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Inhaltsangabe: Winner of the 9984 Leslie T. Wilkins Award for the best book in criminology and criminal justice.
Bookmaking, numbers, and loansharking are reputed to be major sources of revenue for organized crime, controlled by the "visible hand" of violence. For years this belief has formed the basis of government policy toward illegal markets. Drawing on police files, confiscated records, and interviews with police, prosecutors, and criminal informants, Reuter systematically refutes the notion that the Mafia, by using political connections and the threat of violence, controls the major illegal markets. Instead, he suggests that the cost of suppressing competition has ensured that these markets are populated with small enterprises, many of them marginal and ephemeral.
Peter Reuter is a Senior Economist at the Rand Corporation. Disorganized Crime is included in The MIT Press Series on Organization Studies, edited by John Van Maanen.
Buchbeschreibung MIT Press, Cambridge, England, U.K., 1986. Trade Paperback. Buchzustand: Near Fine. No Jacket. Reprint. Winner of an award for the best book in criminology and criminal justice, this book applies economic theory to the study of illegal markets and refutes the notion that the Mafia, through political corruption and the threat of violence, controls the major illegal markets; instead the author, who was research director of a national advisory commission on gambling, finds that the cost of suppressing competition ensures that these markets are not centrally controlled but populated with small enterprises, many of them marginal and ephemeral (red & brown pictorial cover with white lettering, slight edge wear; otherwise a bright, clean, tight copy). Buchnummer des Verkäufers 005502
Buchbeschreibung The MIT Press, 1985. Paperback. Buchzustand: New. Buchnummer des Verkäufers P110262680483