Reasoning as Memory (Current Issues in Thinking and Reasoning) - Softcover

Softcover

ISBN 10: 184872148X ISBN 13: 9781848721487

Verlag: Routledge, 2014

Inhaltsangabe

There is a growing acknowledgement of the importance of integrating the study of reasoning with other areas of cognitive psychology. The purpose of this volume is to examine the extent to which we can further our understanding of reasoning by integrating findings, theories and paradigms in the field of memory.

Reasoning as Memory consists of nine chapters that make explicit links between basic memory process, and reasoning and decision-making. The contributors address a number of key topics including:

• the relationship between semantic memory and reasoning
• the role of expert memory in reasoning
• recognition memory and induction
• working memory and reasoning
• metamemory in reasoning.

In addition, the chapters provide broad coverage of the field of thinking, and invite the intriguing question of how much there is left to explain in the field of reasoning when one has extracted the variance due to memory.

This book will be of great interest to advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and researchers interested in reasoning or decision making, and to researchers interested in the role played in cognition by a variety of memory processes.

Über diesen Titel

Über die Autorin bzw. den Autor

Aidan Feeney is Senior Lecturer at Queen’s University Belfast, UK. His research interests include thinking in children and adults, including inductive reasoning, decision making, and counterfactual thinking and regret.

Valerie A. Thompson is Professor of Psychology at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. Her research interests include intuitive judgments, thinking and decision making, and metacognition.

Details zur Ausgabe

• Verlag: Routledge
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2014
• Sprache: Englisch
• ISBN 10: 184872148X
• ISBN 13: 9781848721487
• Einband: Tapa blanda
• Auflage: 1
• Anzahl der Seiten: 202
• Herausgeber: Feeney Aidan
• Kontakt zum Hersteller: Nicht verfügbar
• Verantwortliche Person: Nicht verfügbar