Is Christian belief rationally acceptable? Must every Christian defend his or her beliefs with exhaustively logical arguments, or is belief solely a matter of faith rather than logical argument? In Communities of Informed Judgment, Frederick D. Aquino offers an alternative route, showing how John Henry Newman's notion of the illative sense of reasoning paves a way for constructing a fresh account of the rationality of Christian belief. Moving beyond both modern and postmodern accounts of rationality, Aquino constructs a proposal of informed judgment, blending Newman's notion of the illative sense of reasoning with recent work in social and virtue epistemology.

The first part of the book focuses primarily on Newman's treatment of the illative sense in the Grammar of Assent, with the University Sermons as a backdrop. The second part addresses the problem of securing a common standard of justification. Though Newman acknowledges the social and communal facets of judgment, his focus is primarily on the personal dimension. Aquino develops Newman's insights into a social epistemology of informed judgment, transposing the problem of common measure into a problem of trusting the illative sense as a reliable belief-forming process in communities of informed judgment.

An original contribution to Newman studies, the book has an interdisciplinary focus, drawing from recent work in social epistemology, virtue epistemology, and cognitive science. It also takes up issues relevant to the philosophy of religion, epistemology of religious belief, systematic theology, ecumenical dialogue, and studies in John Henry Newman.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Frederick D. Aquino is Assistant Professor of Theology at Abilene Christian University. He serves on the editorial boards of Newman Studies Journal and Christian Higher Education, and is the editor of

Journal for Case Teaching.

PRAISE FOR THE BOOK:

"An important contribution to Newman studies and to the systematic theological investigation of belief formation by merging 'Newman's account of the illative sense with insights from recent work in social and virtue epistemology.' "—Michael C. Martin,

Anglican Theological Review

"[A] well-executed retrieval and expansion of Newman's concept of the illative sense using the resources of contemporary epistemology in the analytic philosophical tradition."—J.A. Colombo, Theological Studies

"Aquino offers invaluable insights into Newman's argument concerning how the formative experiences encountered by an individual within these larger communities contribute to his or her understanding of the relationship shared by faith and reason."- Todd C. Ream,

Catholic Books Review

"This is a significant work that seeks to encourage a fuller understanding of Newman's thought and the coming to faith. It is highly recommended for serious students of theology."-Lucien J. Richard, OMI Catholic Library World

"Frederick D. Aquino has done justice to the complexity of Newman's thought and demonstrated its continuing relevance for theology, epistemology and ethics. He moves confidently between Newman's most important writings on the nature of truth, and the work of contemporary theorists, especially in the field of virtue ethics. His study illuminates aspects of Newman's thought that have often gone unnoticed and gives him a voice in the ongoing debate about the way in which individuals and communities ascertain the truth. By augmenting and challenging Newman's insights with the results of contemporary research, Aquino opens up new perspectives for both Newman studies and theological epistemology."—Prof. Terrence Merrigan, Faculty of Theology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

"By drawing out the communal notions found just beneath the surface of Newman's thou

Communities of Informed Judgment

Newman's Illative Sense and Accounts of RationalityBy Frederick D. Aquino

The Catholic University of America Press

Copyright © 2004 The Catholic University of America Press
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8132-1364-4

Contents

Acknowledgments................................................................ix1. Re-reading Newman...........................................................12. University Sermons: A Preliminary Investigation.............................143. Cultivating Personal Judgment: A Methodological Dilemma.....................484. A Social Epistemology of Informed Judgment..................................945. Shaping Communities of Theological Judgment.................................147References.....................................................................165Index..........................................................................177

Chapter One

Re-reading Newman

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Under what conditions is it appropriate to think of Christian belief as rationally acceptable? Recent scholarly developments furnish new resources for tackling this important question. Such efforts do not suggest dissatisfaction with the process of human rational reflection itself, but they reveal a growing dissatisfaction with scholarly treatments of the nature and scope of human cognition. There has been a tendency, for example, to think of Christian belief either as based on canons of strictly deductive and inductive logic or as based on faith. Recent accounts of rationality, however, expand options for understanding the process of belief-formation. The aim is to carve out broader and more refined accounts of rationality that reflect the actual conditions under which Christians form and sustain beliefs.

New accounts of rationality consider various factors that shape the process of belief-formation. Some accounts, for instance, explore the role of non-rule-governed judgments in forming, evaluating, and sustaining beliefs. As Harold Brown points out, "a growing number of philosophers, including philosophers of science, have been slowly coming to the conclusion that we can not make sense of human knowledge without recognizing the role that judgement plays at key epistemic junctures." The focus on judgment recognizes that rule-governed procedures of reasoning, though important, do not capture fully the nature and scope of human cognition. Rational assessment of beliefs requires acquisition of knowledge and skills in different domains of knowledge. In practicing good cognitive habits, people of informed judgment learn how to detect key clues for evaluating evidence in concrete situations.

Part of the task involves understanding the social context in which people refine cognitive skills and cultivate informed judgment about particulars. Focus on the social dimension of reasoning recognizes both the domain-specificity of human cognition and the impact of environment on cognitive development. Reducing human cognition to what goes on in the head fails to account for social conditions under which people form and sustain beliefs. Cognitive development requires distribution of labor, not simply the activity of a brain isolated from the influence of other cognitive agents. It depends on the human capacity "to diffuse achieved knowledge and practical wisdom through complex social structures, and to reduce the loads on individual brains by locating those brains in complex webs of linguistic, social, political, and institutional constraints." By calling into question the notion of disembodied cognition, emphasis on the social nature of reasoning explores the process by which cognitive agents shape maturation of reasoning within real-world environments. People learn to reason under the tutelage of exemplars of cognitive excellence; they hone cognitive capacities in order to reason proficiently in a domain of knowledge. Proficiency in reasoning, therefore, stems from induction into a community with vibrant practices, nurtured by exemplars of skillful judgment.

In An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, John Henry Newman makes a similar point in discussing the nature, function, and scope of the illative sense. His proposal shows a strong preference for an empirical study of human cognition; a real-world environment is the context from which we evaluate cognitive performance and determine whether beliefs are rationally acceptable. The stress here is compatible with the focus on the concrete nature of human cognition. Accounts of human cognition consider constraints under which people reason within everyday events (e.g., limited time and knowledge). Consequently, cognitive success depends on the capacity to employ information effectively within real-world environments. Securing reliable channels of informed judgment plays an indispensable role in achieving epistemic goals and in refining cognitive performance.

Rethinking Judgment

Newman's notion of the illative sense paves the way for the construction of a fresh account of the rationality of Christian belief. It attempts to "steer a middle path between reducing religion to a matter of emotion or sentiment and reducing argumentation to a formal logical or deductive reasoning." Newman's project focuses on the informal and tacit dimension of reasoning, shaped by experience and personal insight. In dealing with the rationality of Christian belief, most accounts of rationality have focused their attention on determining whether a certain proposition yields rationally acceptable beliefs. Some accounts, however, have recently explored how a community context facilitates development of intellectual virtues and how these qualities contribute to the process of forming and sustaining beliefs. Newman understands such activity as the cultivation of personal judgment, which requires mastery of a concrete field of knowledge and enhancement of cognitive skills. He challenges the claim that beliefs are rationally acceptable if and only if demonstrative proof is forthcoming. Evidence can be seen from various perspectives; antecedent assumptions, training, experience, and moral disposition influence evaluation of evidence. In addition, belief-formation is a cumulative process of investigation: Christians form, evaluate, and sustain beliefs by accumulating different material (e.g., testimony, tradition, experience, and Scripture). The illative sense sifts, evaluates, and integrates various pieces of evidence into a synthetic judgment and furnishes concrete answers to specific questions.

The Grammar contains the most explicit formulation of the illative sense and gives considerable attention to how personal judgment shapes the process of belief-formation. As a complex belief-producing process, the illative sense enables people to be certain about concrete matters without epistemic access to how the mind justifies knowledge. Explicit awareness of the grounds of belief is not a precondition for forming rationally acceptable beliefs. Though the illative sense connects various pieces of data, its manner of concluding does not follow strictly a rule-governed process of inquiry.

In highlighting the domain-specificity of judgment, Newman notes the difficulty of furnishing a common measure independent of cognitive practices. The personal nature of the illative sense of reasoning complicates the search for a common ground by which radically different communities can adjudicate truth claims. Though his proposal makes sense of intellectual...