This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.
The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Satish K. Jain is Professor at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, India. He did his Master’s in Economics from Delhi School of Economics, and Ph.D. from the University of Rochester, USA. His areas of interest are law and economics, and social choice theory.
This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.
The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, USA
Paperback or Softback. Zustand: New. Economic Analysis of Liability Rules. Book. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers BBS-9788132235026
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 27004514-n
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: California Books, Miami, FL, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers I-9788132235026
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italien
Zustand: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 03c15e49e76cd9cbd18795e6090a2aa3
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ria9788132235026_new
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Chiron Media, Wallingford, Vereinigtes Königreich
PF. Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 6666-IUK-9788132235026
Anzahl: 10 verfügbar
Anbieter: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled. 192 pp. Englisch. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9788132235026
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 27004514-n
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Books Puddle, New York, NY, USA
Zustand: New. pp. 192 Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2015 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 26378098888
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 192. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 385805079
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar