Inhaltsangabe
"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo- gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni- tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy- value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any- thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in- volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be- havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main- tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Reseña del editor
"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Weitere beliebte Ausgaben desselben Titels
Suchergebnisse für Action Control: From Cognition to Behavior (Springer...
Beispielbild für diese ISBN
Action Control: From Cognition to Behavior (Springer Series in Social Psychology)
Anbieter: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Vereinigtes Königreich
Verkäuferbewertung 5 von 5 Sternen
Zustand: Poor. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In poor condition, suitable as a reading copy. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,650grams, ISBN:354013445X. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9767158
Gebraucht kaufen
EUR 87,88
Versand:
EUR 28,49
Von Vereinigtes Königreich nach USA
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar