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The Future of Europe: Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice After the Euro Crisis (Future Perfect: Images of the Time to Come in Philosophy, Politics and Cultural Studies) - Softcover

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9781783481132: The Future of Europe: Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice After the Euro Crisis (Future Perfect: Images of the Time to Come in Philosophy, Politics and Cultural Studies)

Inhaltsangabe

A major collection of essays by a multidisciplinary panel of experts exploring the various interpretations of the European crisis and the future of the European Union.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Serge Champeau is a researcher at the Spanish think tank, Globernance. He was previously a professor of philosophy at Bordeaux. He is the author of several books in French.

Carlos Closa is professor of political science at the Institute for Public Goods and Policies (IPP) at the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) and part-time professor and co-coordinator of research area at the Global Governance Programme, RSCAS at the European University Institute.

Daniel Innerarity is Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at the University of the Basque Country, Research Professor at the Basque Foundation for Science (IKERBASQUE) and Director of the Institute for Democratic Governance (Globernance).

Miguel Poiares Maduro is professor of law at the European University Institute, Florence. In April 2013 he was appointed as Minister of Regional Development in the Portuguese government.

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The Future of Europe

Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice After the Euro Crisis

By Serge Champeau, Carlos Closa, Daniel Innerarity, Miguel Poiares Maduro

Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd.

Copyright © 2015 Serge Champeau, Carlos Closa, Daniel Innerarity, and Miguel Poiares Maduro and contributors
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-78348-113-2

CHAPTER 1

The Euro Crisis and Its Constitutional Implications

Sergio Fabbrini

The euro crisis has radically called into question the constitutional system of the European Union (EU) as formalized by and in the Treaty of Lisbon (entered into force on 1 December 2009). The EU constitutional system was based on a plurality of constitutional compromises. First, the compromise between a supranational union (in charge of single-market policies) and an intergovernmental union (in charge of those policies traditionally close to national sovereignty, such as the economic and financial policy of the EMU [Economic and Monetary Union] and the foreign and security policy of CFSP [Common Foreign Security Policy] and ESDP [European Security and Defense Policy]). Second, the compromise between EMU countries (that is, the member states adopting the common currency, the euro, or engaged in meeting the macroeconomic criteria for adopting it, the "pre-ins") and member states retaining their own traditional currency (because they were allowed to opt out from the EMU, the so-called "outs"). Third, the compromise, within the euro area, between the centralization of monetary policy by a supranational institution (the European Central Bank or ECB) and the decentralization of economic, fiscal, and budgetary policies in the member states, subject to the voluntary coordination of their governments.

In order to meet the challenges posed by speculation in the financial markets, the EU has approved a panoply of new legislative measures through the procedures established by the Treaty of Lisbon, but a number of EU member states have also approved new intergovernmental Treaties (the European Stability Mechanism, or ESM, and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, the so-called Fiscal Compact) outside of the Treaty of Lisbon, besides executive agreements (as the European Financial Stability Facility or EFSF and the Euro Plus Pact) binding of course only the signatory member states. These legislative measures, intergovernmental Treaties and special-purpose agreements have upset the multilayer structure of constitutional compromises. The EU is experiencing true constitutional disorder. How can it solve it?

In order to answer this question, I will proceed as follows: In section 1, I will discuss the first compromise between two different political interpretations of the EU (the supranational and intergovernmental interpretations) that emerged definitively with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. In section 2, I will enter more in detail into EMU structure, discussing the compromise between EMU member states (favouring a deeper political integration) and the member states outside of the EMU (interpreting the EU as an economic community), but also the compromise within the euro area between centralization and decentralization of the EMU. In section 3, I will analyse the consequences of the euro crisis on the multilayer structure of constitutional compromises, showing why the euro crisis has been transformed into a crisis of the EU. In section 4, I will investigate the plausible alternatives (the parliamentary union and the compound union), both centred around the euro area, for going beyond the current situation. Finally, I will draw some conclusions from the analysis.


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