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Vickrey Auction: Auction, William Vickrey, English Auction, Incentive compatibility, Uniform Price Auction - Softcover

 
9786131111068: Vickrey Auction: Auction, William Vickrey, English Auction, Incentive compatibility, Uniform Price Auction
Softcover
ISBN 10: 6131111065 ISBN 13: 9786131111068
Verlag: OmniScriptum, 2010

Inhaltsangabe

Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. A Vickrey auction is a type of sealed-bid auction, where bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins, but the price paid is the second-highest bid. The auction was created by William Vickrey. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction, and gives bidders an incentive to bid their true value. Vickrey''s original paper considered only auctions where a single, indivisible good is being sold. In this case, the terms Vickrey auction and second-price sealed-bid auction are equivalent, and are used interchangeably. When multiple identical units (or a divisible good) are being sold in a single auction, the most obvious generalization is to have all winning bidders pay the amount of the highest non-winning bid. This is known as a uniform price auction. The uniform-price auction does not, however, result in bidders bidding their true valuations as they do in a second-price auction unless each bidder has demand for only a single unit.

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Reseña del editor

Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. A Vickrey auction is a type of sealed-bid auction, where bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins, but the price paid is the second-highest bid. The auction was created by William Vickrey. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction, and gives bidders an incentive to bid their true value. Vickrey''s original paper considered only auctions where a single, indivisible good is being sold. In this case, the terms Vickrey auction and second-price sealed-bid auction are equivalent, and are used interchangeably. When multiple identical units (or a divisible good) are being sold in a single auction, the most obvious generalization is to have all winning bidders pay the amount of the highest non-winning bid. This is known as a uniform price auction. The uniform-price auction does not, however, result in bidders bidding their true valuations as they do in a second-price auction unless each bidder has demand for only a single unit.

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Verlag
OmniScriptum
Erscheinungsdatum
2010
Sprache
Englisch
ISBN 10 
6131111065
ISBN 13 
9786131111068
Einband
Tapa blanda
Anzahl der Seiten
80
Herausgeber
Surhone Lambert M., Timpledon Miriam T., Marseken Susan F.
Kontakt zum Hersteller
Nicht verfügbar
Verantwortliche Person
Nicht verfügbar