Why Europe Was First: Social Change and Economic Growth in Europe and East Asia 1500-2050 (Anthem Studies in Development and Globalization, Band 2) - Softcover

Buch 3 von 6: Anthem European Studies

Ringmar, Erik

 
9781843312413: Why Europe Was First: Social Change and Economic Growth in Europe and East Asia 1500-2050 (Anthem Studies in Development and Globalization, Band 2)

Inhaltsangabe

For most of its history Europe was a thoroughly average part of the world: poor, uncouth, technologically and culturally backward. By contrast, China was always far richer, more sophisticated and advanced. Yet it was Europe that first became modern, and by the nineteenth century China was struggling to catch up. This book explains why. Why did Europe succeed and why was China left behind? The answer, as we will see, does not only solve a long-standing historical puzzle, it also provides an explanation of the contemporary success of East Asia, and it shows what is wrong with current theories of development and modernization.

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Erik Ringmar

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'A thought-provoking and well-written book that provides a unique and idiosyncratic contribution to world history.'
"Professor John M. Honson, author of 'The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization'"
'Ringmar provides the most concise and powerful explanation that I have read, and in enjoyable and skillfully-wrought prose. This is an intellectual feast.'
"Jack A. Goldstone, Hazel Professor, George Mason University"
For most of its history Europe was a thoroughly average part of the world: poor, uncouth, technologically and culturally backward. By contrast, China was always far richer, more sophisticated and advanced. Yet it was Europe that first became modern, and by the nineteenth century China was struggling to catch up. This book explains why. Why did Europe succeed and why was China left behind? The answer, as we will see, does not only solve a long-standing historical puzzle, it also provides an explanation of the contemporary success of East Asia, and it shows what is wrong with current theories of development and modernization.
Erik Ringmar teaches political economy and cultural sociology at National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan. He received a PhD from Yale University in 1993 and between 1995 and 2006 he taught at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His "Surviving Capitalism: How We Learned to Live with the Market and Remained Almost Human "was published by Anthem Press in 2005.

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Why Europe Was First

Social Change and Economic Growth in Europe and East Asia 1500-2050

By Erik Ringmar

Wimbledon Publishing Company

Copyright © 2007 Erik Ringmar
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-84331-241-3

Contents

the logic,
1. The Nature & Origin of Modern Society, 1,
2. The Failure & Success of East Asia, 13,
3. The Self-Transforming Machine, 27,
reflection,
4. The Discovery of Distance, 43,
5. The Face in the Mirror, 61,
6. Institutions that Reflect, 75,
entrepreneurship,
7. Origins of the Entrepreneurial Outlook, 95,
8. The Age of the Demiurge, 113,
9. Institutions that Get Things Done, 131,
pluralism,
10. A World in Pieces, 151,
11. The Polite Alternative, 171,
12. Institutions that Deal with Conflicts, 187,
european paths to modernity,
13. Institutions & Revolutions, 205,
China,
14. Reflection, 221,
15. Entrepreneurship, 243,
16. Pluralism, 259,
17. Europe & China Compared, 275,
reform & revolution in Japan & China,
18. Foreign Challenges, Japanese Responses, 293,
19. Japan & China in a Modern World, 309,
the future of modern society,
20. The New Politics of Modernization, 325,
Notes, 339,
Bibliography, 369,
Index, 393,


CHAPTER 1

The Nature & Origin of Modern Society

For most of their existence there was nothing particularly unique about European societies. In medieval Europe everybody, or nearly everybody, was a peasant, poor and illiterate with a life expectancy at birth of perhaps 35 years. The few tools that existed in peasant society required a heavy input of manpower, productivity was low and the occasional surplus was quickly gobbled up by a small, oppressive elite. What passed for science was, even among the educated, hopelessly confused with superstition and most aspects of life were heavily influenced by custom and by an all- pervasive Church. Medieval society was not static, to be sure, but changes when they occurred were ad hoc and coincidental; stability was the social norm if not always a social reality.

Then something happened which in a comparatively short time made European societies radically different both from previous versions of themselves and from other societies. Agriculture became more productive; people moved to cities to work in factories which used increasingly sophisticated production techniques; people's life expectancy increased, education improved, and science made rapid and amazing progress. Instead of being slaves to nature, the Europeans became nature's masters, and instead of living side by side with other cultures, they set off to conquer the world. No longer ad hoc and coincidental, change became continuous and progressive. This restless, ruthless, expanding and ever-changing world is the modern Western world as we know it now.

Compare East Asia. Countries such as China and Japan were always at least as "sophisticated" and "advanced" as those of Europe. In the sixteenth century the first European visitors to this part of the world acknowledged as much and were profoundly impressed with the power and wealth of East Asian rulers and with the good manners and discipline of their subjects. Yet history took quite a different turn in this part of the world. When Europe began changing rapidly, especially in the nineteenth century, East Asia seemed to remain much the same. This "failure" to emulate European examples attracted comment from observers as diverse as John Stuart Mill and G W F Hegel. Looking at their own part of the world the Europeans saw change everywhere; looking at the East they saw nothing but "stagnation" and "the despotism of custom."

Although we today are unlikely to endorse these particular conclusions, the puzzle itself remains. The differences between East Asia and Europe increased dramatically in the course of the nineteenth century. The most obvious indicator of this sudden gap is perhaps the new style of European imperialism. When sustained contact with East Asia was first established in the sixteenth century the European presence there was limited. Foreigners were banned from Japanese soil between 1639 and 1868 and in China they were strictly controlled by the authorities. In the nineteenth century, however, Europeans returned with far more ambitious plans and with the troops and gunboats to back them up. While neither China nor Japan was ever colonized formally, from this time onward elites in both countries began struggling hard to somehow "catch up" with the technically far more proficient barbarians.

This contrast gives rise to a number of questions. The most obvious ones concern why and how: Why was Europe suddenly able to develop so rapidly and how did the transformation happen? What conjunction of factors made it possible for this particular part of the world to break so radically with its past and to become so different from other societies? And why did the transformation not first take place in China or Japan which, by all accounts, were at least as well positioned for a similar take-off? These historical questions concern the nature and origin of what has come to be called a "modern" society. What makes a society modern? Why have some societies been able to modernize more quickly and effortlessly than others? The aim of this book is to answer these questions.


'Modernity' and 'The Modern'

More needs to be said about the idea of the modern. In the history of ideas references to "the modern," or a "modern age," first appear in the work of Humanist scholars of the Renaissance, and their use of the term was almost always polemical. The aim behind the phrase was to draw as sharp a contrast as possible between the activities of the Humanists themselves and the traditional Scholastic philosophers associated with the universities and the Church. The Humanists were people who admired the achievements of classical Greece and Rome and they were highly critical of the ignorance and superstition of contemporary Europeans. They believed that things could improve if only the glories of the ancients could somehow be revived, and if the future were modeled on Antiquity. The intervening period — what came to be known as the "middle ages" — could then be dismissed as an embarrassing age of darkness. The people who devoted themselves to this subversive antiquarianism were known as "the moderns."

The more the Humanists learned about the classical civilizations, the more multifaceted and realistic their picture of them became. As some of the moderns came to realize, there were actually a large number of things that the ancients did not know, could not do or had not discovered. As the English philosopher Francis Bacon pointed out in the early seventeenth century, the Greeks and the Romans knew nothing about gunpowder, the compass and the printing press. All three were recent inventions, achievements of the modern age. This ability to invent new, previously un-heard of, things gradually came to change the relationship to the ancient world. As Bacon explained, antiquity "deserves that reverence, that man should make a stand thereupon, and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make progression." From the seventeenth century onwards the future became more important than the past and the Europeans increasingly looked forward rather than backward.

In the course of the eighteenth century this forward- looking optimism was translated into a new account of...

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