Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all(-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Sharon Pfister obtained a master's degree in economics and a teaching diploma at the University of St. Gallen, where she continues to work as a lecturer after finishing her Ph.D. in this topic. Motivated by a strong interest in understanding social interactions and society, her work reflects her curiosity in exploring conflicting interests; as well as her passion for making possible explanations accessible to a broad audience.
Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all(-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power.
Contents
n Winner-Takes-All-Contest
n Mutual Deterrence
n Bargaining Theory
Target Groups
· Researchers and students in disciplines Economics, International Relations and History
· Theoretical conflict researchers and security experts
The Author(s)
Sharon Pfister obtained a master's degree in economics and a teaching diploma at the University of St. Gallen, where she continues to work as a lecturer after finishing her Ph.D. in this topic.
Motivated by a strong interest in understanding social interactions and society, her work reflects her curiosity in exploring conflicting interests; as well as her passion for making possible explanations accessible to a broad audience.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 21058210-n
Anzahl: 15 verfügbar
Anbieter: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, USA
Paperback. Zustand: new. Paperback. Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all (-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power. Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9783658039523
Anbieter: Chiron Media, Wallingford, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 6666-IUK-9783658039523
Anzahl: 10 verfügbar
Anbieter: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all (-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power. 143 pp. Englisch. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9783658039523
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In English. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ria9783658039523_new
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 21058210-n
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Books Puddle, Woodside, NY, USA
Zustand: New. pp. xvi + 143 2013th edition. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 26142296916
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. xvi + 143 41 Illus. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 135067787
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 2013 edition. 159 pages. 8.20x5.80x0.34 inches. In Stock. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers x-3658039523
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Deutschland
Zustand: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. xvi + 143. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 18142296926
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar