Can Labour Win?: The Hard Road to Power - Softcover

Diamond, Patrick

Softcover

ISBN 10: 1783485442 ISBN 13: 9781783485444

Verlag: Ri1, 2015

Inhaltsangabe

The Labour party was not just narrowly defeated in the UK's General Election in 2015, it was overwhelmingly rejected by an electorate who no longer trust the party. This book examines how the party must understand its failures and recover to become a credible challenger in the next election.

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Über die Autorinnen und Autoren

Patrick Diamond is a Senior Research Fellow at Policy Network, Gwilym Gibbon Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, and a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Politics at the University of Oxford.

Giles Radice is a Labour member of the House of Lords

Penny Bochum is an experienced interviewer and researcher who has worked on the Southern Discomfort pamphlets since 1992

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Can Labour Win?

The Hard Road to Power

By Patrick Diamond, Giles Radice, Penny Bochum

Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.

Copyright © 2015 Policy Network
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-1-78348-544-4

Contents

About the Authors, 
Acknowledgements, 
Executive Summary, 
Introduction: Why Did Labour Lose?, 
The Electoral Battleground: Polling Analysis and the Views of Wavering Voters, 
Why Labour Lost: Party Views, 
What Labour Must Do, 
Conclusion: Labour's Hard Road to Power, 

CHAPTER 1

THE ELECTORAL BATTLEGROUND

Polling Analysis and the Views of Wavering Voters

This chapter presents the quantitative polling research carried out by Ipsos Mori alongside the key findings of our qualitative survey carried out among voters across England, Wales and Scotland. The poll was conducted 10 days before the general election; it provides a snapshot of the electorate's attitudes and views as they weighed up which way to vote in the period up to 7 May. The chapter focuses on voters' perceptions of Labour and examines why so many were not prepared to support the party at the 2015 election.

The results underline the scale of the political challenge now facing Labour in the wake of its election defeat. In 2010, our research for Southern Discomfort Again found deep disillusionment after 13 years of Labour government and the financial crisis. Since then, the party appears to have gone backwards: its strategic position is, in key respects, worse than it was five years ago. We found evidence of important differences of social class and geography in voters' attitudes, which partly explains Labour's variable regional performance and its inability to connect with large swathes of England. These voters recognise that Labour has a social conscience and wants to make Britain fairer, but they have little confidence in the party's economic management credentials seven years on from the financial crash. They will not take much notice of Labour's social vision until they can be sure the party will not plunge Britain back into economic chaos.

Britain today is an economically anxious country where faith in politics has fallen to an all-time low. Middle-income, working- and middle-class Britain feels increasingly betrayed, unable to have confidence in any of the established political parties. These voters are aspirant and as anxious to get on in life as ever, but they are cautious about their prospects in the face of rising job insecurity, declining real wages, plummeting living standards and, as a consequence, a major increase in household debt. They want a better future for their children and grandchildren, but worry that life is set to get even tougher and that the advantages of a middle-class lifestyle – a steady, well-paid job, owning your own home, regular foreign holidays, a decent education – will be even harder to attain for the next generation. Middle-income Britain wants hope in the face of pessimism and uncertainty.

LABOUR HAS GONE BACKWARDS SINCE 2010

Labour today is seen as less of a national party than it was in 2010:

• Only one-third of voters (34 per cent) now say that Labour is close to people in the south of England, compared to 55 per cent in 2011 (see Table 2.1). Unsurprisingly, 71 per cent say the Conservatives are close to people in the south.

• This is mirrored by a fall in the proportion of voters who say that Labour is close to the middle class, down from 55 per cent in 2010 to 40 per cent today. This compares to 68 per cent for the Conservatives.

• In 2010, Labour and the Conservatives were seen as relatively equal in terms of being close to those who own their own home (55 and 60 per cent respectively). By 2015, the proportion of voters who saw Labour as close to home-owners fell to 39 per cent, while it remained at a similar level (62 per cent) for the Conservatives.

• Labour's pursuit of the '35 per cent strategy' targeting 'core' Labour voters and disaffected left-leaning Liberal Democrats appears to have markedly narrowed its base of support. The party is now perceived as close to the working class by a margin of 62 to 24 per cent.

Despite reforming its links with the trade unions, a similar proportion of voters (68 per cent) perceive Labour to be close to the unions as in 2010 (67 per cent). One area in which Labour has apparently made some progress is in pursuing a tougher stance on immigration. Less than half of voters (47 per cent) now believe that Labour is close to immigrants, compared to 57 per cent in 2010 – then hardly surprising perhaps in the wake of Gordon Brown's travails with Gillian Duffy in Rochdale. The Conservatives are now seen as somewhat closer to immigrants (24 per cent compared to 19 per cent), which is no doubt reflected in rising support for Ukip. When asked whether Labour was more interested in helping immigrants instead of those born in Britain, voters were evenly divided (33 per cent agreed; 33 per cent disagreed). We return to this theme below.

Labour's electoral strength is that many voters would like to trust and support the party: they identify with Labour's broader mission of a fairer society with opportunities widely spread. As one voter said: "I would like to vote Labour next time. They represent my sort of experience more than the Conservatives." Another added: "For me, it's always a struggle not to vote for Labour. I would naturally vote Labour, I voted for Blair and Brown." When Labour had been on the brink of government before, one younger voter felt a sense of optimism about the future: "A couple of times in my life I felt there was some kind of hope, like when you had [Bill] Clinton and Blair. I felt change was possible ... I am from a strong Labour family. Labour was part of my life. I was so excited when Tony Blair got into power. I genuinely believed it marked a new era of politics."

THE PARTY OF ECONOMIC INCOMPETENCE

Labour has made little progress since 2010 in addressing its key strategic weakness: a reputation for economic incompetence. Only 16 per cent of voters trust the party most to run the economy – exactly the same figure as in 2010 – compared to 33 per cent for the Tories (in the south-east, the margin is 42 to 11 per cent). In the south of England (outside London), the figure falls to 11 per cent. Just 12 per cent of voters trust Labour most to reduce the budget deficit, the same figure as in 2010 (falling to eight per cent in the south). In the West Midlands, the Conservatives are more trusted than Labour to reduce the deficit by 44 to 10 per cent. The Labour leadership's argument that the deficit was rising under the Conservative chancellor, George Osborne, because of falling real wages (and therefore of declining tax revenues) completely failed to connect with voters.

Since the financial crash, Labour has utterly failed to restore its economic credibility with the electorate. When asked to choose which term best described today's Labour party, 44 per cent of voters in the south selected "incompetent": across Britain, the figure was 37 per cent. The voters we interviewed had little sense of what Labour's economic policy actually amounted to. What they did remember was scarcely advantageous to the party's reputation: "There was a sense they were against people who generate wealth."

Labour was still blamed for the crash and the deficit by most of the respondents, and not felt to have policies to deal with the deficit: "They messed things up in 2010. They screwed up on the economy. Even if they didn't overspend, they didn't put the case well that they didn't overspend." Another voter was adamant: "The Labour attitude to spending was wrong and they were reluctant to admit the Labour government spent too much. They overspent, they were blind about the financial troubles and they don't admit that." Voters wanted Labour to recognise that the deficit was a problem and had to be addressed head on by whoever was in government: "They are anti-austerity and want to continue spending and I agree with the Conservative policy of paying off the debt. That is essential and I disagree with Labour. You've got to try and pay it back; you've got to take that seriously. I mean, look at the mess they made. And they left the Conservatives to deal with it and we are all still paying for that."

Nonetheless, the Conservatives were scarcely applauded for their economic performance: trust in them to run the economy fell from 44 per cent to 33 per cent between 2010 and 2015 reflecting the anaemic recovery and the stagnation of wages and living standards. Osborne missed his government's deficit reduction targets: as a result, trust in the Conservatives to reduce the budget deficit fell from 51 per cent in 2010 to 35 per cent by 2015. That said the Conservatives were notably more trusted on the deficit in southern England (40 per cent).

The mood in Britain remains markedly pessimistic seven years after the financial crisis first struck. When asked "whether children growing up in Britain today are likely to face a tougher time as adults than their parents' generation", 68 per cent agreed against seven per cent who disagreed. A majority were not confident their children or grandchildren would be as secure financially (51 to 40 per cent), able to fulfil their educational potential without incurring large debts (64 to 28 per cent), or to buy a home before they are thirty (69 to 23 per cent). The electorate's attitude today is stoic but hardly upbeat: 32 per cent expect life to be tough but they will get by; 30 per cent think they'll be "just about ok". Those currently in work were less confident they would find a job if made redundant (46 to 36 per cent), but people in the south of England are unsurprisingly somewhat more optimistic.

One voter, referring to the acute sense of economic insecurity among those on middle incomes, said: "My friends have kids and they spend a phenomenal amount of money to break even at the end of the month and they can't even go on holiday. If you work hard you should be able to go on holiday. They can't. People I know are working 60 hours a week and are still having to claim tax credits. That is unbelievable. It makes people tired and not engaged with politics." There was a feeling that the worst might now be over although life was still tough: "It's better than it was but we do struggle. We're always worried about paying the bills and we don't have anything extra left over." The so-called 'squeeze' on middle incomes had been felt acutely: "I have not had a pay rise for 20 years. My husband earns less than he did 20 years ago. My rate of pay is the same as it was in 1988. The only thing that has gone up is the prices." Labour identified the salient issue of the 'squeezed middle' after 2010, but given the perception of economic incompetence the party was not trusted to remedy the problem. Labour's campaign rhetoric focusing on zero-hours contracts highlighted issues that generally affect those on very low incomes rather than the middle.

THE LEADERSHIP QUESTION

Being leader of the opposition is a tough job, especially given the hostile media. However, the tracking surveys conducted by YouGov demonstrated that Ed Miliband was never trusted or liked by voters. Even towards the end of the election campaign, during which he was generally believed to have performed well, he was thought to be doing badly by 56 per cent of voters. This was better than at the beginning of the year, when 70 per cent thought he was doing badly. After a brief honeymoon from when he was elected leader until April 2011, his 'doing badly' rating has hardly been below 50 per cent. Similarly, YouGov figures between 2010 and 2015 show that Miliband never got above the mid-20s when voters were asked who would make the best prime minister. Cameron, although not liked, was always between 30 to 40 per cent.

The last YouGov tracker before the election, taken on 4–5 May, showed the following views about Miliband and Cameron:

Table 2.2 Miliband v Cameron: voters' views on leaders'
characteristics

Leader's characteristics Miliband % Cameron %
Sticks to what he believes in 23 27
Honest 19 12
Strong 9 21
In touch with ordinary people 26 8
Good in a crisis 5 19
Decisive 9 24
A natural leader 4 21
Charismatic 6 17
None of these 49 41
Don't know 11 8

Source: YouGov Tracker Poll, 4–5 May 2015

Although at the end of the campaign Miliband was perceived to be more honest and in touch with ordinary people than Cameron, he only scored in single figures on the key leadership qualities of 'being good in a crisis', 'decisive' and 'a natural leader'. Miliband sought to project himself as a conviction politician, but he was actually seen as less principled than Cameron, perhaps as a consequence of his transactional, focus group-driven approach to politics.

YouGov's results are not unique: all the polling companies showed similarly dire results for Miliband: Ipsos Mori's 'Political Trends' demonstrate that he was not regarded as capable enough to be prime minister. In November 2014, they found that only 13 per cent believed that Miliband was ready to be prime minister, while 73 per cent thought he was not. That finding included the majority of Labour supporters: 53 per cent said he was not ready to be prime minister with only 35 per cent saying he was. By February 2015, the numbers saying he was ready had risen, but only to 21 per cent, while 63 per cent still disagreed. In March 2015, Ipsos Mori found that 30 per cent agreed with the statement: "I do not like Ed Miliband but I like the Labour party", while 32 per cent liked neither Ed Miliband nor the Labour party. In April, only 33 per cent thought he was a capable leader and 24 per cent that he would be good in a crisis. Similarly, ICM's polls consistently found that voters thought Miliband was doing a poor job.

The verdict of our qualitative survey was equally damning: "I didn't like Miliband. If you have no confidence in the leader, then you're thinking: what are they going to do in power?" Some voters were more sympathetic given the mauling Labour's leader received from the press: "He's always fighting against a tide of being unconvincing although he's probably a good guy. His heart is in the right place." However, others objected to the manner of Miliband's leadership victory in 2010: "Ed Miliband was the wrong leader, he came in with union support and has been deluded and eccentric ... He didn't fill me with confidence or make me believe in him or the Labour party and I really, really disliked Ed Balls ... They got the wrong Miliband." There was a feeling that Labour's leadership team were rather stale and unable to present a fresh vision to the country: "The old guard like Ed Balls are past their sell-by date ... Ed Balls was not the right sort of man. The Conservatives ran rings round them."

It was also significant that Miliband's ratings were lower than those of the Labour party itself. In the months before the election, The Independent reported that: "Most polls still have Miliband hovering around the -20 per cent mark (a stark improvement over this time three or four months ago, when he was nearer -40 per cent in some approval ratings) and only Survation report that the Labour leader has ventured into the positives." The leadership question also blunted Labour's response to the accusation that it would be in a weak coalition government with the SNP at the mercy of Nicola Sturgeon: "The biggest concern I had was the SNP having a significant influence in a coalition government and using that influence, so although I disagree with a lot of what the Conservatives stood for, I would rather have a Conservative government able to stand up to the SNP."

WHAT DOES LABOUR STAND FOR?

One apparent success of Miliband's period as leader was to convey a sharper sense of what Labour stands for (see Figure 2.1). In 2011, only 40 per cent of voters were clear what Labour stood for in comparison to 58 per cent by 2015 (while 36 per cent were unclear). In the south of England, the figure rose from 37 per cent to 59 per cent. Intriguingly, Scottish voters were less clear about what Labour stood for in 2015: the figures here were 54 to 41 per cent. The problem, however, was that although voters overall felt they knew more about Labour, they did not particularly like what they heard.

Labour's leader developed a succession of arguments such as his attack on predatory capitalists and energy companies, while railing against the excesses of the wealthy. Voters knew more about what Miliband stood for, but it worried them or actively deterred them from supporting Labour. They also felt that Labour lacked a positive appeal and message, spending too much time attacking the other parties: "There was no clear message apart from being oppositional." Labour is seen as a party that no longer has the confidence to stand up for what it believes in: "They're not courageous. They don't say what they think." Younger votes in Scotland particularly felt that Labour had failed to set out a convincing alternative: "I was disappointed that Labour didn't distance themselves from the cuts. Welfare has been used as a scapegoat. Labour could have pointed that out. We heard the SNP saying they would fight for our interests. What did Labour say? Keep voting Labour and you get the cuts."

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Can Labour Win? by Patrick Diamond, Giles Radice, Penny Bochum. Copyright © 2015 Policy Network. Excerpted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc..
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Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Ri1
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2015
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 1783485442
• ISBN 13: 9781783485444
• Einband: Tapa blanda
• Anzahl der Seiten: 82
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar