On Ops: Lessons and Challenges for the Australian Army since East Timor (ACSACS) - Softcover

Frame, Tom; Palazzo, Albert

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1742235093 ISBN 13: 9781742235097

Verlag: UNSW Press, 2016

Inhaltsangabe

No-one in the Australian government or Army could have predicted that in the 25 years following the end of the Cold War Army personnel would be deployed to Rwanda, Cambodia, Somalia, Bougainville, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Solomon Islands. In a constructive critique of the modern Australian Army, 'On Ops' examines the massive transformation that has taken place since troops were deployed to East Timor 1999. After decades of inactivity and the 'long peace' of the 1970s and 1980s the Army was stretched to the limit. Contributors include John Howard and Peter Leahy as well as Craig Stockings, David Horner and an impressive array of military historians, academics, intelligence experts and ex and current Army.

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Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Tom Frame was a naval officer for 15 years before being ordained to the Anglican ministry. He served as Bishop to the Australian Defence Force from 2001-2007 and is the author/editor of 28 books on a range of topics including the ethics of armed conflict. He is a regular media commentator on naval, religious and ethical affairs.

Albert Palazzo is the director of Research for the Australian Army. He has published widely on the history of Australian Army. Major works include The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901-2001; Moltke to bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in Contemporary Military Environment and The Future of War Debate in Australia. His recent research has focused on the effects of resource limits and climate change on the future character of war.

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On Ops

Lessons and Challenges for the Australian Army Since East Timor

By Tom Frame, Albert Palazzo

University of New South Wales Press Ltd

Copyright © 2016 Tom Frame and Albert Palazzo
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-1-74223-509-7

Contents

CONTRIBUTORS, 
ACRONYMS, 
LESSONS AND LEARNING Tom Frame, 
PART 1: THE BIGGER PICTURE, 
1 The Army and national interest John Howard, 
2 The emerging strategic environment David Horner, 
3 Combat ready? Peter Leahy, 
PART 2: VIEWS FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL, 
4 Lessons from East Timor Craig Stockings, 
5 Islander perspectives: Bougainville and the Solomon Islands Reuben Bowd, 
PART 3: OPERATIONAL AND READY?, 
6 Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on terror Amin Saikal, 
7 Improvements and challenges for Army's ISR enterprise Scott Gills, Ben Alward and Tim Rutherford, 
8 Logistics and the failure to modernise David Beaumont, 
9 Logistics and emerging technology Allison Sonneveld, 
10 The costs and complexities of health support Anthony J. Chambers, 
PART 4: VIEWS FROM THE MEDIA, 
11 The military and the media Brendan Nicholson, 
12 Balancing information and reputation Leanne Glenny, 
13 Public interest and Defence information Michael Harris, 
PART 5: ON ETHICS AND MORALITY, 
14 Intervention – a duty to protect? Stephen Coleman, 
15 The challenge of moral injury Tom Frame, 
PART 6: FINAL ASSESSMENTS, 
16 The Army and government objectives John Blaxland, 
POSTSCRIPT Albert Palazzo, 
NOTES, 

CHAPTER 1

THE ARMY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

JOHN HOWARD

There was an enormous increase in the military operations in which Australia was involved during the time that I was Prime Minister from March 1996 until August 2007. I have to say at the outset that it was not entirely what I expected. Politics is a combination of the widely anticipated (often, in reality) and the totally unexpected. When I was elected Prime Minister I had no idea of what lay ahead for this country and I dare say very few of our foreign policy, strategic or military advisers had any idea either. Nobody could have envisaged the intervention in East Timor. I certainly do not believe that anybody would have foreseen the coming of terrorism in the form of attacks on Washington and New York in the September of 2001. There was an entirely different attitude in official circles on both sides of politics about active interventions in Pacific Island countries, such as the Solomons, and we were still living in the long shadow of the Vietnam conflict's aftermath, although that war had ended more than twenty years before my government was elected. Nonetheless, it was a period of time in which there was, in my judgement, a subdued level of public consciousness about potential military involvement in a range of situations abroad as the conflict in Vietnam had evoked enormous controversy in the community. There remained intense feelings about it – not about the quality of the military contribution by Australian forces, but about the strategic wisdom of the involvement and the continuing consequences of that involvement – and this influenced public attitudes towards the use of Australia's military capabilities in any context.

When the Coalition parties came to government one important decision we took was to ring-fence Defence from any expenditure cuts in our first budget. It is fair to say that was an attitude that was substantially maintained during our time in office and, of course, in addition there were significant increases in many areas of Defence expenditure. We ordered a review – there are always reviews when governments come to power, whether it is in Defence or anywhere else – into the financing and management of the forces. The first Defence Minister in my government, Ian McLachlan, announced that an inquiry led by Vice Admiral Chris Barrie (who later became the Chief of Defence Force) would seek to use the language of the trade, to shift resources away from 'the back office to the sharp end'. I will leave others to decide whether or not that was successful. But our initial commitment to exempt Defence from expenditure cuts was the basis of the Coalition's commitment to national security. There would be no defence on the cheap; it needed to be properly funded.

The turning point for me and the whole government in relation to defence was the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) operation. It required careful decision-making that was conscious of both the long- and short-term political and diplomatic consequences of Australian action, and it demanded substantial additional investment in supplies and equipment. This was not the first occasion on which the Coalition Government had deployed Australians abroad – and this is often overlooked. In response to the continued refusal of the Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein to comply fully with the United Nations resolution on weapons inspections, we had sent a Special Forces contingent to the Middle East in 1998. They were deployed with strong bipartisan support. Together with Opposition Leader Kim Beazley, I met the contingent in Western Australia before they departed. Their mission was to co-operate with other allied forces in helping to enforce the air space and flying restrictions associated with implementing the resolution. A deal was subsequently brokered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the Iraqi regime, and the Australian personnel came home. But there was a fundamental change of mood in the political arena of our own region in 1999.

The origin of this mood change was the very unexpected decision of the President of Indonesia, Dr BJ Habibie, to contemplate significant change with respect to Indonesia's policy on the continuing occupation of East Timor. I wrote to Dr Habibie, who came to office following the resignation of General Suharto early in March 1998. My letter urged him to hold a plebiscite on the future status of East Timor within Indonesia. He certainly surprised us when he agreed to hold such a plebiscite without delay, and to include the option of complete separation from Indonesia. This went beyond our government's expectations.

This proved to be a deeply unpopular decision in some sectors of Indonesia, especially within their armed forces. In the months before the vote there was widespread violence committed by rogue elements of the Indonesian military in East Timor. The situation deteriorated to such a degree that by the early months of 1999 it was obvious to many of us in the government that military intervention was a very real possibility. Should force be required to reinstate order and to restrain local militias, the government was aware that Australia would be expected to play a substantial role in any intervention. After all, we were the largest and most prosperous nation in the region. I made it clear that if we were to play a major role in the intervention it would include overall leadership. I had come to the conclusion that this was the sort of operation in which Australia needed to be in a position where we could exercise maximum control and direct influence.

History records my intense disappointment with President Bill Clinton when he told me the United States was unable to provide any ground forces to be part of an intervention in East Timor. I genuinely thought at the time that a contingent of American ground forces would be needed and, in my naivety, I thought they would be provided, given the shared history of our two nations. Despite my...

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: UNSW Press
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2016
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 1742235093
• ISBN 13: 9781742235097
• Einband: Taschenbuch
• Anzahl der Seiten: 346
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: preigu; mail@preigu.de; ; Lengericher Landstr. 19; Osnabrück; 49078; Deutschland