Absolute and Relative Gains in the American Decision to Release Nuclear Weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Historical Case Study

The question of whether states pursue absolute or relative gains has divided neo-realism and neo-liberalism for quite some time now. Thus whereas neo-realists contend that states seek comparative advantages relative to others, neo-liberal scholars argue that they are primarily interested in absolute individual gains. In applying social-constructivist ideas, however, this book will demonstrate that such a preference for relative or absolute gains is not naturally predetermined, but inextricably linked to the continual 're-construction' of states' national identities and interests. By analyzing the Truman Administration's decision for using nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, this case study will show that American leaders were much more preoccupied with achieving absolute rather than relative gains. Such absolute considerations were influenced by the pressures of an anarchic self-help system, specific domestic imperatives and the personal views of individual policy-makers who believed that only swift socio-economic recovery and the creation of a more peaceful security environment would ultimately ensure their country's long-term international position.

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Chapter I. Theoretical Framework:
1.1 Neo-realist and Neo-liberal Views
The terms relative and absolute gains are often employed by IR scholars as two discrete analytical categories characterized more by their inherent dichotomy than the possible interrelation of their underlying propositions. Thus neo-liberalism assumes states to share a natural preference for absolute or individual gains in their interactions with other nations, independent of those achieved by others. More specifically, they are above all interested in enhancing their own national power, prosperity and well-being, leading them to consider matters of international import in "strictly individualistic terms" so as to ensure their own highest possible payoff. As Jospeh Grieco succinctly recapitulated that position, neo-liberalism essentially expects states to "calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of [their own] preferences."
These views sharply contrast with those put forward by neo-realism or structural realism. Particularly, neo-realists contend that states' primary objective is "not to attain the highest possible individual gain or payoff, [but] to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities." Accordingly, Kenneth Waltz argued that since nation-states want to maintain their relative position within the international system in order to improve their security and thus ensure their survival, it is only once the latter has been assured that they can turn to "such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power." Although offensive realists part with defensive neo-realism in that they regard power maximization as the main driving force in international politics, they likewise assert that relative gains-concerns ultimately outweigh absolute gains-considerations in actors' political thinking. Hence both branches of neo-realism hold that states first examine the effects of their decisions on their relative position vis-à-vis international rivals, and thus essentially only thereafter their impact on domestic and/or socio-economic matters (absolute gains).
While neo-liberalists typically stress the salience of absolute gains, neo-realists do, however, by no means underestimate the value of absolute capabilities for states' security, survival and/or power accumulation. Yet in contrast to neo-liberalism, they believe that concerns over absolute gains alone are altogether insufficient in accounting for states' behaviour in international relations. Consequently, they not only add, but also attach greater significance to relative gains-considerations in their analysis. Although the realist contention that political units invariably favour relative over absolute gains is certainly disputable- and ultimately untenable as a general assumption about states' preferences in any strategic situation , the neoliberal notion that states are insensitive to how they fare in relation to other nations appears even less plausible. After all, it is unreasonable to suppose that states are unconcerned about balance of power-relations or others' offensive capabilities even as they themselves are seeking to enhance their position within the international system.
In any event, however, it is premature to trace such a presumed sensitivity to absolute or relative gains to states' a priori preferences for them. Instead the latter must be seen as a direct function of their specific strategic environment. In so doing, Robert Powell may be right that the competitive nature of the international system imposes severe structural constraints on states' activities, causing any desire at augmenting their absolute capabilities to often give way to more acute concerns over relative gains. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to infer from that reality that states' international surroundings will by default compel them to prioritize relative over absolute advantages. Relative gains-concerns undeni