too, will generally defer to the expertise of an administrative agency in interpreting the law and carrying out its provisions.
Notwithstanding these facts, regulatory agency officials often feel obliged to assert that they have little flexibility, because they fear that flexibility will lead to being "used" by industries or will prompt complaints from advocacy groups and the press that a company is being given preferential treatment. We believe strongly, however, that regulatory discretion is a tool that can be used to produce results that are better for society. We would not expect a regulator to do less than carry out the law, as he or she understands that law. Likewise, however, we would not expect a regulator to forsake a chance to produce a more beneficial result than that anticipated in the law. We believe that negotiation is a means to accomplishing the latter end.
Regulatees must understand that flexibility also means a lack of uniformity. When a regulator and regulatee enter into negotiations, the chosen solution to a permitting or compliance problem might be different from that required of others in the industry. It is this variability that enables an environmental agreement to be tailored to the particular economic and financial concerns of a given regulatee.
The community, also, must accept that negotiations will likely produce different results in similar cases. The community has a right to expect that the deals and deal mak-ing that lead to such disparate results will be transparent and open to public review. Environmental regulation, after all, is a process carried out for the public good, and the public officials associated with that process must remain accountable to the body politic.
The Goal for Regulatees
Regulatees should learn how to initiate and carry out a process of negotiation that does not in any way threaten the integrity of the regulatory process or individual regulators (see Figure 1.3). Indeed, the establishment of a respectful and trusting relationship is essential to reaching environmental agreements. The mutual gains approach is based on understanding the interests of the other parties. In this approach, both the substance and the process of the negotiations are critical. Action taken by both parties "away from the table" before face-to-face negotiations occur are important, too, in that they help provide people with a better sense of the context and substance of the other party's interests.
The mutual gains approach is both a strategy and a set of tactics. As a strategy, it provides a broad framework within which an environmental negotiation can take place. But it also provides the context for tactical steps that all parties might seek to employ. The approach is tied to specific behaviors exhibited and choices made before, during, and after face-to-face sessions. How can regulatees do a better job of finding out what regulators really need to know to do their job effectively? We explore ways they can improve communications with the many levels of agency personnel. We offer advice on how they can get interpretations of regulations before making major financial commitments. Finally, we provide insights into how regulatees can get readings from the agency about their "bottom line"—what they really would be willing to live with.
The Goal for Regulators
Likewise, regulators need help understanding the interests and problems of regulated companies (see Figure 1.4). After all, regulators' goal should not be to achieve...
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