Conventional wisdom dictates that a fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical. However, contrary to this conventional views, recent research has demonstrated that fiscal policy is actually procyclical in most developing countries. In this book, we attempt to propose a new interpretation of this procyclicality after reviewing theoretical and empirical evolution of the research. In particular, by incorporating the political effort behavior of private agents into a weak government model, we explore how income fluctuations affect the optimal budget deficits in a political economy. If the government can control the political behavior, normally, the optimal budget deficit should rise in a recession as a first-best case; however, interestingly, a recession does not necessarily prompt an increase in the budget deficits in a second-best political economy. The response of the budget deficits to income fluctuations mainly depends on the efficiency of political effort, which may correspond to the degree of democracy and bureaucratic efficiency of the governments. We test the prediction of the pro-cyclical fiscal policy and find it applicable for democratic countries with semi-efficient governments including Japan.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Toshihiro Ihori is a special professor of economics at the National Gradual Institute for Policy Studies and a professor emeritus of The University of Tokyo. He is an Academic Advisor of the Research Institute of Capital Formation, Development Bank of Japan. He has a B.A. and a M.A. from The University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins University. His major field of research is public economics. Details are at the web site of the National Gradual Institute for Policy Studies.
Keigo Kameda is a Professor of Economics at School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University. His main areas of research are public finance and macroeconomic policies. Born in 1970, Prof. Kameda received a Bachelor’s degree in Economics at Keio University in 1993 and a Ph.D. in Economics at Keio University in 2014. He was appointed Professor of Economics at School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University in 2015.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italien
Zustand: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers C5GEOKMMOL
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: As New. Unread book in perfect condition. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 33848420
Anzahl: 15 verfügbar
Anbieter: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Conventional wisdom dictates that a fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical. However, contrary to this conventional views, recent research has demonstrated that fiscal policy is actually procyclical in most developing countries. In this book, we attempt to propose a new interpretation of this procyclicality after reviewing theoretical and empirical evolution of the research. In particular, by incorporating the political effort behavior of private agents into a weak government model, we explore how income fluctuations affect the optimal budget deficits in a political economy. If the government can control the political behavior, normally, the optimal budget deficit should rise in a recession as a first-best case; however, interestingly, a recession does not necessarily prompt an increase in the budget deficits in a second-best political economy. The response of the budget deficits to income fluctuations mainly depends on the efficiency of political effort, which may correspond to the degree of democracy and bureaucratic efficiency of the governments. We test the prediction of the pro-cyclical fiscal policy and find it applicable for democratic countries with semi-efficient governments including Japan. 84 pp. Englisch. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9789811329944
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 33848420-n
Anzahl: 15 verfügbar
Anbieter: Books Puddle, Woodside, NY, USA
Zustand: New. pp. 81. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 26381951113
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Vereinigtes Königreich
Paperback. Zustand: Brand New. 84 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.16 inches. In Stock. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers x-981132994X
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. Print on Demand pp. 81. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 380871510
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: moluna, Greven, Deutschland
Zustand: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Develops a new and plausible explanation as to why and when governments should control the budget deficits procyclicallyEmpirically shows how democratic economies whose government functions weakly should adopt procyclical fiscal p. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 256833226
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Deutschland
Zustand: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 81. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 18381951107
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Conventional wisdom dictates that a fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical. However, contrary to this conventional views, recent research has demonstrated that fiscal policy is actually procyclical in most developing countries. In this book, we attempt to propose a new interpretation of this procyclicality after reviewing theoretical and empirical evolution of the research. In particular, by incorporating the political effort behavior of private agents into a weak government model, we explore how income fluctuations affect the optimal budget deficits in a political economy. If the government can control the political behavior, normally, the optimal budget deficit should rise in a recession as a first-best case; however, interestingly, a recession does not necessarily prompt an increase in the budget deficits in a second-best political economy. The response of the budget deficits to income fluctuations mainly depends on the efficiency of political effort, which may correspond to the degree of democracy and bureaucratic efficiency of the governments. We test the prediction of the pro-cyclical fiscal policy and find it applicable for democratic countries with semi-efficient governments including Japan. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9789811329944
Anzahl: 1 verfügbar