Gung Ho: The Corps' Most Progressive Tradition. Dieser Artikel ist nicht verfügbar.Gung Ho: The Corps' Most Progressive Tradition

The machinegun's terrible WWI toll should have made all nations' small-unit tactics more surprise-oriented, but U.S. squads are still stuck with firepower-and-control-enhancing maneuvers. Until their parent units are allowed to develop a few of the less predictable (nonstandardized) kind, U.S. grunts and special operators must depend on history for better technique. "Gung Ho!" contains highly advanced (but then quickly forgotten) formations and movements from their own history. The most action-packed of all the Posterity Press titles, it first shows how the fire team concept was copied from the Chinese by Lt.Col. Carlson. Then it follows his Marine Raiders (and their infantry successors) through some of the heaviest fighting of WWII and Vietnam. While many of their buddy and fire team "plays" are no longer in use, they should be. Without them, today's electronics-draped riflemen have little chance of secretly assaulting any defender. The Pentagon's new plan to use tiny groups of GIs as force multipliers throughout Africa will not work without this kind of light-infantry expertise. While Carlson's Raiders were conducting Maneuver Warfare at the squad level on Guadalcanal, America's most elite special operators still cannot. 4th Raider Bn. (also Maoist in format) discovered how line infantry units needed no tanks, airstrikes, or artillery to take advanced strongpoint matrices. Its redesignation--2nd Bn., 4th Marines--did so at the Sugar Loaf Complex on Okinawa. Only necessary was a staggered row of fire teams "working together" from within parallel lanes. With 111 illustrations and many firsthand accounts, this book will be hard to put down.

After 28 years of commissioned and noncommissioned infantry service, John Poole retired from the United States Marine Corps in April 1993. While on active duty, he studied small-unit tactics for nine years: (1) six months at the Basic School in Quantico (1966); (2) seven months as a rifle platoon commander in Vietnam (1966-67); (3) three months as a rifle company commander at Camp Pendleton (1967); (4) five months as a regimental headquarters company (and camp) commander in Vietnam (1968); (5) eight months as a rifle company commander in Vietnam (1968-69); (6) five and a half years as an instructor with the Advanced Infantry Training Company (AITC) at Camp Lejeune (1986-92); and (7) one year as the Staff Noncommissioned Officer in Charge of the 3rd Marine Division Combat Squad Leaders Course (CSLC) on Okinawa (1992-93). While at AITC, he developed, taught, and refined courses on maneuver warfare, land navigation, fire support coordination, call for fire, adjust fire, close air support, M203 grenade launcher, movement to contact, daylight attack, night attack, infiltration, defense, offensive Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), defensive MOUT, Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) defense, and leadership. While at CSLC, he further refined the same periods of instruction and developed others on patrolling. He has completed all of the correspondence school requirements for the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Naval War College (1,000-hour curriculum), and Marine Corps Warfighting Skills Program. He is a graduate of the Camp Lejeune Instructional Management Course, the 2nd Marine Division Skill Leaders in Advanced Marksmanship (SLAM) Course, and the East-Coast School of Infantry Platoon Sergeants' Course. In the 18 years since retirement, John Poole has researched the small-unit tactics of other nations and written eleven other books: (1) The Last Hundred Yards, a squad combat study based on the consensus opinions of 1,200 NCOs and casualty statistics of AITC and CSLC field trials; (2) One More Bridge to Cross, a treatise on enemy proficiency at short range and how to match it; (3) Phantom Soldier, an in-depth look at the highly deceptive Asian style of war; (4) The Tiger's Way, the fighting styles of Eastern fire teams and soldiers; (5) Tactics of the Crescent Moon, insurgent procedures in Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq; (6) Militant Tricks, an honest appraisal of the so-far-undefeated jihadist method; (7) Terrorist Trail, tracing the jihadists in Iraq back to their home countries; (8) Dragon Days, an unconventional warfare technique manual; (9) Tequila Junction, how to fight narco-guerrillas; (10) Homeland Siege, confronting the 4GW assault by a foreign power's organized-crime proxies; and (11) Expeditionary Eagles, outmaneuvering the Taliban. As of September 2010, John Poole had conducted multiday training sessions (on 4GW squad tactics) at 40 (mostly Marine) battalions, nine Marine schools, and seven special-operations units from all four U.S. service branches. Since 2000, he has done research in Mainland China (twice), North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, India (twice), Pakistan (twice), Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Tanzania, Venezuela, and Sri Lanka. Over the course of his lifetime, he has visited scores of other nations on all five continents. He tried to visit Lahore in the late Spring of 2011. The Pakistani visa request was not honored. Between early tours in the Marine Corps (from 1969 to 1971), John Poole worked as a criminal investigator for the Illinois Bureau of Investigation (IBI). After attending the State Police Academy for several months in Springfield, he was assigned to the IBI's Chicago office. There, he worked mostly on general criminal and drug cases.