This book defends a novel view of mental representation—of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs—beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves—given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective?
The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from thesame commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions—as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes—as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought.
Die Inhaltsangabe kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Nicholas Rimell is a lecturer in philosophy at the School of Philosophy and Sociology at Jilin University (Changchun, China). His research is in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, as well as philosophy of language and ethics. He is especially interested in where these areas of philosophy come together.
It is commonly held that our beliefs are attitudes towards propositions, and that a belief’s truth value (true or false) depends on the truth value of the proposition toward which it is an attitude. From this plausible view Rimell builds a theory of mental representation with two striking features. First, our “I” beliefs have private content―content that only a single subject can entertain. Second, it is impossible to think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus, the fountain of youth). In light of the latter claim, Rimell offers an error theory meant to explain what we are doing when we think we’re thinking about nonexistents. To non-specialists, this book serves as a clear, careful introduction to central questions at the intersection of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind: Are thought and meaning entirely in the head? What’s special about first-personal thought and speech? How (if at all) can we think about nonexistents, given that prima facie thinking involves a relation between a subject and an object of thought? To specialists, this book is designed to challenge the standard ways of thinking about these questions and to offer a unified response to them.
„Über diesen Titel“ kann sich auf eine andere Ausgabe dieses Titels beziehen.
Anbieter: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, USA
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ABLIING23Apr0412070092285
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, USA
Paperback. Zustand: new. Paperback. This book defends a novel view of mental representationof how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefsbeliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselvesgiven that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective? The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from thesame commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositionsas the things towards which our beliefs are attitudesas talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought. This book defends a novel view of mental representationof how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9789811635199
Anbieter: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. In. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers ria9789811635199_new
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar
Anbieter: Chiron Media, Wallingford, Vereinigtes Königreich
PF. Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 6666-IUK-9789811635199
Anzahl: 10 verfügbar
Anbieter: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Deutschland
Taschenbuch. Zustand: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs-beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves-given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from the same commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions-as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes-as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought. 232 pp. Englisch. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 9789811635199
Anzahl: 2 verfügbar
Anbieter: Books Puddle, New York, NY, USA
Zustand: New. 1st ed. 2021 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 26396343481
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irland
Zustand: New. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers V9789811635199
Anzahl: 15 verfügbar
Anbieter: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Vereinigtes Königreich
Zustand: New. Print on Demand. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 401082214
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Deutschland
Zustand: New. PRINT ON DEMAND. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 18396343475
Anzahl: 4 verfügbar
Anbieter: moluna, Greven, Deutschland
Zustand: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we. Bestandsnummer des Verkäufers 702287872
Anzahl: Mehr als 20 verfügbar